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Abstract
This thesis consists of two self-contained studies in Debt Valuation Adjustments
(DVAs). The first study is motivated by the debate about the introduction of the
Fair Value Option for financial Liabilities (FVOL) and the requirement to recog-
nize and separately disclose DVAs in financial statements. This study investigates
what we can learn regarding own credit risk from DVAs. Using a sample of U.S.
bank holding companies that adopt the FVOL, we show that DVAs generally can-
not be explained by the same factors that explain contemporaneous changes in
the credit quality of these institutions. These results may be driven by the op-
portunistic use of the FVOL or the superior ability of managers to estimate own
credit risk. Further tests indicate that DVAs for fair value Level 3 reporters can
explain future changes in credit risk, providing support for the latter explanation.
The second study compares the reported Debt Valuation Adjustments provided by
managers with the estimated DVAs based on market information. To obtain the
Abstract ii
estimated DVAs we use two structural credit risk models: the Merton (1974) model
and the Leland (1994) model. We find that the private information contained in
the reported DVAs causes a significant deviation of the estimated DVAs from the
reported DVAs. This deviation is more pronounced for the banks with high volatile
creditworthiness and gets better for the banks with stable credit standing. Find-
ings suggest that the reported DVAs reflect more private information on credit
risk when the economy is volatile rather than stable. In addition, the comparison
of estimation errors shows that the Merton model outperforms the Leland model
with regard to the estimation of DVAs over the sample period, suggesting that the
incorporation of additional information in structural models does not improve the
performance of pricing DVAs.
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Over the past decades, the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) and
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have been working on projects
examining the feasibility of extending fair value measurement to more financial in-
struments. This is because the current mixed-attribute accounting model (part at
fair values and part at historical cost) has led to criticisms from both practitioners
and investors. Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 159, The Fair Value
Option for Financial Assets and Liabilities (FASB 2007) states that measuring
related assets and liabilities differently without having to apply complex hedge ac-
counting standards would cause high volatility in accounting earnings, which does
not represent the economics of a firm’s activities.1
To mitigate this concern, the FASB and the IASB introduced fair value option
(FVO) in SFAS No. 159 and IAS No. 39 in 2007 and 2006, respectively, to allow
1Prior studies consider the earning volatility as an important issue because higher earnings
volatility are perceived as higher likelihood of bankruptcy (Kim et al. 2001), and are associated
with lower market valuation (Hodder et al. 2006; Barnes 2001; Easton and Zmijewski 1989 ).
1
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firms to voluntarily measure a broad scope of financial instruments (including fi-
nancial liabilities) at fair value, with recognition of quarterly changes in fair value
in reported earnings. Although the FVO is not mandatory, the decision to adopt
FVO is irrevocable at the inception of financial instruments or upon adoption of
this option if the inception is prior to it. The election of FVO is made on an
instrument-by-instrument basis and is applied only to the entire financial instru-
ments.
The fair value measurement of financial liabilities for which the fair value op-
tion has been elected is governed by the guidance set forth in SFAS No. 157,
Fair Value Measurements, issued in 2006.2 Specifically, SFAS No. 157 requires
that the changes in the fair value of liabilities due to the changes in the firm’s
own credit risk should be reported in accounting earnings. Therefore, an entity
recognizes a loss when its own credit risk decreases and a gain when its own credit
risk increases. The standard-setters define these unrealized gains or losses as the
Debt Valuation Adjustments (DVAs).
Critics argue that recognizing DVAs in net income is counterintuitive and mis-
leading to investors. The main concern is that the firm recognizes DVA gains
in reported earnings, although the firm’s credit risk increases. Analogously, im-
provements in the firm’s credit quality would result in recognition of DVA losses.
For example, during the recent financial crisis 2008, Morgan Stanley flipped $3.3
2To date, SFAS No. 157 and SFAS No. 159 have been incorporated into the FASB Accounting
Standard Codification in Topics 820-10 and 825-10, respectively. SFAS No. 159 is effective after
the beginning of an entity’s first fiscal year that begins as of November 15, 2007. Early adoption
is permitted after the beginning of a fiscal year that begins on or before November 15, 2007.
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billion losses into a $1.7 billion gains by recognizing the DVA gains as the credit
quality deteriorated. By contrast, Citigroup recognized a $4.2 billion DVA losses
during the recovery period of 2009. Given this counterintuitive accounting effect,
regulators and analysts pay close attention to the effect of DVA on reported ac-
counting earnings to mitigate the concern of earning management.3 Besides, Basel
III requires banks to derecognize the DVAs in the calculation of the regulatory
capital by derecognizing.4
Apart from the practitioners, academics have also debated whether the DVAs
should be removed from the net income in order to avoid the counterintuitive ac-
counting results. Most empirical research has focused on the valuation relevance
and risk relevance of fair value option on liabilities (FVOL). The opponents pro-
vide evidence that some early adopters of SFAS No. 159 have a tendency to exploit
the standard’s transition adjustment provision in order to meet and beat target
earnings (Chang et al. 2011; Gutherie et al. 2011; Henry 2009; Song 2008). The
transition provision of SFAS No. 159 requires that firms which elect the FVO to
report the effect of the first remeasurement to fair value as a cumulative-effect
adjustment to the opening balance of retained earnings. This provision creates an
opportunity for firms to avoid recognizing a loss arising from underwater securities
in the income statement. Specifically, at adoption, unrealized losses on securities
for which the firm elected FVO can be ”moved” directly from the accumulated
other comprehensive income (AOCI) section of shareholders’ equity to retained
3”...booking such gains...erode earnings quality and possibly open a new way for executives
to massage earnings”(Reilly D. The Wall Street Journal, Sep. 28, 2007); ”...can produce coun-
terintuitive and misleading results”(Moody’s 2017).
4The Basel Committee initially issued the Basel III rules in December 2010 and then issued
the revised rules in June 2011.
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earnings without passing through the income statement. Therefore, on the one
hand, there is no loss in the income statement resulting from the sale of the se-
curities subsequent to the fair value election. On the other hand, any subsequent
increase in the value of the securities would result in the gain recognized in the in-
come statement. Gilman (2007) states no rule specifically prohibits this provision
that might be used to aim at having losses bypass the income statement. Given
this possible concern caused by the early adopters of SFAS No. 159, Couch et al.
(2017) examine whether adoption of SFAS No. 159 effectively reduces earnings
volatility, which is the intent and spirit of the standard. They find that SFAS No.
159 failed to systematically reduce earnings volatility.5
However, none of these studies considers the election of fair value option for finan-
cial liabilities and its relationship with a firm’s own credit risk. Wu et al. (2016)
complement these current studies by investigating the motivation and character-
istics of FVOL during the financial crisis. They conclude that adverse selection
occurs among adopters of FVOL. Specifically, they find that financially vulnerable
firms are systematically more likely to adopt the FVOL and these firms under-
perform nonadopters in terms of long-run stock returns. In line with the concern
from opponents for recognizing DVAs in accounting earnings, Gaynor et al. (2011)
conduct an experiment with CPAs as participants to test whether these profes-
sionals correctly interpret the DVA gains or losses reported in net income. They
find that 70% of the participants are misled by the reported DVA gains and losses
as they incorrectly associated DVA gains (losses) with a(n) decrease (increase) in
5In contrast, in analyzing the FVO in IAS 39, Fiechter (2011) concludes that firms’ use of the
option successfully mitigated earnings volatility.
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credit risk. Dong et al. (2016) provide evidence that banks exercised discretion
over DVAs to smooth earnings during the recent financial crisis but not afterwards.
In contrast, the proponents state that reporting DVAs in accounting earnings is
informative to financial statements users. Chung et al. (2012) assess the valuation
and risk implications of reporting DVA gains and losses. They find that these
controversial gains and losses are positively related to stock returns and income
volatility and also positively associated with market-based risk measures. These
findings indicate that recognizing DVAs in accounting earnings are value-relevant
and risk-relevant to investors. Fontes et al. (2018) find that fair value measure-
ment of assets is associated with noticeably lower information asymmetry and that
this reduction is larger when banks also recognize DVAs. This finding is consis-
tent with DVAs providing investors with important information on how gains and
losses are shared between equityholders and debtholders (Merton 1974). In line
with this finding, Cedergren et al. (2019) find that DVAs are positively related to
equity returns for banks with low unrecognized assets.
To contribute the arguments over the recognitions of DVAs in accounting earnings,
Chapter 2 examines whether the information (including the private information)
in the reported DVAs correctly reflect (or are at least positively correlated to)
changes in the credit quality of the entity. Indeed, prior studies focus on the
value and information asymmetry implications of DVAs and associated disclosures
without addressing this question. This is because few entities reported DVAs and
voluntary adoption of FVOL loses the comparability across both time and enti-
ties. However, we believe the investigation on the reliability of reporting DVAs
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in accounting earnings matters to investors given the findings in the prior studies
that reported DVAs are value and risk-relevant to investors (Chung et al. 2012).
Moreover, both FASB and IASB have invested considerable time and resources in
introducing and amending the FVOL accounting standard, providing evidence as
to whether this process leads to more informative financial statements or not is
important.
We firstly express these gains/losses into changes in credit spreads (DVA-estimated
changes in credit spreads). Having DVAs expressed as a change in credit spreads,
rather than gains/losses, allows us to understand better the magnitude of these
changes and to use the regression model specifications developed in the literature
to investigate the determinants of changes in credit spreads.
Then, we investigate whether DVA-estimated changes in credit risk can be ex-
plained by the same factors that explain changes in CDS and/or bond spreads.
This will provide an indication of whether DVAs reflect market information on
the credit quality of the entities. Our expectation is that DVA-estimated changes
in credit spreads are not explained by the same factors that explain changes in
market-based measures of credit spreads. This is because DVAs may incorpo-
rate not only the market but also private managerial information about the credit
standing of the entity.
Second, in order to distinguish between public and private information incorpo-
rated in DVAs, we use the information on the fair value Level of the financial
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instruments measure under the FVOL.6 If financial liabilities under the FVOL
are measured at fair value Level 1 and 2, then DVAs are based mainly on mar-
ket information. In this case, we expect changes in bond, and CDS spreads to
be significant in explaining DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads. If financial
liabilities under the FVOL are measured at fair value Level 3, valuation is based
mainly on entity-supplied inputs, and therefore, DVAs incorporate private infor-
mation about the credit quality of the entity. In this case, we expect to find that
DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads can predict future changes in CDS and
bond spreads. If managers manipulate fair values of liabilities to report biased
numbers, then DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads are expected to have no
predictive ability.
We find that changes in bond and credit spreads are statistically significant in
explaining DVA-estimated changes in credit spread for banks that report liabili-
ties at fair value Level 1 and 2. These results provide evidence that market inputs
are used in the DVAs estimation process for Level 1 and 2 reporters. When we
investigate whether reported DVAs convey private information about the credit
quality of the entity, we find that lagged DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads
are significant in explaining changes in bond and CDS spreads for Level 3 reporters.
These results indicate that managers have superior information in estimating own
credit risk. The results are robust if we use only the discretionary portion of DVA-
estimated changes in credit spreads or control for the propensity of the firm to use
6In SFAS No. 157, Level 1 inputs are quoted prices in active markets and hence require
no judgment. Level 2 inputs are data-adjusted from similar items traded in active markets
or from identical or similar items in markets that are not active. Level 3 inputs are considered
”unobservable” and are based on the models or assumptions of management, valuation specialists,
or both. These inputs are the most subjective and are difficult to verify.
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Level 3 fair values.
Our results support the view that managers have an information advantage in
estimating DVAs, and that the fair value measurements based on managerial in-
puts better reflect the credit risk of liabilities in our sample. We believe that our
results improve our understanding of managerial decision-making with respect to
fair value accounting, contributing to the literature that examines the equity and
risk relevance of fair value Levels. Our findings indicate that managers use their
discretion in computing Level 3 fair values to provide information to the market
that is useful to predict future risk. We also contribute to the debate about the role
of fair value accounting in generating decision-useful financial information (Fontes
et al. 2018; Blankespoor et al. 2013; Koonce et al. 2011).
Given the findings in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 investigates the informativeness of
reported DVAs to investors. Following the guidance set forth in SFAS No. 157,
management requires to apply complex approaches and data resources in the mea-
surement process of DVAs. Moreover, the disclosure on the DVAs is voluntary and
usually reported in footnotes. This opaque DVAs reporting allows management
to exercise discretion over DVAs. Therefore, the reported DVAs may reasonably
attract stakeholders’ concerns about the private information exploited by manage-
ment in the estimation of DVAs.
To address the concern mentioned above, we compare the reported DVAs provided
by management with the estimated DVAs based on market information, denoted as
Chapter 1. Introduction 9
market information-estimated DVAs. If the market information-estimated DVAs
differ from the reported DVAs significantly, we could state the internal credit
risk assessment reflects private information that is not covered by the external
credit risk assessment. Alternatively, if the market information-estimated DVAs
are close to the reported DVAs, we could conclude that the external credit risk
assessment timely capture the information on credit risk through financial reports.
To estimate the DVAs, we rely on structural credit risk models rather than the
widespread market measures of credit risk (i.e., CDS spreads, bond spreads) for
two primary reasons. First, the market measures of credit risk are expressed in the
credit spreads rather than gains/losses that are not comparable with the reported
DVAs. Second, bond spreads are not perceived as a cleaner measure because they
are also influenced by factors as tax, liquidity, and duration. CDS spreads are only
available for large financial institutions so that using this measure would signifi-
cantly reduce our sample.7
To generate the precise measure of credit risk with the compatible format to re-
ported DVAs, we rely on structural credit risk models for several reasons. First,
structural models can provide guidance about the theoretical determinants of de-
fault risk and offer an unique structure to extract default-related information from
the equity market. Second, the estimated results from structural models repre-
sent pure default risk of the counterparty in financial contracts. However, other
credit assessments CDS spreads and bond prices can be noisy due to existence of
other risk factors (Leland 2009; Tang and Yan 2007; Ericsson et al. 2006; Blanco
et al. 2005). Third, the option theory-based default probability is particularly
7Out of 38 bank holding companies in our sample, 13 banks issue CDS.
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attractive because the resulting formula is a function of ’observable’ variables in-
cluding leverage ratio, asset market value and asset volatility.8 Beside, models
use equity market information to make a forward-looking prediction of the default
risk. Krainer and Lopez (2004) suggest that market information, especially equity
market information, should be included in the oversight of financial institutions.
Fourth, structural credit risk models have been successfully implemented in the
industry. A benchmark in the application of structural credit risk model is the
KMV model (Crosbie and Bohn 2003). Even though a few studies attempt to
criticize the implementation of structural models in financial institutions due to
their high leverage and complex liability structure (Eom et al. 2004), many prior
studies have appropriately used modified structural credit risk models in banks for
the purpose of some interesting questions.9 Furthermore, model misspecification
could largely cancel out in computing the intertemporal difference of bond prices
due to the changes in firms’ own credit risk over two subsequent periods, which is
denoted as DVAs.
In this Chapter, we first compare the distribution of market information-estimated
DVAs and the reported DVAs. This is necessary to analyze the dispersion of both
the estimated and observed DVAs over the sample period due to large standard
deviation of estimated DVAs. Then, we compute the measure of estimation errors
to investigate the extent to which the market information-estimated DVAs deviate
8The asset market value and asset volatility are ’quasi-observable’ variables, because these
two values are generally estimated based on equity value and equity volatility.
9Tsesmelidakis and Merton (2012) implement the CreditGrade model, which is based on the
work of Merton 1976 by assuming stationary leverage, to value the ”too big to fail” (TBTF)
premium in financial institutions. Chen et al. (2014) use a flexible, lattice-based structural
credit risk model to examine the term structure of default probabilities for Lehman Brothers.
These empirical applications provide strong support of the feasibility of structural models in
banks.
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from the reported DVAs. Specifically, we compute the signed differences between
the estimated and reported DVAs as a measure of bias (Errors) and unsigned
differences between the estimated and reported DVAs as a measure of accuracy
(Absolute Errors). The positive (negative) Errors indicate that structural mod-
els overestimate (underestimate) the DVAs. Large Absolute Errors indicate the
market information-estimated DVAs remarkably deviate the reported DVAs, sug-
gesting the reported DVAs convey private information which is not reflected in the
capital market. Alternatively, small Absolute Errors indicate the capital market
could capture the information contained in the reported DVAs timely through fi-
nancial reports. To investigate whether the Absolute Errors between the estimated
and reported DVAs are driven by the model misspecification, we compare the per-
formance of pricing DVAs between the Merton model and the Leland model, as
the Leland model incorporates certain additional information.10 Finally, we ex-
amine whether estimation errors are prone to systematic errors. In particular, we
conduct multivariate regressions of estimation errors on factors that represent the
firm-specific variables, bond-specific variables and macroeconomic variables. The
significant variables suggest the estimation errors from structural models are as-
sociated with them.
We find that the market information-estimated DVAs by structural models de-
viate the reported DVAs significantly, especially when banks’ own creditworthi-
ness is volatile. Specifically, the Merton and Leland models tend to overestimate
10The Leland model relaxes some assumptions in the Merton model by considering the en-
dogenous default barrier, tax rate and default costs.
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the DVAs on average. However, the analysis of estimation errors by year sug-
gests that both the Merton and Leland models tend to underestimate the DVAs
when the banks’ own creditworthiness is volatile (i.e., the extremely high or low
estimates are clustered around the 2008 financial crisis and 2011 sovereign debt
crisis). Conversely, in stable credit risk conditions, these two models have a ten-
dency of overestimation and their performance with regard to DVA estimations
gets better. The results in analyzing the systematic estimation errors also pro-
vide consistent evidence that structural models lead to larger estimation errors for
banks with higher market leverage and asset volatility. In both the Merton and
Leland models, the leverage ratio and asset volatility are two main channels of de-
fault risk. These results suggest reported DVAs convey more private information
during the deterioration of creditworthiness.
Further, we investigate the estimation errors in four sub-samples: zero DVA re-
porters, non-zero DVA reporters, positive DVA reporters and negative DVA re-
porters. We compare the pricing performance over these four sub-samples due to
their different effects on accounting earnings. Specifically, unlike zero DVAs, the
reported non-zero DVAs could result in unrealized DVA gains and DVA losses.
Furthermore, we split non-zero DVAs into positive DVAs and negative DVAs, as
positive (negative) DVAs result from deterioration (improvement) of firms’ credit
risk that could in fact lead to economic losses (gains). Cedergren et al. (2012)
find that compensation committees place different weights on positive DVAs and
negative DVAs. Therefore, we compare the estimation errors between positive and
negative DVA reporters to investigate whether management estimate DVA gains
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and DVA losses differently.
We find that the estimates for zero DVA and non-zero DVA reporters are sig-
nificantly different. In particular, the Merton and Leland models underestimate
the DVAs on average for zero DVA reporters, but overestimate the non-zero DVAs.
Moreover, comparing to non-zero DVAs, the Absolute Errors for zero DVAs are
immaterial, suggesting the estimation errors in full sample are mainly attributed
to zero DVA reporters. Further, we split non-zero DVAs into positive and negative
DVAs due to their opposite accounting effects — DVA gains and DVA losses. The
insignificant t-statistics of equality test indicate that the Absolute Errors between
these two groups are equal. However, the measure of Error suggests the Merton
and Leland models underestimate DVA gains but overestimate DVAs losses. The
results suggest that management estimate positive DVAs and negative DVAs dif-
ferently, while the capital market treats them indifferently.
Finally, we compare the Absolute Errors between the Merton model and the Leland
models. The smaller Absolute Errors for the Merton model suggest the Merton
model outperforms the Leland model in terms of pricing DVAs, especially when the
firms’ credit risk increases. This finding indicates that incorporation of additional
information in structural models does not improve the performance of estimating
DVAs.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 examines whether the
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reported DVAs correctly reflect the changes in the firms’ own credit risk. Chap-
ter 3 compares the reported DVAs with the market information-estimated DVAs
by implementation of structural credit risk models. Chapter 4 presents the main
conclusions of the thesis.
Chapter 2
What can we learn about credit
risk from debt valuation
adjustments?
2.1 Introduction
The introduction of the Fair Value Option for financial Liabilities (FVOL) has
been one of the most controversial issues in the fair value accounting project. An
entity electing the FVOL, either under SFAS No. 159 ”The Fair Value Option for
Financial Assets and Financial LiabilitiesIncluding an amendment of FASB State-
ment No. 115” (FASB 2007) or IFRS 9 ”Financial instruments” (IASB 2014), is
required to measure financial liabilities at fair value and to recognize and sepa-
rately disclose in the financial statements Debt Valuation Adjustments (DVAs).
DVAs represent changes in the fair value of the financial liabilities measured under
the FVOL that result from the change in the ability of the firm to settle these lia-
bilities in full. Therefore, an entity recognizes a loss (negative DVAs) when its own
15
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credit risk decreases and a gain (positive DVAs) when its own credit risk increases.
The FVOL was introduced in order to simplify the use of hedge accounting, en-
abling the firms to eliminate or reduce accounting mismatch that arise from the
measurement of assets at fair value. However, the recognition of DVAs in the
financial statements stirred the debate regarding its effect on the usefulness and
informativeness of accounting numbers. On the one hand, it has been argued that
the resulting gains and losses are counterintuitive to the way in which gains and
losses are typically viewed (Chasteen and Ransom 2007; Lipe 2002). As the mar-
ket value of liabilities decreases when the entitys credit quality deteriorates, a gain
is recognised when a bad economic event occurs. Similarly, a loss is recognized
when a good economic event occurs. Resulting changes in reported income are
considered by some to be misleading and difficult to explain to investors (Lipe
2002). On the other hand, Barth et al. (2008) argue that DVAs are consistent
with debtholders partially absorbing shocks to the firm value (Merton 1974).
A number of empirical studies investigate the effects of DVAs recognition. Barth et
al. (2008) use changes in credit ratings times the debt-to-assets ratio as a proxy for
DVAs. Using a sample of non-financial firms, they find that the effect of own credit
risk changes on equity returns is attenuated by the presence of debt. The study
concludes that DVAs should be candidates for inclusion in accounting income if
the objective is the faithful representation of the firms liabilities and economic
performance. Fontes et al. (2018) find that fair value measurement of assets is
associated with noticeably lower information asymmetry and that this reduction
is larger when banks also recognize DVAs. This finding is consistent with DVAs
providing investors with important information on how gains and losses are shared
between equityholders and debtholders (Merton 1974). In line with this finding,
Cedergren et al. (2019) find that DVAs are positively related to equity returns for
banks with low unrecognized assets.
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The above studies investigate the value and informational asymmetry implica-
tions of DVAs and associated disclosures, assuming that DVAs correctly reflect
(or are at least positively correlated to) changes in the credit quality of the entity
and/or that DVAs reflect changes in credit spreads captured by the market. In this
paper, we contribute to the debate in this accounting policy area by investigating
if reported DVAs indeed reflect changes in credit spreads captured by the market
and whether incremental information about the entity’s own credit risk (beyond
information that can be inferred from the market) is conveyed, i.e., private infor-
mation. If reported DVAs can be explained by the market information
of credit risk, we state managers faithfully reflect the changes in the
fair value of liabilities due to the changes in the firm’s own credit risk
captured by the market. Otherwise, we have two non-mutually exclu-
sive explanations. The first is that managers may use reported DVAs
for opportunistic purpose. Managers may have incentives to use DVAs
to manage earnings, especially during our sample period that DVAs are
reported in net income. For example, Dong et al. (2019) find managers
used DVAs to meet earnings targets during the 2008 financial crisis.
However, exercising of discretion over DVAs to smooth earnings dis-
appeared when the economy recovers. This finding is not unexpected.
First, managers have to rely on internal models and inputs to estimate
DVAs when the financial markets are illiquid. In addition, auditors
have more difficulties to evaluate whether significant assumptions used
by management in periods of high uncertainty are correct (Bell et al.,
2012). In line with this, Wu et al. (2016) find firms with higher credit
risk, lower profitability, and negative abnormal stock returns are more
likely to opportunistically elect the FVOL. The second explanation is
that managers may use private information about banks’ own credit risk
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to estimate DVAs and credibly communicate the internal credit risk in-
formation to the capital market through DVAs disclosure. Although
deterioration in credit quality led banks to recognize gains in earnings,
the FVOLs irrevocability reverses this effect for adopting firms when
credit quality improves. For this reason, according to the adverse selec-
tion hypothesis, firms with good financial conditions should have more
tendency to comply with the intent and spirit of SFAS No. 159 than
vulnerable banks. For example, Altamuro et al. (2013), find that man-
agers generate higher quality fair value estimates than market inputs
due to their information advantage, especially in larger banks, as larger
banks have more resources to measure the fair value for sophisticated
financial instruments. In this paper, we shed light on the second expla-
nation to examine whether incremental information about the entitys
own credit risk (beyond information that can be inferred from the mar-
ket) is conveyed.
For the implementation of this study, we use a sample of U.S. bank holding com-
panies. We focus on banks, as they are the main users of financial instruments
for which the FVOL is applicable. Therefore, the effects of DVAs recognition and
disclosure are expected to be more pronounced, compared to industries that make
only limited use of financial instruments. Second, large U.S. banks have listed
bonds and/or CDS, enabling us to obtain market-based measures of credit risk.
Finally, we focus on a single country in order to make sure that our results are
not driven by differences in the institutional environment. Our sample covers the
period 2007-2017, and includes 38 unique banks. Out of the 887 bank-quarters
for which FVOL is adopted, banks report a positive (negative) Debt Valuation
Adjustment (DVA) in 171 (176) quarters. In more than half of the quarters the
banks report a zero DVA, indicating that the effect of own credit risk changes on
the fair value of liabilities was considered to be zero or immaterial.
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DVAs are changes in the fair value of liabilities (gains or losses), calculated based on
internal estimates about the entitys own credit risk. We firstly convert these gain-
s/losses into changes in credit spreads (DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads).
Having DVAs expressed as a change in credit spreads, rather than gains/losses,
allows us to understand better the magnitude of these changes and to use the
regression model specifications developed in the literature to investigate the de-
terminants of changes in credit spreads. As a first step, we investigate whether
DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads can be explained by the same factors
that determine the changes in CDS and bond spreads. This provides us with
an indication whether DVAs reflect market information on the credit quality of
the entities. We find that, on average, DVAs cannot be explained by the same
factors that explain changes in bond and CDS spreads. We have two possible,
non-mutually exclusive explanations for this finding. The first is that on average,
DVAs do not reflect changes credit quality of the entity, and therefore FVOL is
used by entities for opportunistic reasons. The second explanation is that DVAs
reflect management assessment of the credit quality of the bank, providing insider
information on the expected cash flows of the bank that it is not captured by the
market.
To investigate whether incremental information about the entity’s own credit risk
(beyond information that can be inferred from the market) is conveyed, we use
information on the Level of fair value of liabilities under the FVOL. This enables
us to distinguish between DVAs that reflect mainly market information and DVAs
that reflect private managerial information about the credit risk of the entity. Us-
ing different cut-off levels, we classify our banks into Level 1 and 2 reporters and
Level 3 reporters.1 We group together Level 1 and 2 reporters, as only a small
1For the results presented in the paper, a bank is considered Level 1 and 2 (Level 3) reporter,
if it reports 80% or more of its financial liabilities under the FVO at Level 1 and 2 (Level 3).
The inference of our results does not change if we use a 100% or a 70% cut-off.
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proportion of liabilities under the fair value option (FVO) is reported at Level
1. We find that changes in bond and CDS spreads are statistically significant in
explaining DVA-estimated changes in credit spread for banks that report liabil-
ities at fair value Level 1 and 2. These results are consistent with the principle
that market inputs are used in the DVAs estimation process for Level 1 and 2 re-
porters. When we investigate whether reported DVAs convey private information
about the credit quality of the entity, we find that lagged DVA-estimated changes
in credit spreads are a significant determinant of changes in bond and CDS spreads
for Level 3 reporters. These results are consistent with managers having superior
information in estimating own credit risk, and they are robust if we control for the
propensity of the firm to use Level 3 fair values. However, these results cannot
rule out the use of DVAs for opportunistic reasons.
Our results support the view that managers have an informational advantage in es-
timating DVAs, and that the fair value measurements based on managerial inputs
offer additional information about the credit risk of liabilities in our sample. We
believe that our results improve our understanding of managerial decision-making
with respect to fair value accounting, contributing to the literature that examines
the equity and risk relevance of fair value Levels. Our findings indicate that man-
agers use their discretion in computing Level 3 fair values to provide information
to the market that is useful to predict future risk. We also contribute to the de-
bate about the role of fair value accounting in generating decision-useful financial
information (Fontes et al. 2018; Blankespoor et al. 2013; Koonce et al. 2011).
Although the US bank holding companies setting offers several advantages, there
are caveats that should be considered when interpreting the results of this study.
First, it is unclear whether our findings generalize to industries with more limited
use of the FVOL. Second, the limited number of observations does not allow us to
explore the cross-sectional variation within the groups of Level 1 and 2 reporters
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and Level 3 reporters or whether DVAs can predict default better than market-
based measures of credit risk. Third, when we estimate our DVAs-estimated
changes in credit risk, we make a number of simplication assumptions
regarding liabilities under the FVO. This simplification assumptions are
driven by the aggregate disclosure of those instruments. Therefore, we
cannot exclude that some of our results are driven, at least partly, by
estimation error.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides information
on the recognition and disclosure of DVAs, presents the related literature and ex-
plains our research questions. This is followed by section 3 discussing the sample
and research design. Section 4 presents our results, while, section 5 summarizes
the findings and contains concluding remarks.
2.2 Background and hypothesis development
2.2.1 Fair value option for liabilities and debt valuation
adjustments
Financial liabilities can be recognized either at amortized cost or at fair value.
The financial liabilities that can be recognized at fair value includes financial lia-
bilities held for trading, derivatives or other financial instruments that qualify for
hedge accounting treatment as well as financial instruments for which the FVOL
is elected (see Figure 1). The election of FVOL is made on an instrument-by-
instrument basis, it is irrevocable at the inception or upon adoption of this option
if the inception is prior to it. The option can be applied only to the entire financial
instrument, i.e., unlike hedge accounting the manager cannot fair value only that
part of the instrument that might be exposed to the hedged risk. DVAs are rec-
ognized and disclosed for financial liabilities that are measured under the FVOL.
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DVAs represent changes in the fair value of the financial liabilities under the FVO
that result from the change in the ability of the firm to settle these liabilities in
full. Under SFAS No. 159 (ASC 825), for our sample period, DVAs are reported
in the net income. For fiscal years beginning after 15 December 2017, DVAs are
reported in other comprehensive income (ASC 825-10-45-5).
In order to estimate changes in own credit risk and resulting DVAs, entities apply
a range of valuation techniques. Kengla and De Jonghe (2012) present survey re-
sults on how DVAs are estimated by financial institution. Out of the 19 financial
institutions, 4 reported that they were using CDS spreads, 4 were using primary
issuances data (based on the latest issuances), 4 were using secondary market
data (as for example bond spreads), 5 were using curves set internally by trea-
sury and/or asset-liability management departments, while the rest were using a
blended approach (a combination of information including observable inputs and
internal data). Note, that from the market one can observe credit spreads, which
are driven not only by the credit risk of the company but also by other factors
(as for example, liquidity and duration). If the characteristics of the liabilities
under the FVO are different to the instruments that are traded, the firm will make
adjustments to the observed credit spreads.
Although annual reports provide little information on how DVAs are estimated,2
financial liabilities under the FVO are disclosed in accordance with the three-level
measurement hierarchy (FASB 2006). Therefore, financial statement users are able
to differentiate between varying degrees of reliability regarding the valuation in-
puts. Level 1 fair value estimates are based on quoted prices for identical assets or
liabilities in active markets. Level 2 estimates are based on quoted market prices
2When DVAs are significant, SFAS 159 (ASC 825) requires that the entities disclose qualitative
information about the reasons for instrument-specific credit risk changes as well as how DVAs
are determined. However, when we read this information in the financial statements of banks in
our sample, we find that it is often very brief and that important steps in the calculation process
are not provided. Therefore, it is difficult for financial statement users to understand how DVAs
are estimated.
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for similar assets or liabilities and inputs other than quoted prices, as for example
interest rates and yield curves, while, Level 3 estimates are based on unobservable
entity-supplied inputs for the asset/liability. FASB required that the entity use
market inputs whenever they can be obtained without undue cost and effort.
2.2.2 Related literature
Two streams of literature are relevant to our study. The first stream looks at
the informational effects and value implications of DVAs recognition. Lipe (2002)
uses an example of a firm that experiences severe financial distress to show that
ratios computed using net income adjusted by DVAs do not faithfully depict the
firms negative performance. In a study that uses Certified Public Accountants
as participants, Gaynor et al. (2011) shows that disclosures about DVAs are not
sufficient to avoid misleading interpretations. The participants are unable to asso-
ciate a gain (loss) arising from changes in the fair value of liabilities to an increase
(decrease) in credit risk. Using archival data, Schneider and Tran (2015) examine
the informational effects of DVAs recognition. For a sample of European IFRS
banks, they provide evidence that DVAs recognizers exhibit lower bid-ask spread
compared to non-adopters of the FVOL, consistent with FVOL mitigating infor-
mation asymmetry. Fontes et al. (2018) find that fair value measurement of assets
is associated with lower information asymmetry and that this reduction is larger
when banks also recognize DVAs. This finding is consistent with DVAs providing
investors with important information on how gains and losses are shared between
equityholders and debtholders (Merton 1974).
A number of studies investigate the value relevance of DVAs. Using a sample
that includes both financial and non-financial entities, Chung et al. (2017) report
a positive relationship between DVAs and current period stock returns, suggesting
that DVAs are value relevant. The study of Cedergren et al. (2019) investigates
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the value relevance of DVAs, considering the level of unrecognized assets. They
find that, when the level of unrecognised assets is low, DVAs are positively associ-
ated to stock returns. However, this relation becomes less positive as the level of
unrecognized assets increases, and eventually it becomes negative. This result sug-
gests that investors understand the influence of unrecognised assets on the value
relevance of DVAs.
More closely to our study, Dong et al. (2019) investigate the determinants of
DVAs and banks exercise of discretion over DVAs. The study finds that DVAs
are positively associated with changes in bond spreads and provides evidence that
abnormal DVAs are negatively associated with pre-managed earnings, consistent
with banks exercising discretion over DVAs to smooth earnings. However, the
study does not address the question of what the market learns about credit risk
from DVAs.
The second stream of related literature investigates the value and risk relevance
of different fair value Levels. Song et al. (2010) find that the association between
share prices and fair values of assets and liabilities is higher for Levels 1 and 2
than for Level 3 fair values. This result suggests that investors place less weight
on the fair value of assets and liabilities that are based on unobservable inputs.
The fair value hierarchy is also shown to influence information asymmetry between
the managers of a firm and the external capital market participants. Magnan et
al. (2015) report that Level 3 fair values increase forecast dispersion, and Riedl
and Serafeim (2011) provide evidence that firms with greater exposure to Level 3
assets have higher costs of capital, as measured by equity betas. In line with these
results, Iselin and Nicoletti (2017) provide evidence that banks change the asset
composition of their portfolios to avoid disclosure of Level 3 assets.
While the above studies indicate that fair values based on inputs corresponding
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to higher levels in the fair value hierarchy are more useful, this is not always the
case. For example, Altamuro and Zhang (2013) find that Level 3 mortgage servic-
ing rights reflect better the risk of the underlying servicing portfolios than Level 2
mortgage servicing rights. Their results indicate that managers have an informa-
tion advantage in estimating the fair value of instruments that are not traded in
active markets. Furthermore, Lawrence et al. (2016) report that the association
between share prices and Level 3 fair values is similar to the association between
share prices and Level 1 and Level 2 fair values. Their results are based on a
sample of close-end funds where all assets are measured at fair value. Their study
attributes the results of earlier studies to problems with research design, as prior
studies draw conclusions from samples where only a small proportion of assets are
measured at fair value.
2.2.3 Research questions
Most of the studies that investigate the effects of DVAs recognition and associated
disclosures make the assumption that DVAs correctly reflect (or at least positively
correlated to) changes in the credit quality of the entity and/or that DVAs reflect
changes in credit spreads captured by the market. This paper contributes to the
debate in this accounting policy area by investigating if reported DVAs indeed
reflect changes in credit spreads captured by the market, and whether incremental
information about the entity’s own credit risk (beyond information that can be
inferred from the market) is conveyed.
First, we investigate whether DVA-estimated changes in credit risk can be ex-
plained by the same factors that explain changes in CDS and/or bond spreads.
This will provide an indication whether DVAs reflect market information on the
credit quality of the entities. Our expectation is that DVA-estimated changes
in credit spreads are not necessarily explained by the same factors that explain
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changes in market-based measures of credit spreads. This is because DVAs incor-
porate not only market but also private managerial information about the credit
standing of the entity.
Second, in order to distinguish between public and private information incorpo-
rated in DVAs, we use information on the fair value Level of the financial in-
struments measure under the FVOL. If financial liabilities under the FVOL are
measured at fair value Level 1 and 2, then DVAs are largely based on market infor-
mation. In this case, we expect changes in bond and CDS spreads to be significant
in explaining DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads. If financial liabilities un-
der the FVOL are measured at fair value Level 3, valuation is largely based on
entity-supplied inputs, and therefore, DVAs incorporate private information about
the credit quality of the entity. In this case, we expect to find that DVA-estimated
changes in credit spreads can predict future changes in CDS and bond spreads.
2.3 Sample selection and research design
2.3.1 Sample selection
Our sample includes U.S. bank holding companies that file quarterly FR Y-9C re-
ports with the Federal Reserve. We focus on financial companies, as DVAs are not
economically relevant in other industries.3 This can be driven by the limited use
of financial instruments by non-financial firms and the complexity of the fair value
option application. We restrict our sample to bank holding companies because,
as opposed to other financial institutions (e.g., mutual funds, credit unions), they
provide detailed and standardized disclosures on FVOL election and DVAs in their
regulatory filings. The sample period is 2007:Q1 to 2017:Q4. We choose to include
3Using a sample of all non-financial firms with available 10-K documents in EDGAR in 2009
(year with the highest number of FVOL adopters in our sample), we find that only 11 adopted
the FVOL. None of these 11 non-financial firms reports non-zero DVAs.
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observations from 2007 because FASB allows early adoption of SFAS No.159 (ASC
825) on eligible financial instruments, although the effective date of the standard
is January 1, 2008 for regular adopters.4
Once bank holding companies elect the FVOL, they are required to report two
data items in quarterly FR Y-9Cs. One is total gains/losses on liabilities un-
der the FVO (BHCKF553), and the second is gains or losses on liabilities under
the FVO attributable to changes in own credit risk (BHCKF554). These items
are downloaded from Bank Regulatory database. We require that banks report
BHCKF553 or BHCKF554 at least once over our sample period. This process
leaves us with 85 bank holding companies. For some bank -quarters, data on
DVAs are missing from the database. To increase the size of our sample, we hand-
collect DVAs from 10Q/10K filings for the selected bank holding companies.5 An
example of such disclosures is provided in Appendix 2.3. DVAs reported in Bank
Regulatory occasionally differ from those in the 10Q/10K filings.6 In such a case,
in line with Cedegreen et al. (2019), we use entries from the 10Q/10K filings, as
these amounts are likely more scrutinized by auditors.
We also require that banks are publicly traded, with 150 trading-day observa-
tions available, in order to estimate our explanatory variables (asset values and
volatility), and that they have positive book value of liabilities (Eom et al. 2004).
This reduces our sample to 46 unique banks. Finally, we hand-collect information
on maturity, fair value and principal of liabilities under the FVOL from financial
reports, removing from our sample the banks that do not provide this informa-
tion. This information is needed in order to calculate the DVA-estimated changes
in credit spreads. This process yields a sample of 887 bank-quarter observations,
representing 38 unique banks. Appendix 2.4 provides a list of all the banks in our
4Our results are robust if we exclude from our analyses the early adopters.
5Firms are required to report DVAs in 10Q/K filings if these are material.
6This is the case for only 6 bank-quarters, and our results are robust to the exclusion of these
observations from our sample.
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sample. The sample selection process is summarized in Table 1.
Table 2 provides detailed information on the number of FVOL adopters that rec-
ognize DVAs per year. The downloaded quarterly data on DVAs from Bank Reg-
ulatory database report the total DVA since the beginning of the financial year.
In order to obtain quarterly DVA, we need to take the difference between two
quarters. The number of bank-quarter observations is quite low for 2007, as it in-
cludes only early adopters of the FVOL. Out of the 887 bank-quarter observations,
banks report positive (negative) DVA in 171 (176) quarters. This indicates that
in 171 (176) quarters the banks experienced a deterioration (an improvement) in
their credit quality. In more than half of the quarters the banks report zero DVA,
despite the fact that they adopt the FVOL, indicating that the effect of own credit
risk changes in the fair value of liabilities was zero or immaterial. Managers
in our sample banks need to disclose DVAs in FR Y-9C regardless of
their materiality. Meanwhile, managers only disclose material DVAs in
10K/Q reports. For each quarter we consider the first date that any of
the two types of reports became available as the date that DVA infor-
mation is publicly available (release day).7 There is no rigid threshold of
the materiality of DVAs to be reported. Cedergren et al. (2019) show
that banks adopting large amounts of liabilities under FVO reported
larger magnitudes of DVAs than banks adopting few amounts of liabil-
ities under FVO given the same changes in credit risk. Consistently,
we find large banks with large amounts of FVOL in our sample are the
main reporters of non-zero DVAs. Indeed, the magnitudes of reported
DVAs do not affect the inference from results because the reliability is
of interest in this paper.
7The statutory due dates are the 60th for 10K filings and 35th day for 10Q filings.
For FR 9Y-C reports the due day is the 40th day following interim quarter-ends
and the 45th day following the fourth quarter-end. Reports can be released earlier
than the due date, so some times FR 9Y-C is released earlier than 10Q/K.
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Among early adopters, there are 16 positive DVA recognizers and only 1 negative
DVA recognizer, which coincides with the growing deterioration in creditworthi-
ness during early 2008. However, a similar number of banks report positive and
negative DVAs over financial crisis. This is not in line with our expectation, as en-
tities typically experience a credit deterioration during such a period. One possible
explanation for this result is that changes in credit quality were also more volatile
during this period. Appendix 2.4 provides information on the number of quarters
where zero, positive and negative DVAs are reported per bank. In Panels B and
C we report information on DVAs for large banks and other banks respectively.
We classify a bank as a large bank if it has a book value of assets greater than
$50 billion.8 As we can see from Panel B, most of the positive and negative DVAs
are driven by large banks. When we look at other banks, in 92% of bank-quarters
that the FVOL was adopted, a zero DVA is reported.
2.3.2 DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads
DVAs are based on internal estimates of the entitys credit risk. In order to inves-
tigate what determines DVAs, and whether they provide new information on the
credit quality of the banks, we firstly convert reported DVA amounts from financial
statements into changes in credit spreads. Expressing DVAs as changes in credit
spreads, rather than reporting them as dollar gains/losses, allows us to arrive at
a unit-free standardized measure that is directly comparable across different ob-
servations, as it already takes into account relevant credit information embedded
in bonds yield as well as its maturity and coupon structure. This measure, which
we label DVA-estimated spread, is interpreted in the same way as market-based
credit spreads and, as such, its magnitude can be directly compared to that of
the latter. Furthermore, DVA-estimated spreads can be directly used in regres-
sion model specifications developed to investigate the determinants of changes in
8$50 billion is used as a threshold for most requirements of enhanced supervision by the
Federal Reserve.
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credit spreads. A positive DVA (gain) indicates an increase in DVA-estimated
credit spreads, whereas a negative DVA (loss) indicates a decrease. In order to be
able to express these gains/losses as changes in credit spreads, we use information
on liabilities under the FVO from financial statements.
The amount and/or type of liabilities under the FVO can change from one report-
ing period to the other, because new liabilities may occur and/or some liabilities
may extinguish. Therefore, in order to get the DVA-estimated changes in credit
spreads we need to rely on information from the same reporting period. We de-
note with F̂ V Lt the hypothetical value of liabilities under the FVO at the end of
quarter t, in the absence of DVAs. DV At is the change in fair value of liabilities
due to fluctuations in creditworthiness in quarter t, while FV Lt is the actual fair
value of liabilities under the FVO at the end of the same quarter after DVAs are
considered. Because a negative DVA (loss) indicates an increase in the value of
liabilities, while a positive DVA (gain) indicates a decrease in the value of liabil-
ities, the actual fair value of liabilities at time t (FV Lt), equals to the value of
liabilities in the absence of own credit risk changes (F̂ V Lt) minus DV At:
FV Lt = F̂ V Lt −DV At (2.1)
FV Lt and DV At are provided in the financial statements, therefore, we use equa-
tion (1) to estimate F̂ V Lt. If DV At is zero, the actual fair value of liabilities
equals to the hypothetical fair value of liabilities (FV Lt = F̂ V Lt). If there is an
improvement in the credit quality (decrease in credit spread), the entity will have
a loss, indicated by a negative DVA. In this case, the actual fair value of liabilities
will be higher than the hypothetical fair value of liabilities (FV Lt > F̂V Lt). This
is because the cash flows of liabilities are discounted at a lower rate (decrease in
credit spread) than the rate that they would have been discounted in the absence
of credit quality improvement. Similarly, in case of deterioration in credit quality
(positive DVA), the actual fair value will be lower than the hypothetical fair value
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(FV Lt < F̂V Lt).
Next, we estimate the discount rate applied to obtain the actual fair value of
liabilities and the discount rate applied to obtain the hypothetical fair value of li-
abilities. To do this, we assume that liabilities under the FVO consist of one type
of bond that pays coupon semi-annually.9 Based on the bond valuation formula:






























where yt (ŷt) is the semiannually compounded actual (hypothetical under no own
credit risk changes) yield to maturity, and B is the face value of liabilities under
FVO. To estimate the two yields (yt, ŷt ), we hand-collect information on face
value (B) and maturity (T) of FV Lt from financial statements. If we do not have
more precise information, we assume that debt maturing in 5 years and beyond
has a maturity of 10 years.10 We also use the price weighted average coupon rate
(c) on straight coupon bonds issued by each bank in U.S. dollars.
The yield to maturity is equal to the risk free rate plus the credit spread. Given
that the risk free rate for the specific quarter is the same, the DVA-estimated
change in credit spread (Delta DV A CS) is given by the difference between the
actual yield to maturity and the hypothetical yield to maturity:
Delta DV A CSt = yt − r − (ŷt − r) = yt − ŷt (2.4)
9We need to make this simplification assumption, as financial reports do not pro-
vide this information for all the individual liabilities under the FVO. Chang et al.
(2011) investigate banks FVO elections for different types of financial instruments.
They find only early adopters likely to elect AFS securities under FVO in order
to exploit the SFAS No. 159s transition adjustments. This characteristic of in-
struments does not apply to liabilities and then our results. In addition, we also
estimate DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads assuming zero-coupon debt. The
conclusions based on the revised results remain the same.
10Our results do not change if we assume debt matures in 20 years.
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where r is the risk free rate with consistent maturity with liabilities under the
FVO, estimated by fitting Nelson and Siegel (1987) curve. Appendix 2.5 provides
the time-line of accounting and market information as well as a numerical exam-
ple on how the variables are measured based on equations (1-4). The numerical
example is based on the DVA disclosures provided in Appendix 2.3.
Descriptive statistics on the inputs and DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads
are presented in Table 3. The average change in credit spreads estimated for the
whole sample as well as for non-zero DVAs is negative. The table also includes
information on changes in CDS spreads as well as on changes in bond spreads.11
We obtain CDS and bond credit spreads from Thomson Reuters Datastream. We
use CDS spreads for identical maturities to the liabilities of the banks under FVOL
using linear interpolation. We have CDS spreads for 13 banks in our sample, result-
ing in 379 quarterly observations. For bond spreads, we identify publicly traded
bonds without inherent option rights issued by banks in the sample from 1996 to
2017, as the database starts to disclose bond-related information in 1996. Bond
spread is defined as the corporate bond yield minus the yield of the benchmark
Treasury rate. If there is no benchmark bond with the same maturity, then lin-
ear interpolation is used to estimate the yield of the equivalent benchmark. For
bonds with a maturity longer than the longest benchmark, the equivalent bench-
mark yield is always the yield of the longest Treasury bond. The same holds for
bonds with maturities shorter than the shortest benchmark, where the yield of
the shortest Treasury bond is used. We include quarterly bond yield spreads for
the same period as with DVAs data (2007 to 2017). This process yields to a fi-
nal sample of 1,313 bonds from 27 bank holding companies and 21,514 quarter
11We use CDS spreads as they are a cleaner measure of the credit risk compared to bond
spreads. Bond spreads are influenced by factors as tax, liquidity, and duration. However, using
bond spreads enables us to increase the number of observations for our tests and to check the
robustness of our results. For some entities in the sample we have available both CDS and bond
spreads.
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credit spreads. We define changes in bond credit spreads (Delta Bond CS) as the
difference in credit spreads between two consecutive quarters. We also estimate
changes in bond-spreads at bank-level (Delta Bond CS Mean). As in Barth et
al. (2012), we measure spread as the averages of the spread for each of the banks
bonds, weighted by the bond price. To avoid the effect of outliers, we winsorize
changes in bond spreads at 1 and 99 percent (Blankespoor et al. 2013; DeFond et
al. 2011).12
2.3.3 Research design
Firstly, we investigate whether DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads (Delta DV A CS)
can be explained by the same factors that explain changes in CDS or bond spreads.
This will provide us with an indication whether DVAs reflect market information
on the credit quality of the entities. For our multivariate analysis we estimate the
following linear regression model:
Delta DV A CSt = α +
∑
βjExplanatoryV ariablesjt + ε (2.5)
In structural credit risk models, the value of debt is obtained using contingent-
claims pricing techniques. Investing in risky debt is equivalent to holding an
otherwise identical riskless debt and having a short position in a put option on the
firm’s assets with exercise price equal to the face value of debt (Merton 1974). In
this framework, the credit spread (CS), is a function of the face value of debt, the
market value and volatility of the firm’s assets, the riskless interest rate and debt
maturity. In line with Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), we expect changes in credit
spreads to be positively associated with changes in leverage (Delta Lev), changes
12Descriptive statistics confirm that there are some potentially non-valid observations in the
data, resulting in extreme positive or extreme negative changes in credit spreads. These non-
valid observations may be a result of error entry in the database, illiquid bonds, and/or bonds
of very long or short maturity. Our results are robust to (1) using not winsorized data, (2) using
the log form of bond spreads and (3) deleting observations that are candidates for data errors
(Bessembinder et al. 2006; Helwege et al. 2014).
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in asset volatility (Delta Sigma) and changes in the probability or magnitude
of downward jump (Delta Jump), and negatively associated with changes in the
spot rate (Delta r10), changes in the slope of the yield curve (Delta Slope) and
changes in business climate (Delta Climate). Appendix 2.7 provides a detailed
description of the explanatory variables.
In order to control for the panel data structure of our sample we estimate re-
gressions results adjusted to account for correlation within firm clusters and we
include firm fixed effects. Estimating regressions using a within-year control design
does not change the inference of our results.13
2.4 Empirical results
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for all bank-quarters (Panel A) as well as for
the bank-quarters that non-zero DVA is reported (Panel B). The largest quarterly
gain (loss) from DVAs during our sample period is $3,410 ($3,135) million, while
the average DVA is $-14.7 million.14 We also provide the ratio DVA to lagged
liabilities under the FVO (DV A/FV L lag). The mean DV A/FV L lag is 0.0008
for all FVOL adopters, whereas for non-zero DVA reporters is 0.0021.
Table 5 reports Pearson correlation coefficients for all the variables that are used in
the regression analysis. The correlation between the control variables is relatively
13In the main analysis, we do not include time fixed effects because macro-economic variables
do not vary enough over quarters and because of the small sample size for some of the analyses
(Li and Prabhala 2005). The results are robust for our larger subsample of bond spreads when we
(1) use year fixed effects, (2) remove the macro-economic control variables and include quarter
fixed effects and (3) include indicator variables for first, second and third quarter.
14These DVA gains (losses) greatly affected the net incomes of the largest U.S.
bank holding companies in 2008, exemplified by Morgan Stanleys DVA gains flipping
the 3.3 billion losses into 1.7 billion profits attributable to credit deterioration.
Chapter 2. What Can We Learn About Credit Risk From Debt Valuation
Adjustments? 35
low, indicating no multicollinearity between explanatory variables. As, expected,
the correlation between DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads and changes
in bond and CDS spreads is positive, however, it is small. The correlation be-
tween Delta DV A CS and Delta Bond CS is 0.13, while the correlation between
Delta DV A CS andDelta CDS CS is 0.08. This is another indication that DVAs
may provide different information about the credit quality of the entities than the
market-based measures of credit risk. The correlation between changes in CDS
spreads and (mean) bond spreads is 0.48 (0.66). This less than perfect correlation
is not unexpected. Literature provides evidence that CDS spreads contain credit
risk information that is not captured by bonds of the same firm, and that CDS
spreads lead bond spreads (Blanco et al. 2005; Lee et al. 2018).15
2.4.2 Determinants of DVA-estimated changes in credit
spread
Table 6 presents regression results on the determinants of DVA-estimated changes
in credit spreads. The first column presents results for all FVOL adopters, includ-
ing bank-quarter observations where zero DVA is reported. Only Delta Slope is
statistically significant in explaining DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads and
the adjusted R-squared is low, indicating limited explanatory power of the model.
In the second column, we only consider bank-quarter observations in which non-
zero DVA is reported. The only significant variable for the results presented in the
second column is Delta Jump.
15The fact that CDS spreads lead bond spreads, as documented in the extant literature, is
immaterial for our analysis. Lags in the CDS spreads-bond spreads lead-lag relationship are
measured in days (e.g., the lag order in Lee et al. 2018 is three days), whereas, due to the nature
of accounting data, the relevant duration of a lag in our setting is one month/a quarter.
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To assess the explanatory power of the control variables in our model, we run re-
gressions on changes in CDS and bond yield spreads.16 These results are presented
in the last three columns of Table 6. For changes in CDS spreads, Delta Lev,
Delta Jump and Delta Climate are statistically significant. The adjusted R-
squared increases to 12.10%. In the last two columns, where the dependent vari-
ables are the change in bond spreads and the average change in bond spreads,
most of the coefficients have the predicted sign, and a number of them are statis-
tically significant. The explanatory power of the model is also much higher, with
an adjusted R-squared between 13% and 34%. Similarly to Blanco et al. (2005)
and Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), our models leave significant variance both in
changes in CDS spreads and changes in bond spreads unexplained. According to
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), this may be a results of spreads being driven by
market-wide supply and demand shocks.
One concern is that our results are driven by the way we estimate our depen-
dent variable (Delta DV A CS). Although we incorporate all available informa-
tion on the characteristics of the instruments under the FVO, as we explained
in subsection 3.2, we had to impose some assumptions in our estimation process.
To check robustness of the results to these assumptions, we use a number of al-
ternative dependent variables. We scale DV A t by (1) assets, (2) mean value of
liabilities under the FVO, (3) liabilities under the FVO at the beginning of the
period (4) total liabilities, and we also use the natural logarithm of DVA as well
as the annual DVA. The results are very similar to these presented in Table 6
(untabulated results). Most of the control variables are not significant and the ex-
planatory power of the regression models is low. This is also the case if we repeat
our analysis after splitting the sample into positive and negative reported DVA
(untabulated results). We also investigate whether our insignificant results in the
16An alternative market-based measure of changes in credit risk is changes in credit ratings.
However, because in our sample we have only a small number of changes in actual and estimated
credit ratings, we are unable to meaningfully use this measure.
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first two columns in Table 6 are driven by observations for which we do not have
market-based measures of credit risk available. To do this, we run our regressions,
firstly, using only the observations for which we have available changes in CDS
spreads and secondly, using only observations for which we have available changes
in bond spreads. The inference of our results do not change. Untabulated findings
indicate that most of the variables are insignificant in explaining DVA-estimated
changes in credit spreads.
The above analysis shows that reported DVAs are not explained on average by
the factors that explain changes in credit spreads. This result can be driven by
the fact that DVAs incorporate both market and private information on the credit
risk of the entity. The use of private information in the estimation of DVAs can
result in entities using FVOL for opportunistic behaviour and/or in order to pro-
vide insider information on the credit standing of the bank that it is not captured
by the market.
The study of Dong et al. (2019), provides evidence consistent with banks ex-
ercising discretion over DVAs to smooth earnings. While we cannot rule out this
possibility, the incentives for earnings management in our sample are likely to be
lower than in Dong et al. (2019). Firms in our sample report DVAs in a stan-
dardised way in their machine-readable FR Y-9C, resulting to higher transparency
associated with these gains/losses. In addition, incentives for earnings manage-
ment are likely to further decrease after 2017 due to DVAs no longer be reported
in net income. Therefore, in the subsequent analysis we focus on investigating
whether DVAs reflect managements assessment of the credit quality of the bank,
providing insider information on its credit standing to the market.
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2.4.3 Fair value Level
In order to investigate whether DVAs convey incremental information about the
entity’s own credit risk (beyond information that can be inferred from the market),
we distinguish between public and private information incorporated in DVAs. To
do this, we use information on the fair value Level of liabilities under the FVO
(FVL). Table 7 provides information on the percentage of liabilities under the
FVO at Level 1 and 2 and Level 3 (Panel A), as well as the number of observa-
tions classified as Level 1 and 2 or Level 3 reporters using different cut-offs (Panel
B). Because only a small percentage of liabilities under the FVOL is measured at
fair value Level 1, we had to group Level 1 and 2 reporters together.17 For the re-
sults presented in the paper, a bank is considered Level 1 and 2 (Level 3) reporter,
if it reports 80% or more of its financial liabilities under the FVO at Level 1 and 2
(Level 3) in a specific quarter. The inference of our results does not change if we
use a 100% or a 70% cut-off.
The table provides information for the whole sample, as well as the sub-samples
for which we have available changes in CDS and bond spreads. Note, that if the
inputs used to measure the fair value of liabilities under the FVO fall into different
levels of the hierarchy, then the Level employed for measurement and presentation
is based on the lowest Level input. Therefore, it is possible for banks to have CDS
spreads and/or traded bonds and report their liabilities under the FVO at Level
3. Similarly, a Level 2 reporter may not have CDS spreads and/or traded bonds
available, but use quoted market prices for similar instruments issued by another
company. When we use the 80% cut-off, 433 bank-quarter observations are classi-
fied as Level 1 and 2 reporters, while, 306 bank-quarter observations are classified
as Level 3 reporters. When we look at the observations for which we have CDS
data available, the number of bank-quarter observations decreases significantly,
17Only 3 bank holding companies in our sample are classified as Level 1 reporters when we use
the 80% cut-off.
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only 228 bank-quarter observations are classified as Level 1 and 2 reporters and
49 bank-quarter observations are classified as Level 3 reporters.
For Level 1 and 2 reporters, we expect DVA-estimated changes in credit spread to
be better explained by the factors that explain market-based measures of changes
in credit spreads than for Level 3 reporters, because market inputs are used for the
estimation of DVAs. Regression results presented in Table 8 suggest that DVA-
estimated changes in credit spreads are still not well explained by the factors that
explain market-based measures of changes in credit spreads for Level 1 and 2 re-
porters (columns 1). The only significant variables are changes in business climate
and probability of downward jump. For Level 3 reporters, none of the explanatory
variables is significant. The adjusted R-squared is negative for both Level 1 and 2
and Level 3 reporters, indicating that the models contain terms that do not help
to predict the DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads.18
The results for Level 1 and 2 category can be largely driven by the Level 2 re-
porters. If liabilities under the FVO are traded, the market-based measure of
changes in credit risk and the DVA-estimated credit risk should be tautological,
and therefore, explained by the same factors. However, this is rarely the case in
our sample. Only 3 bank holding companies (33 bank-quarters) report more than
80% of liabilities under the FVO at fair value Level 1. The rest of bank holding
companies in the Level 1 and 2 category are Level 2 reporters. For the valuation
of their liabilities under the FVO, Level 2 reporters use quoted market prices from
similar instruments that are traded, and inputs other than quoted prices. From the
market, one can observe the credit spread of the instrument, which is driven not
only by the credit risk of the company but also by other factors (as for example,
liquidity and duration). If the characteristics of the liabilities under the FVO are
different to the instruments that are traded, the firm will make adjustments to the
18 Unadjusted R-squared is positive but very low for both regressions.
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credit spreads. Because of these adjustments and potential measurement error,
the observed credit spreads can differ from the DVA-estimated credit spreads for
Level 2 reporters.
In columns 3-11, we include some additional explanatory variables, the changes
in CDS and bond spreads. The coefficients on the changes in CDS spreads and
bond spreads are statistically significant for Level 1 and 2 reporters. The adjusted
R-squared of the models also increases significantly. These results are consistent
with the fact that, for liabilities measured at fair value Level 1 and 2, market in-
puts are used in the DVAs estimation process. We find no such evidence for Level
3 reporters.
Next, we investigate whether reported DVAs convey private information about
the credit quality of the entity. To do this, we look at the ability of reported DVAs
to predict future changes in credit spreads. To generate results presented in Ta-
ble 9, we include in the models explaining the market-based measures of changes
in credit spreads the contemporaneous DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads
(Delta DV A CS t) as well as the one-quarter leading DVA-estimate change in
credit spreads (Delta DV A CS t + 1) and the one-quarter lagged DVA-estimate
change in credit spreads (Delta DV A CS t−1). If managers provide insider infor-
mation to the market through DVAs and associated disclosures, we expect lagged
DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads to be significant in explaining changes
in CDS and bond spreads. We expect this to be particularly the case for Level 3
reporters, as Level 3 fair values are based on managerial inputs. The number of
observations decreases, as we need data on CDS spreads and bond spreads as well
as one-quarter lead and lagged data on DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads.
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The leading DVA-estimated change in credit spreads coefficient is not signifi-
cant, indicating that future DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads and cur-
rent market-based measures of changes in credit spreads are uncorrelated. The
coefficient of the contemporaneous DVA-estimated change in credit spreads is sig-
nificant for Level 1 and 2 reporters. This result is in line with the results presented
in Table 8, and consistent with market inputs used for the estimation of DVAs for
Level 1 and 2 reporters. The lagged DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads
are significant in explaining changes in the bond and CDS spreads for Level 3
reporters. In addition, the explanatory power of our models, captured by adjusted
R-squared, increases significantly. This result is consistent with managers provid-
ing insider information to the market through DVAs and associated disclosures. To
investigate further the ability of DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads to lead
market-based measures of credit risk, we also estimate a panel vector autoregressive
(PVAR) model that describes the dynamic evolution of our variables (Holtz-Eakin
et al. 1988). Untabulated findings confirm that DVA-estimated changes in credit
spreads lead market-based measures of credit risk for Level 3 reporters. Using the
model and moment selection criteria of Andrews and Lu (2001), we find that the
optimal number of lags in the PVAR model is one (quarter), in line with the model
presented in Table 9.
For the results presented in Table 9, the choice of one quarter as the length of
a (single) lag is driven by the structure and limitations of our data. While market
spreads can be measured almost continuously, we can only measure DVA-implied
spreads with quarterly frequency (as they are based on accounting data). There-
fore, faced with time series for two variables with a different sampling frequency,
we need to settle for the lag length that corresponds to the sampling frequency of
the variable that is measured less often. However, if the reported DVAs and associ-
ated disclosures are informative to the market, we expect these to influence credit
spreads as soon as they becomes available. In the regressions presented in Table
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10, we examine the predictive ability of DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads
using one-month window. Due to the data frequency limitations explained above,
we include in our analyses only the one-quarter lagged DVA-estimate change in
credit spreads (Delta DV A CS t− 1). As information on DVAs is available both
in FR 9Y-C and 10Q/K, we consider the one-month window after the end of the
quarter as a reasonable approximation of the release of the information without
imposing strict assumptions on the release date, or reducing the power of our re-
sults because of the thin trading of bonds/CDS. We expect Delta DV A CS t− 1
to explain changes in credit risk in the first month of the following quarter, and
this effect to disappear in the following months.
The first 3 columns of Table 10 present results for the first month of the quar-
ter. Results for the second and third month are presented in columns 4-6 and 7-9
respectively. The explanatory variables are re-estimated to correspond to the spe-
cific one-month window. We only include results for changes in bond spreads, but
results are very similar if we use the mean change in bond spreads.19 In line with
our expectation, Delta DV A CS t− 1 is only significant in explaining changes in
bond spreads in the first month for Level 3 reporters.
2.4.3.1 Additional endogeneity control
The classification of the bank-quarter observations as Level 1 and 2 or Level 3
reporters is based on the liabilities for which the bank adopts the FVO. If the
banks that adopt the FVOL at Level 3 are different from the banks that adopt the
FVOL at Level 1 and 2, we have a selection bias. In order to control for the time
invariant unobservable characteristics that affect the changes in credit spreads, we
include in all our regressions bank fixed effects. To control for potential time vary-
ing unobservable characteristic, we use the two-stage Heckman (1979) correction
19The coefficient of Delta DV A CS t− 1 is positive put insignificant in the first month if we
use CDS spreads. This is likely to be driven by the small number of observations for the CDS
tests.
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procedure. First, we use a probit model to explain the use of fair value Level 3
reporting. Following the reasoning of Altamuro and Zhang (2013) and Iselin and
Nicoletti (2017), we expect that Level 3 reporting is associated with the size of the
bank (Size), the auditors (Big4), the use of the FVO for assets (FV OA) and the
importance of liabilities under FVO (FV L/TA). Appendix C provides a detailed
description of the explanatory variables.
The results from estimating the probit model are presented in Panel A of Ta-
ble 11. As in Table 10, we look at the predictive ability of DVAs, using one-month
window. The pseudo− R2 is around 61 percent indicating a good fit. The coeffi-
cients on Size and FV L/TA are negative and significant, in line with larger firms
having liabilities that are traded, and therefore reported at Level 1 and 2. The
coefficient on FV OA is positive and statistically significant, while, the coefficient
on Big4 has the opposite sign to our expectation. In the second stage, reported
in Panel B of Table 11, we add the self-selection parameter (λ) calculated from
the probit regression to our main regression models. We only include results for
changes in bond spreads, but results are very similar if we use the mean change
in bond spreads. In line with our results in Table 10, lag Delta DV A CS is only
significant in explaining changes in bond spreads in the first month for Level 3
reporters.
The predictive ability of DVAs appears to be driven by the superior ability of
managers to estimate own credit risk. This result contributes to the fair value lit-
erature, and in particular to the studies that examine the equity and risk relevance
of fair value Levels. Our findings indicate that managers use their discretion in
computing Level 3 fair values to provide information to the market that is useful
to predict future risk. The study also contributes to the small group of studies
that consider the effects of fair valuing liabilities (Fontes et al. 2018; Koonce et
al. 2011; Blankespoor et al. 2013).
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2.4.4 Further sensitivity analyses
To investigate the robustness of our findings, we conduct several additional anal-
yses. The effective date of FVO standard is January 1, 2008 for regular adopters,
however, early adoption from 2007 is allowed. To test if our results are driven by
early adopters, we run our regressions deleting 2007 observations from the sam-
ple. Untabulated findings show that the inference or our results do not change.
The lagged DVA-estimated changes in credit spread are significant in explaining
future changes in bond and CDS spreads for Level 3 reporters. We also run our
models using explanatory variables from the accounting literature. Following the
Correia et al. (2018) and Correia et al. (2012), we add to our regression models
the change in firm size, return on assets, distance to default, and book to market
ratio as additional control variables. The results are in line with those of our main
models.
2.5 Conclusions
Motivated by the debate that occurred in the accounting policy area regarding the
introduction of the FVOL, this paper investigates whether reported DVAs indeed
reflect changes in credit spreads captured by the market and whether incremental
information about the entity’s own credit risk (beyond information that can be in-
ferred from the market) is conveyed. While accounting standards have introduced
the FVOL to enable the firms to eliminate or reduce accounting mismatch that
arise from the measurement of assets at fair value, concerns have been raised that
firms may opt for opportunistic election of the FVOL.
Using a sample of U.S. bank holding companies we find that, on average, DVAs
cannot be explained by the same factors that determine changes in credit risk.
We propose a number of non-mutually exclusive explanations for this result. The
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first of them is that, on average, DVAs do not reflect changes in credit quality
of the entity, and therefore FVOL is used by managers for opportunistic reasons.
The other explanation is based on the conjecture that managers may possess in-
formation about institutions’ own credit risk that are not fully embedded in bond
market data.
When we investigate the ability of reported DVA to predict future changes in
credit spreads we find that lagged DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads are
significant in explaining changes in CDS and bond spreads. This result is driven by
banks that report liabilities at fair value Level 3, providing support that managers
provide insider information to the market through DVAs and associated disclo-
sures. These results however, cannot exclude the use of DVAs for opportunistic
reasons. Overall, our results improve our understanding of managerial decision-
making with respect to fair value accounting and contribute to the debate about
the role of fair value accounting for financial liabilities in generating decision-useful
financial information.
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Appendix 2.1 Accounting Recognition of Finan-
cial Liabilities
Figure 2.1: Accounting recognition of financial liabilities



































Appendix 2.2 Empirical Results
Table 2.1: The sample selection procedure
Banks that report net gains or losses on liabilities (bhckf553) or net gains or losses on
liabilities attributable to changes in their own credit risk (bhckf554) at least once during
sample period 2007: Q1 to 2017: Q4 85
Banks that match with COMPUSTAT and CRSP with publicly available stock price and
positive book value of liabilities 46
Banks that report fair value and principal value of liabilities under fair value option 38
All bank-quarters of selected banks 887
The table provides information on sample selection. In the sample we include U.S. bank holding companies for the period 2007-2017
that have available data. This process leads to 887 bank-quarter observations.
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Table 2.2: FVOL adopters and DVA recognizers per year
Number of bank-quarters
DVA<0 DVA=0 DVA>0 Total Number of banks
Panel A: All banks DVA!=0
2007 1 1% 36 7% 16 9% 53 6% 5
2008 19 11% 68 13% 21 12% 108 12% 13
2009 24 14% 65 12% 13 8% 102 11% 12
2010 19 11% 68 13% 18 11% 105 12% 10
2011 15 9% 50 9% 21 12% 86 10% 9
2012 23 13% 47 9% 10 6% 80 9% 9
2013 24 14% 46 9% 8 5% 78 9% 8
2014 13 7% 42 8% 19 11% 74 8% 8
2015 8 5% 40 7% 24 14% 72 8% 8
2016 14 8% 42 8% 14 8% 70 8% 8
2017 16 9% 36 7% 7 4% 59 7% 6
Total 176 100% 540 100% 171 100% 887 100%
Panel B: Large banks (total assets ¿ $50 billion)
2007 1 1% 0 0% 13 9% 14 3%
2008 10 6% 3 3% 16 11% 29 7%
2009 22 14% 3 3% 7 5% 32 7%
2010 16 10% 15 13% 17 11% 48 11%
2011 13 8% 13 11% 19 13% 45 10%
2012 23 14% 12 10% 9 6% 44 10%
2013 24 15% 16 14% 8 5% 48 11%
2014 13 8% 14 12% 19 13% 46 11%
2015 8 5% 12 10% 24 16% 44 10%
2016 14 9% 17 15% 13 9% 44 10%
2017 16 10% 12 10% 7 5% 35 8%
Total 160 100% 117 100% 152 100% 429 100%
Panel C: Other banks (Total assets ¡ $50 billion)
2007 0 0% 36 9% 3 16% 39 9%
2008 9 56% 65 15% 5 26% 79 17%
2009 2 13% 62 15% 6 32% 70 15%
2010 3 19% 53 13% 1 5% 57 12%
2011 2 13% 37 9% 2 11% 41 9%
2012 0 0% 35 8% 1 5% 36 8%
2013 0 0% 30 7% 0 0% 30 7%
2014 0 0% 28 7% 0 0% 28 6%
2015 0 0% 28 7% 0 0% 28 6%
2016 0 0% 25 6% 1 5% 26 6%
2017 0 0% 24 6% 0 0% 24 5%
Total 16 100% 423 100% 19 100% 458 100%
The table provides information on the number of bank-quarters for which FVOL was adopted, and the recog-
nition of positive and negative DVA each year. Panel A provides information for all the banks, while Panels
B and C provide information for large banks (total assets more than $50 billion) and other banks respectively.



































Table 2.3: DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads, bond spreads and CDS spreads
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Panel A: Inputs for DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads
Coupon rate 887 0.0566 0.0179 0.0113 0.0439 0.0547 0.0671 0.1164
Maturity 887 8.0267 7.1085 1.0000 3.1834 4.8017 10.0000 39.0000
Risk-free rate 887 0.0205 0.0123 0.0014 0.0103 0.0186 0.0282 0.0517
Fair value (’000) 887 21,689,588 44,049,942 1,250 41,429 159,787 10,392,000 358,827,000
Principal value (’000) 887 21,896,584 44,471,600 1,500 61,900 192,900 8,042,000 357,997,000
DVA (’000) (all observations) 887 -14,651 374,937 -3,134,715 0 0 0 3,410,000
DVA (’000) (non-zero DVA) 347 -37,450 599,267 -3,134,715 -143,000 -162 87,000 3,410,000
Panel B: DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads
Delta DVA CS (all observations) 887 -0.0008 0.0147 -0.1591 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1918
Delta DVA CS (non-zero DVA ) 347 -0.0019 0.0234 -0.1591 -0.0018 -0.0001 0.0009 0.1918
Panel C: Market-based measures of changes in credit spreads
Delta CDS CS 379 -0.0002 0.0144 -0.0841 -0.0022 -0.0003 0.0010 0.1451
Delta Bond CS 21,514 0.0006 0.0087 -0.0257 -0.0018 -0.00002 0.0015 0.0587
Delta Bond CS Mean 540 0.0008 0.0073 -0.0235 -0.0020 -0.0001 0.0018 0.0334
The table provides descriptive statistics of the inputs used for the estimation of DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads (Delta DVA CS) as well as
information on Delta DVA CS (Panel B), and market based measures of changes in credist spreads (Panel C). Market-based measures include changes
in CDS spreads of identical maturities to the liabilities of the banks under the FVO (Delta CDS CS), changes in bond spreads (Delta Bond CS) and
changes in the mean bond spread (Delta Bond CS Mean) for the period 2007-2017. We have CDS spreads for 13 banks in our sample, resulting in 379
quarterly observations. For bond spreads, we identify all publicly traded bonds without inherent option rights issued by the banks in the sample. We


































Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics on DVAs and determinants
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Panel A: All FVOL adopters
DVA (’000) 887 -14,651 374,937 -3,134,715 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3,410,000
DVA/FVL lag 887 0.0008 0.0346 -0.1296 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6522
DVA/FVL mean 886 0.0001 0.0269 -0.1282 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4675
DVA/Asset lag 886 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0037 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0041
Delta Lev 887 0.0003 0.0152 -0.0556 -0.0075 -0.0003 0.0075 0.0658
Delta r10 887 -0.0005 0.0044 -0.0102 -0.0038 -0.0010 0.0020 0.0104
Delta Slope 887 0.0002 0.0035 -0.0078 -0.0025 -0.0003 0.0023 0.0101
Delta Sigma 887 -0.0002 0.0133 -0.0660 -0.0040 -0.0005 0.0035 0.1066
Delta Climate 887 0.0193 0.0851 -0.2190 -0.0257 0.0312 0.0635 0.1569
Delta Jump 887 -0.0005 0.0325 -0.0635 -0.0263 -0.0003 0.0263 0.0783
Panel B: Non-zero DVA
DVA (’000) 347 -37,450 599,267 -3,134,715 -143,000 -162 87,000 3,410,000
DVA/FVL lag 347 0.0021 0.0553 -0.1296 -0.0052 -0.0001 0.0026 0.6522
DVA/FVL mean 347 0.0003 0.0431 -0.1282 -0.0055 -0.0001 0.0026 0.4675
DVA/Asset lag 347 0.0000 0.0006 -0.0037 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0041
Delta Lev 347 -0.0003 0.0146 -0.0556 -0.0073 -0.0006 0.0069 0.0658
Delta r10 347 -0.0006 0.0043 -0.0102 -0.0038 -0.0011 0.0020 0.0104
Delta Slope 347 0.0001 0.0034 -0.0078 -0.0025 -0.0003 0.0023 0.0101
Delta Sigma 347 0.0007 0.0127 -0.0603 -0.0028 -0.0002 0.0029 0.0600
Delta Climate 347 0.0187 0.0849 -0.2190 -0.0257 0.0312 0.0635 0.1569
Delta Jump 347 -0.0010 0.0330 -0.0635 -0.0263 -0.0010 0.0263 0.0783
The table reports descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for all the sam-
ple, including bank-quarters where zero DVA were reported. Panel B, includes only the bank-quarters that non-zero DVA were
reported. Accum DVA is the annual DVA and DVA/FVL lag is the ratio of DVA to one quarter lagged liabilities under the FVO.
Delta Lev is the change in the ratio book value of liabilities to market value of assets. Delta r10 is the change in the 10-year Trea-
sury rate. Delta Slope is the change in the slope of the yield curve. Delta Sigma is the change is asset volatility. Delta Climate


































Table 2.5: Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Panel A: All bank-quarters
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 7 8 9 10
1 Delta DVA CS
2 Delta Bond CS 0.1330***
3 Delta Bond CS Mean 0.1020** 0.5877***
4 Delta CDS CS 0.0818 0.4808*** 0.6561***
5 DVA/FVL lag 0.5229*** 0.2526*** 0.1978*** 0.2202***
6 DVA/FVL mean 0.6635*** 0.2493*** 0.1607*** 0.2697*** 0.8115***
7 DVA/Asset lag 0.2603*** 0.2896*** 0.3424*** 0.3538*** 0.3864*** 0.4116***
6 Delta Lev 0.0303 0.2476*** 0.2750*** 0.2744*** 0.0431 0.0214 0.1406***
7 Delta r10 -0.0815** -0.2302*** -0.3423*** -0.1292** -0.0211 -0.0408 -0.1531*** -0.2783***
8 Delta Slope -0.0742** -0.1972*** -0.1122*** -0.1563*** -0.0230 -0.0465 -0.0565* -0.1517*** 0.4412***
9 Delta Sigma 0.0107 0.0285*** 0.1480*** -0.0667 -0.0002 0.0207 0.0613* -0.4639*** -0.1066*** 0.0702**
10 Delta Climate -0.0862** -0.3030*** -0.5022*** -0.3085*** -0.0462 -0.0230 -0.2197*** -0.4347*** 0.5456*** 0.0958*** -0.096***
11 Delta Jump 0.0370 0.1261*** 0.1694*** 0.2043*** 0.0161 0.0181 0.0980*** -0.0084 -0.2571*** -0.2898*** 0.1271*** -0.1127***
Panel B: Non-zero DVA
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 7 8 9 10
1 Delta DVA CS
2 Delta Bond CS 0.1353***
3 Delta Bond CS Mean 0.1311** 0.5774***
4 Delta CDS CS 0.0836 0.4821*** 0.7114***
5 DVA/FVL lag 0.5262*** 0.2569*** 0.2554*** 0.2227***
6 DVA/FVL mean 0.6652*** 0.2535*** 0.2072*** 0.2740*** 0.8117***
7 DVA/Asset lag 0.2590*** 0.2946*** 0.4416*** 0.3581*** 0.3877*** 0.4120***
6 Delta Lev 0.0471 0.2507*** 0.3937*** 0.2778*** 0.0733 0.0360 0.2320***
7 Delta r10 -0.1337** -0.2287*** -0.3413*** -0.1233** -0.0336 -0.0660 -0.2486*** -0.3446***
8 Delta Slope -0.1229** -0.2000*** -0.1673*** -0.1533*** -0.0365 -0.0754 -0.0928* -0.223*** 0.4683***
9 Delta Sigma 0.0238 0.0256*** 0.0723 -0.0741 -0.0030 0.0341 0.1053* -0.464*** -0.0511 0.1234**
10 Delta Climate -0.1391*** -0.2971*** -0.5052*** -0.3036*** -0.0739 -0.0369 -0.3528*** -0.4646*** 0.5659*** 0.1019* -0.1129**
11 Delta Jump 0.0574 0.1290*** 0.2018*** 0.2215*** 0.0260 0.0286 0.1540*** 0.0642 -0.2564*** -0.2944*** 0.0913* -0.1082*


































Table 2.6: Determinants of DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads, CDS spreads changes and bond spreads changes.
Pred. Delta DVA CS Delta DVA CS Delta CDS CS Delta Bond CS Delta Bond
Sign All FVOL Non-zero DVA CS Mean
Intercept -0.0004* -0.0010 0.0016 0.0016*** 0.0015***
t (-1.83) (-1.42) (1.09) (3.31) (3.07)
Delta Lev + -0.0332 -0.1197 0.1478*** 0.0974*** 0.0577**
(-1.16) (-1.34) (2.70) (2.90) (2.35)
Delta r10 - -0.0370 -0.0838 0.7608 0.0015 -0.0866
(-0.25) (-0.20) (1.22) (0.01) (-0.54)
Delta Slope - -0.3378* -0.8164 -0.5777 -0.2344 -0.0689
(-1.65) (-1.42) (-1.12) (-1.04) (-0.40)
Delta Sigma + -0.0072 -0.0418 -0.0664 0.0876** 0.0758
(-0.24) (-0.55) (-1.46) (2.06) (1.01)
Delta Climate - -0.0140 -0.0463 -0.0557** -0.0306*** -0.0295***
(-1.28) (-1.57) (-2.02) (-3.20) (-3.48)
Delta Jump + 0.0035 0.0327*** 0.0775* 0.0091 0.0246
(0.25) (2.83) (1.65) (1.02) (1.56)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 887 347 379 21514 540
Adj. R-squared 6.20% 27.40% 12.10% 13.37% 34.07%
The table presents regression results on the determinants of DVA-estimated credit spreads changes, CDS spreads changes and bond
spreads changes. The first column presents results for all FVOL adopters, whereas for the regression results presented in the second col-
umn, we only include bank-quarters that a non-zero DVA is reported. The third column presents regression results for changes in CDS
spreads with identical weighted average maturities to liabilities under FVOL. The last two columns present results on the determinants
of changes in bond spreads. All variables are defined in Table 4. The coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) are based on



































Table 2.7: Liabilities under the FVO in different Levels
Panel A: Percentage of liabilities in different Levels
Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
All observations
Level 1 and 2 887 57.45% 43.89% 0.00% 0.00% 78.48% 100.00% 100.00%
Level 3 887 42.55% 43.89% 0.00% 0.00% 21.52% 100.00% 100.00%
Observations with Level 1 and 2 540 63.86% 40.86% 0.00% 0.00% 84.49% 97.00% 100.00%
bond spreads avali-
able
Level 3 540 36.14% 40.86% 0.00% 3.00% 15.51% 100.00% 100.00%
Observations with CDS spreads available
Level 1 and 2 379 74.10% 31.75% 0.00% 72.27% 87.10% 96.00% 100.00%
Level 3 379 25.90% 31.75% 0.00% 4.00% 12.90% 27.73% 100.00%
Panel B: Observations classified as Level 1 and 2, and Level 3 reporters
Obs. for different cut-off
100% >80% >70%
All observations
Level 1 and 2 reporters 231 433 507
Level 3 reporters 285 306 317
Observations with Level 1 and 2 reporters 92 292 357
bond spreads avali-
able
Level 3 reporters 140 146 150
Observations with CDS spreads available
Level 1 and 2 reporters 28 228 293
Level 3 reporters 43 49 53
The table presents information on the percentage of liabilities under the FVO at Level 1 and 2 and Level 3 (Panel A), as well as the number of ob-
servations classified as Level 1 and 2 or Level 3 reporters using different cut-offs (Panel B). With the 100% cut-off a bank is considered Level 1 and
2 (Level 3) reporter, if it reports 100% or more of its financial liabilities under the FVOL at Level 1 and 2 (Level 3) in the particular quarter. Simi-
larly, with the 80% (70%) cut-off a bank a bank is considered Level 1 and 2 reporter, if it reports 80% (70%) or more of its financial liabilities under
the FVOL at Level 1 and 2 in the particular quarter. The bank is considered as Level 3 reporter, if it reports 80% (70%) or more of its financial
liabilities under the FVOL at Level 3 in the particular quarter. The table provides information for the whole sample, as well as for the sub-samples


































Table 2.8: Determinants of DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads: Fair value levels
Pred. Level1&2 Level 3 All obs. Level1&2 Level 3 All obs. Level1&2 Level 3 All obs. Level1&2 Level 3
Sign
Intercept -0.0003*** 0.0008*** -0.0012*** -0.0001 0.0009 0.0002 0.0001 0.0020* -0.0004 -0.0003*** 0.0037**
t ( -35.35) ( 4.25) (-3.87) (-0.85) (0.37) (1.08) (1.18) (1.79) (-0.96) (-6.70) (2.32)
Delta CDS t + 0.0280*** 0.0570** 1.2642
(8.30) (2.15) (0.86)
Delta Bond CS t + 0.0381** 0.1363*** -0.1759
(2.00) (4.42) (-1.08)
Delta Bond CS Mean t + 0.1311*** 0.1559** -0.4360
(2.62) (2.56) (-1.07)
Delta Lev + -0.0235 -0.0306 -0.0907 0.0133 -0.4713** 0.0190 0.0202 -0.1329 -0.0567 0.0186 -0.1371
(-0.47) (-1.46) (-0.79) (0.63) (-2.47) (0.83) (0.70) (-0.90) (-0.90) (1.10) (-1.35)
Delta r10 - -0.2568 0.1169 -0.1032 -0.1315* -1.3461* -0.1185* 0.0178 0.0214 0.2058 0.0078 0.0024
(-1.06) (0.68) (-0.41) (-1.90) (-1.86) (-1.95) (0.58) (0.02) (1.08) (0.16) (0.01)
Delta Slope - -0.1075 -0.4860 -0.5028 0.0475 0.3645** -0.0178 0.0063 -0.6551 -0.5688 -0.0330 -0.9359
(-1.24) (-1.15) (-1.34) (0.94) (2.15) (-0.24) (0.46) (-0.64) (-1.35) (-0.93) (-1.04)
Delta Sigma + -0.0411 0.0305 -0.0422 -0.0108 -0.3632 0.0511*** -0.0130 0.2571 -0.0078 -0.0170 0.3477
(-1.08) (0.71) (-0.48) (-0.54) (-0.77) (2.97) (-1.11) (1.07) (-0.13) (-1.35) (0.86)
Delta Climate - -0.0093*** -0.0112 -0.0350 -0.0122*** -0.0871 -0.0161** -0.0165*** -0.0482 -0.0294 -0.0079*** -0.0752
(-2.93) (-0.86) (-1.33) (-2.61) (-0.83) (-2.56) (-6.63) (-1.18) (-1.25) (-3.31) (-1.28)
Delta Jump + 0.0191* -0.0430 0.0176** 0.0088 -0.0928** -0.0045* 0.0061 -0.0503 -0.0051 0.0044 -0.1189
(1.72) (-1.16) (2.27) (1.44) (-2.05) (-1.89) (1.16) (-1.12) (-0.25) (0.95) (-1.19)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 433 306 379 228 49 21514 17754 914 540 292 146
Adj. R-squared -3.48% -2.80% 11.50% 39.88% -18.27% 19.33% 41.41% 4.02% 9.61% 37.57% -4.71%
The table presents regression results of the determinants of DVA-estimated credit spreads for different fair value levels. The first and second columns present
results for DVA determinants for Level 1,2 reporters and Level 3 reporters, respectively. The next columns report results after controlling for changes in CDS
and bond spreads. All other variables are defined in Table 5. The coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) are based on robust standard errors


































Table 2.9: The effect of lagged DVA-estimated changes in quarterly changes of credit spreads
Delta CDS CS Delta Bond CS Delta Bond CS Mean
Pred. All obs. L1&2 L3 All obs. L1&2 L3 All obs. L1&2 L3
Sign
Intercept 0.0018 0.0039** 0.0003 0.0014*** 0.0018*** 0.0007*** 0.0014*** 0.0019*** 0.0009**
t (1.13) (2.29) ( 0.72) (2.83) (3.70) (5.05) (3.44) (3.56) (2.14)
Delta DVA CS t+1 + -0.0182 -0.2493 -0.0353 0.1003 0.2064 -0.0013 0.0071 -0.0974 0.0057
(-0.68) (-0.35) (-1.14) (0.84) (0.90) (-0.78) (0.67) (-0.40) (1.20)
Delta DVA CS t + 0.0085 1.5238*** 0.0234 0.0968 1.0459*** -0.0210 0.0166 1.2695*** -0.0037
(0.28) (5.35) (1.11) (1.07) (9.26) (-1.46) (1.23) (9.36) (-0.43)
Delta DVA CS t-1 + 0.0274 -0.1655 0.0441*** 0.0098 0.1240 0.0136** 0.0081 0.0772 0.0078**
(1.39) (-0.96) (3.87) (0.36) (0.96) (2.02) (1.58) (0.95) (2.05)
Delta Lev + 0.1585* 0.1765 -0.2380 0.1165*** 0.0462 -0.0180 0.0513 0.0326 -0.0589
(1.67) (1.08) (-0.92) (3.60) (1.44) (-0.46) (1.52) (0.63) (-1.28)
Delta r10 - 0.8756 0.5350 0.1700 0.0831 -0.1348 -0.5720 0.0560 0.1174 -0.5360*
(1.21) (1.27) (0.58) (0.35) (-0.80) (-1.11) (0.24) (0.73) (-1.68)
Delta Slope - -0.6685 -0.0032 -0.5311 -0.2466 0.0955 0.3894 -0.1444 -0.0700 0.2904
(-1.00) (-0.01) (-0.98) (-0.88) (0.57) (0.62) (-0.53) (-0.38) (0.74)
Delta Sigma + -0.0660 -0.0280 -0.0850 0.1313*** 0.0855** 0.0801 0.0694 0.0543 0.0575
(-1.12) (-0.31) (-0.88) (3.46) (2.33) (0.83) (0.97) (0.68) (0.62)
Delta Climate - -0.0565** -0.0668** -0.0331 -0.0295*** -0.0268*** -0.0333*** -0.0313*** -0.0259* -0.0290***
(-2.02) (-2.38) (-1.05) (-3.21) (-3.54) (-6.34) (-2.83) (-1.85) (-3.75)
Delta Jump + 0.0812* 0.0327 -0.0274** 0.0082 0.0034 -0.0095 0.0263 0.0224 -0.0082
(1.72) (1.21) (-2.02) (0.92) (0.46) (-1.00) (1.62) (1.37) (-1.08)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 352 211 43 18828 15624 684 491 264 129
Adj. R-squared 11.42% 30.68% 33.74% 17.09% 25.75% 45.98% 27.54% 48.10% 64.87%
The table presents regression results on the effect of DVA-estimated changes in credit spread on market-based measure of risk. The
first three columns present results on quarterly changes in CDS spreads, the next six columns present results for quarterly changes
in bond spreads. Delta DVA CS t+1 is the one-period leading DVA-estimated change in credit spreads. Delta DVA CS t is the con-
temporaneous DVA-estimated change in credits spreads, while, Delta DVA CS t-1 is the one-period lagged DVA-estimated change
in credits spreads. All other variables are defined in Table 5. The coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) are based on



































Table 2.10: The effect of lagged DVA-estimated changes in monthly changes of credit spreads on bond spreads for months
1-3
Delta Bond CS M1 Delta Bond CS M2 Delta Bond CS M3
Pred. All obs. L1&2 L3 All obs. L1&2 L3 All obs. L1&2 L3
Sign
Intercept 0.0001 0.0002** -0.0003*** 0.0009*** 0.0011*** 0.0004** 0.0012*** 0.0014*** 0.0005***
t (0.61) (2.22) (-3.55) (4.88) (5.15) (2.55) (3.41) (3.67) (3.73)
lag Delta DVA CS + 0.0093 0.0135 0.0175*** -0.0165 -0.0900 0.0028 -0.0025 -0.0436 -0.0035
(1.23) (0.42) (3.68) (-0.43) (-0.64) (0.34) (-0.29) (-0.51) (-0.89)
Delta Lev + 0.0523 0.0690* 0.0319* -0.0309 -0.0354 -0.0078 0.0890 0.0846 -0.0905
(1.42) (1.66) (1.68) (-0.70) (-1.24) (-0.23) (1.42) (1.11) (-1.62)
Delta r10 - -0.4021*** -0.2458 0.2237 -0.3529* -0.3533*** -0.6433** -0.7800** -0.9391** -0.3501
(-2.63) (-1.45) (0.81) (-1.74) (-2.71) (-2.28) (-2.11) (-2.28) (-1.43)
Delta Slope - 0.0479 -0.0564 -0.3809 0.1638 0.1376 0.5632 0.9234 0.9591 0.0095
(0.29) (-0.34) (-1.15) (0.82) (1.22) (1.60) (1.29) (1.31) (0.04)
Delta Sigma + 0.0463 0.0700 0.0947 0.0332 0.0151 0.0527 0.1143** 0.1247* 0.1003
(0.63) (1.01) (1.39) (0.53) (0.31) (0.75) (2.01) (1.78) (1.24)
Delta Climate - -0.0024 -0.0071 -0.0108** -0.0326*** -0.0374*** -0.0151** -0.0408** -0.0447*** -0.0226***
(-0.39) (-1.13) (-2.45) (-3.67) (-3.76) (-2.57) (-2.50) (-2.66) (-6.12)
Delta Jump + -0.0030 0.0008 0.0010 0.0105* 0.0125* -0.0013 -0.0030 -0.0081 -0.0146**
(-0.51) (0.14) (1.33) (1.95) (1.95) (-0.47) (-0.47) (-1.05) (-2.06)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20619 17075 850 20807 17161 846 21422 17741 849
Adj. R-squared 5.67% 5.64% 13.04% 10.42% 10.91% 24.82% 9.46% 10.05% 26.61%
The table presents regression results on the effect of lagged DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads on bond spreads using different time
window. The first three columns presents results on the effect of lagged DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads on changes in bond
spreads in the first month of the bank-quarter (Delta Bond CS M1). Columns 4-6 (7-9) present results on the effect of lag Delta DVA CS
on changes in bond spreads in the second month (third month) of the bank-quarter. All other variables are defined in Table 5. The co-
efficient estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) are based on robust standard errors that are clustered by bank and quarter. *,**, and


































Table 2.11: The effect of lagged DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads on bond spreads for months 1 - 3: Controlling for
self-selection
Panel A: Probit estimates for Level 3 measurement
Pred. First Month Second Month Third Month
Sign Probit Chi-square Probit Chi-square Probit Chi-square
Constant 9.2066*** (369.79) 9.3158*** (388.09) 9.3086*** (379.08)
Size ? -0.5274*** (391.25) -0.5327*** (408.44) -0.5316*** (392.44)
Big4 + -0.9679*** (18.75) -1.0757*** (19.45) -1.0794*** (19.62)
FVOA + 1.6071*** (23.81) 1.6873*** (24.50) 1.6807*** (24.40)
FVL/TA ? -0.3277*** (462.25) -0.3279*** (454.54) -0.3271*** (454.97)
Pseudo R-squared 61.44% 61.75% 62.15%
LR Chi square 4940.7*** 4929.08*** 5011.98***
Pearson 4078.24*** 4132.8*** 4096.68***
Observations 20,619 20,807 21,422
Panel B: Including self-selection parameter
Pred. Delta Bond CS M1 Delta Bond CS M2 Delta Bond CS M3
Sign All obs. L1&2 L3 All obs. L1&2 L3 All obs. L1&2 L3
Intercept 0.0030** 0.0041*** -0.0011 0.0017 0.0029** -0.0011** 0.0024 0.0030 0.0004
t (2.46) (3.96) (-0.85) (1.51) (2.08) (-2.50) (1.28) (1.51) (0.35)
lag Delta DVA CS + 0.0080 -0.0043 0.0176*** -0.0170 -0.0919 0.0028 -0.0027 -0.0447 -0.0035
(1.31) (-0.17) (3.76) (-0.45) (-0.67) (0.34) (-0.33) (-0.55) (-0.89)
Delta Lev + 0.0463 0.0596** 0.0321* -0.0288 -0.0305 -0.0111 0.0896 0.0850 -0.0906
(1.48) (2.06) (1.74) (-0.65) (-0.94) (-0.31) (1.45) (1.13) (-1.59)
Delta r10 - -0.4465*** -0.3385*** 0.2249 -0.3605* -0.3722*** -0.6846** -0.7840** -0.9461** -0.3502
(-4.62) (-3.98) (0.81) (-1.75) (-2.70) (-2.27) (-2.09) (-2.27) (-1.43)
Delta Slope - 0.1328 0.1142 -0.3814 0.1771 0.1669 0.6162* 0.9302 0.9665 0.0094
(1.29) (1.25) (-1.14) (0.87) (1.30) (1.69) (1.29) (1.30) (0.04)
Delta Sigma + 0.0445 0.0720 0.0944 0.0353 0.0153 0.0523 0.1134** 0.1210* 0.1000
(0.61) (1.11) (1.41) (0.57) (0.31) (0.74) (1.99) (1.73) (1.23)
Delta Climate - -0.0016 -0.0052 -0.0109** -0.0330*** -0.0388*** -0.0148*** -0.0405** -0.0438** -0.0226***
(-0.31) (-1.04) (-2.54) (-3.67) (-3.87) (-2.64) (-2.44) (-2.50) (-6.11)
Delta Jump + -0.0036 0.0002 0.0011 0.0108** 0.0136** -0.0017 -0.0031 -0.0082 -0.0146**
(-0.61) (0.04) (1.11) (2.06) (2.13) (-0.57) (-0.49) (-1.13) (-2.05)
Lambda ? -0.0009** -0.0011*** 0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0018** -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0001
(-2.44) (-3.76) (0.65) (-0.72) (-1.30) (2.57) (-0.60) (-0.74) (0.06)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20619 17075 850 20807 17161 846 21422 17741 849
Adj. R-squared 6.23% 6.67% 13.01% 10.48% 11.16% 24.95% 9.51% 10.13% 26.53%
The table presents regression results controlling for self-selection. Panel A presents probit estimates on the determinants of Level 3 reporting. Size is the nat-
ural logarithm of total assets, Big4 equals to 1 if the bank is audited by a big 4 auditor and zero otherwise. FVOA is an indicator variable for the use of the
FVO for assets. FVL/TA is the ratio of liabilities under the FVO to total assets. The first two columns presents results for the first month of the quarter, while
columns 3-4 (5-6) present results for the second (third) month of the quarter. Panel B presents results on the effect of lagged DVA-estimated changes in credit
spreads on bond spreads using different time window, including the self-selection parameter (Lambda). The first three columns presents results on the effect of
lagged DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads on changes in bond spreads in the first month of the bank-quarter (Delta Bond CS M1). Columns 4-6 (7-9)
present results on the effect of lag Delta DVA CS on changes in bond spreads in the second month (third month) of the bank-quarter. All other variables are
defined in Table 5. The coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) are based on robust standard errors that are clustered by bank and quarter. *,**,
and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-tailed) respectively.
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Appendix 2.3 An Example of DVA Disclosure
The Appendix provides an example of DVA disclosure by JP Morgan Chase & Co
as of September 31, 2015.
Figure 2.2: Example of DVA disclosure from FR Y-9C report
The 10Q report provides the following note (page 105) :
”Total changes in instrument-specific credit risk (DVA) related to structured notes
were $169 million and $190 million for the three months ended September 30, 2015
and 2014, respectively, and $492 million and $209 million for the nine months ended
September 30, 2015 and 2014, respectively. These totals include such changes for
structured notes classified within deposits and other borrowed funds, as well as
long-term debt.”
Chapter 2. What Can We Learn About Credit Risk From Debt Valuation
Adjustments? 59
Appendix 2.4 List of Banks
Table 2.12: List of Banks
Name Gvkey Quarters DVA¡0 DVA¿0 DVA=0
American International Group Inc. 001487 40 22 18 0
Popular Inc. 002002 4 2 0 2
Bank of Hawaii Corp. 002005 3 0 0 3
Bank of New York Mellon Corp. 002019 6 2 1 3
JP Morgan Chase & Co. 002968 44 19 25 0
Citigroup Inc. 003243 44 22 22 0
Bank of America Corp. 007647 39 22 17 0
Wells Fargo & Co. 008007 5 0 1 4
P N C Finanical Service Group Inc. 008245 23 0 0 23
Keycorp 009783 18 0 0 18
Suntrust Bank Inc. 010187 44 20 16 8
Valley National Bancorp 011861 23 0 0 23
Morgan Stanley 012124 42 19 23 0
Synovus Financial Corp. 013041 5 0 0 5
Fulton Financial Corp. 014172 1 1 0 0
First Bancorp 016821 21 7 12 2
National Penn Bancshares Inc. 017070 11 0 0 11
Old National Bancorp 017095 5 2 3 0
W Holding Company Co Ltd 017157 4 0 0 4
Tompkins Financial Corp. 017240 34 2 0 32
Irwin Financial Corp. 018928 4 2 2 0
VIST Financial Corp. 021595 17 0 0 17
BOK Financial Corp. 024447 12 0 0 12
Cascade Financial Corp. 025719 17 0 1 16
Banner Corp. 061487 44 0 0 44
Flushing Financial Corp. 061585 44 0 1 43
Community Central Bank Corp. 064142 15 0 0 15
First Mariner Bancorp 064194 10 0 0 10
United Security Bankshares 064228 44 0 0 44
Flagstar Bancorp Inc. 064699 19 0 0 19
Umpqua Holdings Corp. 065228 44 0 0 44
First Community Corp. 112295 10 0 0 10
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 114628 36 18 18 0
Metlife Inc. 133768 28 0 0 28
Principal Financial Group Inc. 145701 28 16 11 1
Alliance Bankshares Corp. 146354 23 0 0 23
Western Alliance Bancorporation 163920 44 0 0 44
Ameriprise Financial Inc. 164708 32 0 0 32
This Appendix provides the list of banks in our sample. It also provides information on the
quarters that positive, negative and zero DVA is reported.
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Appendix 2.5 Time-line of Market and Account-
ing Information
This Appendix provides a figure that indicates the time-line that market and accounting infor-
mation becomes available, as well as a numerical example on how we calculate DVA-estimated
changes in credit spreads. The example is based on the DVA disclosures provided in Appendix
A (JP Morgan Chase & Co, 2015) and the process is explained in Section 2.3.2.


































Appendix 2.6 Illustration of DVA-estimated Changes In Credit Spreads Calculation
Figure 2.4: Numerical example on how DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads are calculated
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Appendix 2.7 Variable Definitions
This Appendix provides definition of the variables used in our analysis, as well as information
on the sources.
Explanatory variables used in the main models
• Changes in leverage (DeltaLev): Default is triggered when the leverage ratio becomes
sufficiently high. Hence, an increase in leverage is expected to increase credit spreads.
We define leverage as the ratio of the book value of liabilities (LTQ) (source: Compustat)
to the market value of equity (CSHOQ*PRCCQ) (source: CRSP) plus the book value of
liabilities.
• Changes in the spot rate (Deltar10): A higher spot rate leads to a higher growth rate of
the value of the firm’s assets (or, its risk-neutral drift rate). This results in a reduction
in the credit spreads because of lower default probability. We use the quarterly series of
10-year Treasury rate as a proxy for the spot rate (source: Federal Reserve).
• Changes in the slope of the yield curve (DeltaSlope): The slope of the term structure
positively affects the future spot rates. An increase in the slope, increases the expected
future spot rate leading to a decrease in credit spreads. We define the slope of the yield
curve as the difference between the 10-year and 2-year Treasury rates (source: Federal
Reserve).
• Changes in asset volatility (DeltaSigma): Since option value increases with volatility, we
expect a positive relationship between changes in asset volatility and changes in credit
spreads. We estimate equity volatility using the standard deviation of daily stock returns
over the past 150 days. Then, we use Merton model to estimate the value and volatility
of assets simultaneously. We assume a maturity of 0.25 and use 3-month Treasury yield
as a proxy for the risk free rate (source: CRSP).
• Changes in business climate (DeltaC limate): Changes in credit spreads can be a result of
changes in the expected recovery rate, even if the default probability remains the same.
As the expected recovery rate is an increasing function of business climate, we expect
business climate to negatively affect credit spreads. We use the quarterly S&P returns
from CRSP as a proxy for changes in the business climate (source: CRSP).
• Changes in the probability or magnitude of downward jump (DeltaJump): Given that
implied volatility smiles in observed option prices, the market seems to account for negative
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jumps in the value of the firm. Therefore, an increase in the probability or the magnitude
of a downward jump is expected to increase the credit spreads. We use changes in the
slope of the implied volatility of options on S&P500 index future to capture the changes
in the probability of such a jump (source: Datastream).
Variables used in the first-stage of Heckmans model
• Size of the bank (Size): On the one hand, larger firms are more likely to have liabilities
that are traded, and therefore reported at Level 1 and 2. On the other hand, larger banks
have more resources to develop internal models for valuation, making them more likely to
carry Level 3 assets and liabilities. To measure size, we use the natural logarithm of the
total assets (source: Compustat).
• Audited by big 4 (Big4): If the bank is using big four auditors are more likely to use
firm-specific model inputs to classify the liabilities under the FVO as Level 3. Big4 is a
variable that takes the value 1 if the bank uses a Big 4 auditor and zero otherwise (source:
Bank Regulatory).
• Use of FVO for assets (FV OA): Firms that use the FVO for assets choose to report firm
specific inputs, so they are more likely to value liabilities at Level 3. FVOA is an indicator
variable that takes the value 1 if the bank uses the FVO for assets in the particular quarter
and zero otherwise (source: Bank Annual Reports).
• Importance of liabilities under FVO (FV L/TA): If liabilities under the FVO are impor-
tant for the banks, we expect that the banks invest more in resources to develop internal
models for valuation, making it more likely to measure liabilities at Level 3. However,
it is possible that the FVOL is used more frequently by larger banks. Larger banks are
more likely to have liabilities traded, and therefore reported at Level 1 and 2. We use
the ratio fair value of liabilities under the fair value option to total assets to capture the
importance of this item to the balance sheet (source: Bank Annual Reports).
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In recent decades, accounting standard-setters the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
and the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) have increased the use of fair value
measurement for financial instruments. However, the recent financial crisis led to a vigorous
debate surrounding whether the use of fair value accounting (FVA) in financial statements is
more representative of an entity’s financial position than other accounting measurement bases
(Ryan 2008). A critical evaluation of FVA’s relevance and reliability, which includes both aca-
demics and professionals, is motivated by the issuing of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS)
No. 159, The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Liabilities (FASB 2007).1 SFAS 159
provides firms with an option to irrevocably expand the scope of financial instruments accounted
1Prior to FASB, the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) adopted the fair value
option in the IAS No. 39 (IASB 2006).
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for using fair value, with unrealized gains or losses flowing to earnings.2 The adopter records
unrealized gains (losses) in bottom-line net income that are attributable to the deterioration
(improvement) in firms’ creditworthiness. These gains and losses driven by the fair value option
of liabilities (FVOL) are commonly referred to as debt valuation adjustments (DVAs).3
The recognition of DVAs in net income has lead to competing arguments about whether the
accounting results of DVAs are counterintuitive or not. This concern is driven by the fact that
DVA gains (losses) would be recognized in accounting earnings as result of negative (positive)
economic effect. Specifically, according to SFAS No. 159, the DVAs are computed as differences
between the fair value of liabilities at the beginning and the end of one period that is attributable
to the changes in firms’ own credit risk. If credit risk increases, absent the changes in the interest
rates, the fair value of liabilities decreases, yielding unrealized gains. Among existing research,
Barth et al. (2008) use changes in credit rating multiplied by the debt-to-assets ratio as a proxy
for DVAs. They find that the reduction in equity returns associated with increases in credit risk
is attenuated by the presence of debt. Their findings imply that DVAs should be candidates
for inclusion in earnings if the objective of financial statements is the faithful representation
of the firm’s liabilities and economic performance. However, opponent believe that recognizing
DVAs in accounting earnings results in counterintuitive gains and losses, which misrepresents
real economic condition and entail that outcomes are difficult to interpret (Gaynor et al. 2011).4
Moreover, there are indications that banks manipulate DVAs to smooth earnings during the
recent financial crisis (Dong et al. 2016).
Despite its relevance for financial institutions during the last financial crisis, research on the
recognition of DVAs is limited for two primary reasons.5 First, few entities, mainly large fi-
nancial institutions, adopt the fair value option so that the observations of reported DVAs are
limited. Second, the relevant information on DVAs is optionally disclosed in the footnotes in a
way that is opaque compared to other accounting items with standardized disclosures.
2The intent for issuing this standard is well discussed in Guthrie et al. (2011). The rationale is
1) to mitigate artificial earnings volatility created by the mismatch between assets and liabilities;
2) to expand the use of fair value measurement for financial instruments; 3) to better reflect
inherent economic influence without using complicated hedging accounting.
3From December 2017, DVAs are no longer recognised in the net income, but in other com-
prehensive income.
4These counterintuitive gains (losses) greatly affected the net incomes of the largest U.S. bank
holding companies in 2008, exemplified by Morgan Stanleys DVA gains flipping the $3.3 billion
losses into $1.7 billion profits attributable to credit deterioration.
5Prior research mostly examine the valuation and risk implications of recognizing DVAs (Fonte
et al. 2019; Gaynor et al. 2011; Lipe 2002).
Chapter 3. Evidence on information differences in reported DVAs and market
information-estimated DVAs 66
Understanding the information contained in the reported DVAs is helpful to stakeholders to
understand the underlying economic performance of adopters, considering the counterintuitive
accounting effects of DVAs recognition. Specifically, stakeholders only access public available
information. However, the reported DVAs by management require complex approaches and data
resources in the measurement process. According to SFAS No. 157, the valuation of financial
instruments suggests managers to employ observable and/or unobservable market data in a range
of valuation techniques, dependent on the instrument type.6 Kengla and Jonghe (2012) surveyed
19 financial institutions in 2012, and obtained information on current practices for managing
and measuring DVAs on liabilities designated under the fair value option. They highlighted
that four were using CDS spreads, four were using primary issuances data (based on the latest
issuances), four were using secondary market data (as for example bond spreads), five were using
curves set internally by treasury and/or asset-liability management departments, while the rest
were using a blended approach (a combination of information including observable inputs and
internal data). Therefore, the reported DVAs attracts stakeholders’ concerns about the private
information used by management in the estimation of DVAs,7 especially an opportunistic and
adverse selection behavior that may exist in the adoption of FVOL (Wu et al. 2016; Henry 2009).
To address these concerns, we compare the reported DVAs provided by managers with the
estimated DVAs based on market information, denoted as market information-estimated DVAs.
If the market information-estimated DVAs differ from the reported DVAs significantly, we could
state the internal credit risk assessment reflects private information not covered by the external
credit risk assessment efficiently, as the guidance of DVAs calculation permits management to
use the private information if the market for the underlying liabilities is illiquid. Alternatively,
if the market information-estimated DVAs are close to the reported DVAs, we could state the
external credit risk assessment captures the information on credit risk through financial reports
in a timely manner.
To estimate the market information-based DVAs we rely on the structural credit risk models
rather than the widespread market measures of credit risk (i.e., CDS spreads, bond spreads) for
6FASB (2006) requires financial liabilities under the FVOL to be disclosed in accordance with
the three-level measurement hierarchy. Level 1 fair value estimates are based on quoted prices
for identical assets or liabilities in active markets. Level 2 estimates are based on quoted market
prices for similar assets or liabilities and inputs other than quoted prices, as for example interest
rates and yield curves, while Level 3 estimates are based on unobservable entity-supplied inputs
for the asset/liability.
7There are extant literature stating that the management may exploit the internal information
at the cost of stakeholders by selectively reporting information, and in turn, mislead stakeholders
if the interest of management is not identical to that of stakeholders (Beyer et al. 2010; Healy
and Palepu 2001)
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two primary reasons. First, the market measures of credit risk are expressed by a unit-free stan-
dardized measure (i.e., basis points) rather than dollar gains/losses that are non-compatible to
the reported DVAs when we compare their magnitudes. Second, bond spreads are not perceived
as a clean measure of credit risk because they are also influenced by factors like tax, liquidity,
and duration. CDS spreads are only available for large financial institutions so that using this
measure would decrease our sample size considerably.8
To generate a clear measure of credit risk with the compatible format to the reported DVAs,
we rely on structural credit risk models for several reasons. First, structural models are able
to provide guidance about the theoretical determinants of default risk and the unique structure
that can extract default-related information from the equity market.9 Second, the estimated
results from structural models represent the pure default risk of counterparty in financial con-
tracts. However, other credit assessments CDS spreads and bond prices can be noisy due to the
existence of other risk factors (Leland 2009; Tang and Yan 2007; Ericsson et al. 2006; Blanco et
al. 2005). Third, the option theory-based default probability is particularly attractive because
the final formula is a function of ’observable’ variables including leverage ratio, asset market
value and asset volatility.10 Fourth, structural models use equity market information to make a
forward-looking prediction of the default risk.11 Fifth, structural models have been successfully
implemented into industry. A benchmark in the application of structural credit risk models is
the KMV model (Crosbie and Bohn 2003).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate the information contained in
DVAs by comparing its magnitude to market information-estimated DVAs. Partly, this reflects
the fact that the large sample of firms reporting DVA data has only recently become available in
common database. Our investigation allows us to discuss the extent to which the external credit
risk assessment captures the information on credit risk exploited by the internal measurement,
that is, whether estimated DVAs from structural credit risk models are informative to regulators
and investors.
8Out of 38 bank holding companies in our sample, 13 banks issue CDS.
9 Leland (2012) examines the ability of structural credit risk models to capture the historical
default frequencies across bonds with different ratings. He concludes that the structural models fit
the empirical long-term default frequencies quite accurately for investment-grade and speculative-
grade bonds. This paper uses the default frequencies reported in Moody’s (2001). The investment
grade bonds in this credit rating system are rated above ”Baa” and ”Baa”; the non-investment
grade otherwise is rated below ”Baa”.
10The asset market value and asset volatility are in fact ’quasi-observable’ variables, because
these two values are generally estimated based on equity value and equity volatility.
11 Krainer and Lopez (2004) suggest that market information, especially equity market infor-
mation, should be included in the oversight of financial institutions.
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In this work, we implement the Merton (1976) and Leland (1994) models to estimate the market
information-estimated DVAs, using a sample of U.S. bank holding companies with 887 bank-
quarter observations over the period of 2007-2017. We focus on banks, as they are the main
users of financial instruments for which the FVOL is applicable. Therefore, the effects of DVAs
recognition and disclosure are expected to be more pronounced, compared to industries that
make only limited use of financial instruments.
We first compare the distribution of market information-estimated DVAs and the reported DVAs.
This is necessary to discuss the dispersion of both the estimated and observed DVAs over the
sample period due to large standard deviation of estimated DVAs. Then, we compute the mea-
sure of estimation errors to investigate the extent to which the market information-estimated
DVAs deviate from the reported DVAs. Specifically, we compute the signed differences between
the estimated and reported DVAs as a measure of bias and unsigned differences between the es-
timated and reported DVAs as a measure of accuracy. The positive (negative) signed differences
indicate that structural models overestimate (underestimate) the DVAs. Large unsigned differ-
ences indicate the market information-estimated DVAs remarkably deviate the reported DVAs,
suggesting the reported DVAs convey private information which is not reflected in the capital
market. Alternatively, small unsigned differences indicate that the capital market could capture
the information contained in the reported DVAs timely through financial reports. To investi-
gate whether the unsigned differences between the estimated and reported DVAs are driven by
the model misspecification, we compare the performance of pricing DVAs between the Merton
model and the Leland model, as the Leland model incorporates some additional information.12
Finally, we examine whether estimation errors are prone to systematic errors. In particular, we
conduct multivariate regressions of estimation errors on factors that represent the firm-specific
variables, bond-specific variables and macroeconomic variables. The significant variables suggest
the estimation errors from the structural models are associated with them.
We find that the market information-estimated DVAs by structural models deviate the reported
DVAs significantly, especially when the banks’ own creditworthiness is volatile. Specifically, the
Merton and Leland models tend to overestimate the DVAs on average. However, the analysis
of estimation errors by year suggests that both the Merton and Leland models tend to under-
estimate the DVAs when the banks’ own creditworthiness is volatile (i.e., the extremely high
or low estimates are clustered around the 2008 financial crisis and 2011 sovereign debt crisis).
12The Leland model relaxes some assumptions in the Merton model by considering the en-
dogenous default barrier, tax rate and default costs.
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Conversely, in stable credit risk conditions, these two models have a tendency of overestimation
and their performance with regard to DVA estimations gets better. The results in analyzing the
systematic estimation errors also provide consilient evidence that structural models lead to larger
estimation errors for banks with higher market leverage and asset volatility. In both the Merton
and Leland models, the leverage ratio and asset volatility are two main channels of default risk.
These results suggest reported DVAs convey more private information during the deterioration
of creditworthiness.
Further, we investigate the estimation errors in four sub-samples: zero DVA reporters, non-zero
DVA reporters, positive DVA reporters and negative DVA reporters. We compare the pricing
performance over these four sub-samples due to their different effects on accounting earnings.
Specifically, unlike zero DVAs, the reported non-zero DVAs could result in unrealized DVA gains
and DVA losses. Furthermore, we split non-zero DVAs into positive DVAs and negative DVAs,
as positive (negative) DVAs result from deterioration (improvement) of firms’ credit risk that
could in fact lead to economic losses (gains). Cedergren et al. (2012) find that compensation
committees place different weights on positive DVAs and negative DVAs. Therefore, we com-
pare the estimation errors between positive and negative DVA reporters to investigate whether
management estimate DVA gains and DVA losses differently.
We find that the estimates for zero DVA and non-zero DVA reporters are significantly different.
In particular, the Merton and Leland models underestimate the DVAs on average for zero DVA
reporters, but overestimate the non-zero DVAs. Moreover, comparing to non-zero DVAs, the
unsigned differences for zero DVAs are immaterial, suggesting the estimation errors in full sam-
ple are mainly attributed to zero DVA reporters. Further, we split non-zero DVAs into positive
and negative DVAs due to their opposite accounting effects — DVA gains and DVA losses. The
insignificant t-statistics of equality test indicate that the unsigned differences between these two
groups are equal. However, the measure of signed differences suggests the Merton and Leland
models underestimate DVA gains but overestimate DVAs losses. The results suggest that man-
agement estimate positive DVAs and negative DVAs differently, while the capital market treats
them indifferently.
Finally, we compare the unsigned differences between the Merton and Leland models. The
smaller unsigned differences by the Merton model suggest the Merton model outperforms the
Leland model in terms of pricing DVAs, especially when the firms’ credit risk increases. This
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finding indicates that incorporation of additional information in structural models does not im-
prove the performance of estimating DVAs.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides informaiton on the disclosure and
recognition of DVAs. We also introduce structural credit risk models and their empirical ap-
plications. Section 3.3 discusses the sample selection and provides descriptive statistics. Sec-
tion 3.4 presents the implementation of structural credit risk models and estimates the market
information-estimated DVAs. Section 3.5 provides empirical results and discusses the perfor-
mance of models. Finally, we summarize the main findings of this chapter in Section 3.6.
3.2 Literature review and research questions
3.2.1 Fair value liabilities and debt valuation adjustments
(DVAs)
In recent decades, the FASB has adopted fair value measurement for a wide range of financial
instruments. In 2006, the FASB issued SFAS No. 157 Fair Value Measurements that provided
a unified definition of fair value and established a framework for the disclosures of fair value
measurements. Further, SFAS No. 159 The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Finan-
cial Liabilities extended the scale of financial instruments measured on a fair value basis, with
unrealized gains and losses going to net income. This standard permits firms to elect the FVO
for eligible financial instruments on an instrument-by-instrument basis at the inception of the
instruments or upon adoption of SFAS No. 159 if the inception of the instrument proceeds the
adoption date. This adoption is irrevocable, suggesting that firms cannot stop the use of fair
value measurement unless the selected instruments expire or are sold.
Debt valuation adjustments stems from the application of SFAS No.157 and SFAS No. 159
on eligible financial liabilities. Specifically, the application of SFAS No. 157 requires adopters
to reflect changes in their own credit risk in the measurement of the fair value of liabilities and
then any resulting adjustments are recognized in the accounting earnings. The adoption of SFAS
No. 159 allows firms to measure eligible financial liabilities at fair value that would otherwise be
measured at historical amortized costs. The changes in the fair value of liabilities under the adop-
tion of SFAS No. 159 attributable to the changes in firms’ own credit risk are referred to as DVAs.
Chapter 3. Evidence on information differences in reported DVAs and market
information-estimated DVAs 71
Firms have discretion over the estimation of DVAs, especially when underlying financial liabilities
are illiquid. Specifically, SFAS No.157 allows firms to rely on unobservable entity-supplied inputs
for measurements if no same or similar liabilities are traded in the market. Moreover, we find a
few banks that provide the relevant information, although the SFAS No. 159 requires banks to
disclose information on DVAs in SEC filings when they are significant. Therefore, users of finan-
cial statements have difficulty in understanding how DVAs are estimated, although prior studies
provide strong evidence on the value-relevance of DVAs (Fontes et al., 2018; Chung et al., 2012;
Barth et al., 2008). Therefore, understanding the information contained in the reported DVAs
is important for financial statement users to understand the underlying economic performance
of adopters.
3.2.2 Structural credit risk models
In this study, we compare the reported DVAs with the market information-estimated DVAs to
investigate the extent to which the information in the reported DVAs is different from the one
provided by the market. The market information-estimated DVAs are estimated by implement-
ing structural credit risk models originated by Merton (1974), in which securities are priced as
contingent claims on the process of firm value. In the framework of Merton (1974), the debt
value is considered as the put option on the assets of the firm. The default risk is driven by
business risk (asset volatility) and financial risk (leverage).
Despite the innovative nature of the Merton model, its simplified assumptions lead to shortcom-
ings in its application (Anginer et al., 2014; Hovakimian et al., 2012; Sonke et al., 2007; Bongini
et al., 2002). It assumes that the liability structure of a firm consists of a single zero-coupon bond,
and the bankruptcy is only triggered at maturity. Prior research find that the Merton model
has a tendency towards the underestimation of bond spreads. Following its publication several
articles, including Leland (1994), Longstaff and Scheartz (1995) (LS) and Colline-dufresne et al.
(2001) (CDG), have relaxed the assumptions in the Merton model to incorporate more realistic
conditions. Specifically, Leland (1994) extends the Merton model by considering an endogenous
default barrier, bankruptcy costs and tax savings of the debt. Holding other assumptions the
same as the Merton model, the LS model considers stochastic interest rates rather than the flat
form of the term structure. The CDG model extends the LS model to incorporate a stationary
leverage ratio, allowing the firm leverage to be mean reversed to its target leverage ratio over the
long run. Appendix 3.1 provides a discussion of the Merton and Leland models with regards to
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their assumptions.
Among these four classical structural credit risk models, we only apply the Merton and Le-
land models to estimate DVAs, as these two structural models took major step in pricing debt
by incorporating exogenous and endogenous default barrier respectively. Moreover, empirical
results indicate the Leland model is an exception in that it overpredicts spreads on
most bonds, although it also share the problem of inaccurate estimation (Eom et al.,
2004). Therefore, we denote the estimation errors from the Merton model as the benchmark,
and compare them with the estimation errors from the Leland model to investigate whether the
deviations between the reported DVAs and market information-estimated DVAs are driven by
model misspecification.
In this paper, we denote the estimated DVAs from the Merton and Leland models as the mar-
ket information-estimated DVAs, as the nature feature of structural credit risk models rely on
public available information to price DVAs. Specifically, structural models consider credit risk
as a function of financial leverage, asset value and asset volatility, which are computed from the
information from financial reports and capital market. Thus, the changes in the fair value of
liabilities due to changes in credit risk estimated by structural models — market information-
estimated DVAs — are influenced by market information.
Even though a few studies attempt to criticize the implementation of structural models in finan-
cial institutions due to their high leverage and complex liability structure (Eom et al. 2004), many
papers have appropriately used modified structural credit risk models in banks to investigate a
number of interesting questions. Tsesmelidakis and Merton (2012) implement the CreditGrade
model, which is based on the work of Merton (1976) by assuming a stationary leverage, to value
the ”too big to fail” (TBTF) premium in financial institutions. Chen et al. (2014) use a flexible,
lattice-based structural credit risk model to examine the term structure of default probabilities
for Lehman Brothers. These empirical applications provide strong support for the feasibility of
structural models in banks. Moreover, in pricing DVAs, the estimation errors due to model mis-
specification could largely cancel out in computing the intertemporal differences of bond prices
due to the changes in firms’ own credit risk. In particular, the proportion of bond price that is
overestimated by structural models could be offset after computing the differences of bond price
between two subsequent periods.
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3.3 Sample selection and descriptive statistics
3.3.1 Sample selection
Our sample focuses on U.S. bank holding companies that filed quarterly FR Y-9C with the Fed-
eral Reserve from 2007 to 2017. We start with 2007 because FASB allowed early adoption of
SFAS 159 under certain conditions, and the effective date of standard for all fiscal period begins
after November 15, 2007.13 We restrict our sample to bank holding companies because they
are required to report detailed and standardized disclosures on Fair Value Option for Financial
Liabilities (FVOL) election and DVAs in their regulatory filings.14 Data of the FVOL and DVAs
are downloaded from the Bank Regulatory database. For those banks reporting missing value in
FVOL and/or DVAs we also hand-collect the items from SEC filings.
Table 3.4 provides the sample selection procedure. Bank holding companies that select cer-
tain eligible liabilities under FVOL report two data items in FR Y-9C reports. One is the total
gains and losses on fair-valued liabilities under FVOL (bhckf553), and the second is the gains
and losses on fair-valued liabilities under FVOL attributable to changes in banks’ own credit risk
(bhckf554). Figure 3.1 in Appendix 3.2 provides an example of such reporting.15 A bank holding
company that reported bhckf553 suggests that this bank has adopted the fair value option to
measure certain liabilities and has to consider the effect of changes in banks’ own credit risk
in measuring the fair value of selected liabilities. Thus, if the bank holding company reports
bhckf553, it will also report bhckf554 unless the amount is zero or immaterial.16 In our sample
selection, we require bank holding companies to report bhckf553 or bhckf554 at least once over
the sample period from the first quarter they adopted FVOL through to the fourth quarter of
2017. This process gives us 85 bank holding companies. We also require that banks are publicly
13 SFAS No. 159 is effective for fiscal years beginning after November 15, 2007. The early
adoption is permitted with the requirement of making adoption decision within 120 days after
the beginning of the fiscal year and prior to the issuance of any financial statements. We hand-
collected each bank holding company’s adoption date in its 10-K filings.
14Following the Bank Holding Act of 1956, we define a bank holding company as a company
which controls one or more banks. In order to regulate the activities of bank holding companies,
FR Y-9C reports are required to be disclosed quarterly by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
15An example of the relevant disclosure in SEC filings is also reported in Appendix 3.2. Com-
paring the DVAs reported in SEC filings and FR Y-9C, we find FR Y-9C reports the cumulative
DVAs of the year. In the following empirical tests, we compute the quarterly amount of DVAs
from the reported cumulative magnitudes.
16In some unusual cases, bank holding companies report bhckf554 but miss bhckf553. We
consider those banks electing FVOL, and those missing observations are erroneous entries. The
missed bhckf533 does not affect our empirical tests because they are only used in the sample
selection procedure.
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traded, with 150 trading-day observations available before the end of each quarter over the sam-
ple period to estimate our explanatory variables. This process reduces our sample to 46 banks.
Finally, we hand-collect information on maturity, fair value and principal of liabilities under the
FVOL from SEC filings, removing from our sample the banks that do not provide this informa-
tion. This information is used as the model input to estimate the market information-estimated
DVAs. This sample selection procedure yields a sample of 887 bank-quarter observations, rep-
resenting 38 unique banks. Table 3.5 provides a list of all the banks in our sample.17 The vast
majority of our sample are traditional commercial banks based on SIC codes (31 unique bank
holding companies or 71.82% of bank-quarter observations).18
3.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.6 provides information on the average value of fair value and principal value of liabilities
under FVOL per year. Early adopters accounted for the greatest amounts of liabilities under
FVOL on average, whereas the bank-quarter observations stay the lowest level in our sample
period. After the effective adoption date, the bank-quarter observations in the following three
years are two times more than the early adopters and then decrease gradually, together with the
reduction in the magnitudes of the balanced principal value of liabilities under the FVOL.
In Table 3.7, Panel A summarizes the frequency of bank-quarter DVAs per year over the sample
period with the decomposition of negative, zero, and positive DVA groups. In our sample, 60.88%
of bank-quarters (540 observations) report zero DVAs. The remaining 39.12% of bank-quarter
observations (347) have non-zero values, consisting of 176 negative DVAs and 171 positive DVAs.
This indicates that the effect of own credit risk changes in the fair-valued liabilities was zero or
immaterial in more than half of bank-quarters. Over the sample period, few banks reported
DVAs in 2007, as it includes only early adopters of the FVOL.19 The number of bank-quarters
increases from the effective year of 2008 and decreases after 2010. As the adoption of FVOL is
irrevocable, the reduction in the DVA recognizers is due to the existence of liabilities measured
17In this table, the bank-quarter observations (N), the amounts of reported DVAs (DVAs),
fair value of liabilities under FVOL (FV) and the face value of liabilities under FVOL (PV) are
reported for each bank.
18The remainder of the sample includes 7.67% life insurance and 20.52% brokers and dealers.
They must run at least some banking activities because they are regulated by Federal Reserve
and file FR Y9-C reports.
19Out of 38 bank holding companies in our sample, 14 banks are early adopters.
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under the fair value option (e.g., bonds expired).20
To detect the magnitudes of FVOL adoption, we report information on DVAs for large banks
(Panel B) and other banks (Panel C) respectively in Table 3.7. We classify a bank as a large
bank if it has a book value of assets greater than $50 billion.21 The number of bank-quarters
is almost equally split into large banks (429 observations) and other banks (458 observations).
In addition, we find that large banks are prone to report non-zero DVAs, with 72.73% of bank-
quarter observations have non-zero value (312 out of 429). By contrast, the reported zero DVAs
are mainly from other banks, of which 92.36% of DVA bank-quarters are zero (423 out of 458).
Descriptive statistics on the characteristics of liabilities account for FVOL are presented in Table
3.8. Panel A presents the information on all sample banks (887 bank-quarters). Panel B includes
only the bank-quarters that non-zero DVAs were reported (347 bank-quarters), and Panel C re-
ports bank-quarters that only zero DVAs were reported (540 bank-quarters). We hand-collect
information on maturity, fair value and principal of liabilities under the FVOL from financial
statements.22 We download coupon rates of straight bonds from Datastream. If a bank adopts
multiple bonds under FVOL, we measure maturity and coupon as the weighted average of matu-
rity and coupon respectively, for each of banks’ liabilities, weighted by the fair value of liabilities
at the end of the period.
On average, the non-zero DVA recognizers adopted the FVOL for more liabilities than zero
DVA recognizers. In particular, the average principal value of liabilities under FVO in non-zero
DVA recognizers is$55,000,173,000, which is 88 times higher than those in zero DVA recognizers
($624,464,000). It is consistent with Cedergren et al. (2014), who express DVAs as an increasing
function of the amount of liabilities under FVOL and the changes in credit risk (i.e., asset risk).
That is, the level of reported DVAs is also affected by the amount of liabilities under FVOL
apart from the changes in credit risk. Therefore, the large magnitude of liabilities account for
FVOL could lead to the large magnitude of DVAs given the small changes in banks’ own credit
20The FVOL is made on an instrument-by-instrument basis upon inception of the instrument
or upon adoption of SFAS No. 159 if inception was earlier. A bank may not necessarily adopt
new eligible liabilities under FVOL in each quarter after adoption. Therefore, the liabilities
under FVOL may exist if the adopted liabilities was expired without rolling over new liabilities.
21$50 billion is used as a threshold for most requirements of enhanced supervision by the
Federal Reserve.
22In Appendix 3.2, using JP Morgan Chase & Co as an example, Table 3.1 provides informa-
tion on the disclosure of the fair value of financial liabilities under FVOL. Table 3.2 provides
information on the differences between fair value and principal value of liabilities under FVOL.
Table 3.3 provides information on maturity distribution across various liabilities.
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risk. Besides, the term to maturity varies from 1 year up to 39 years, and the average coupon
rate is similar in non-zero and zero DVA recognizers.
3.4 DVAs Estimation
In this section, we implement the Merton model and the Leland model to estimate market
information-estimated DVAs. Consistent with the framework of Black and Scholes (1973), equity
and debt in the Merton model represent two different claims on the firm value. Equity-holders
have the legal ownership of the firms’ assets, owe a fixed amount of zero-coupon debt and effec-
tively hold a put option on the firms’ assets with the exercise price equal to the face value of
debt. Debt-holders own the face value of debt and have a short position in the put option on
the firm. The value of the two claims sum up to the unlevered value of the firms’ assets, so the
capital structure irrelevance principle holds (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Debt valuation can
be undertaken using standard methods of option pricing. The risk and the return distribution of
debt are inferred from the market value of assets, asset volatility, risk-free rate, time to maturity
and the face value of outstanding liabilities. Since all the inputs in structural models are solely
determined by market information, debt value estimated from a structural credit risk model can
be seen as the market information-estimated valuation.23 Thus, after controlling for the effect
of changes in the risk-free rate, the estimated changes in the value of same debt between two
subsequent periods are referred to as the market information-estimated or estimated DVAs.
The Leland model relaxes the assumptions in the Merton model by introducing corporate taxes
and bankruptcy risk. Instead of the zero-coupon debt structure, the Leland model considers
a perpetual continuous coupon bond which leads to tax shields from debt. Bankruptcy costs
occur when the firm value breaks the default threshold. By contrast with the exogenous default
threshold in the Merton model, the Leland model derives the endogenous default barrier within
the optimal capital structure. By explicitly introducing tax savings and bankruptcy costs, the
levered firm value is not equal to the unlevered firm value. Rather, the levered firm value in-
creases with tax shields and decreases with bankruptcy costs, which allows a classic trade-off in
this model. In the Leland model, the debt value is inferred from the market value of assets, asset
volatility, risk-free rate, perpetual coupon rate, tax rate and recovery rate. Similar to the Merton
23 The market value of assets and asset volatility are simultaneously estimated by solving
two systems of equations which only involve the stock price, stock volatility and firm liability
structure.
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model, asset value and asset volatility are determined by market information on the stock price.
The pricing formulas of these two models are discussed in Appendix 3.1.
3.4.1 Implementation
This section presents the information on the calibration procedure that estimates the parameters
of structural credit risk models. In Table 3.9 we discuss the calibration methods and data sources
that are used to estimate these parameters.
3.4.1.1 Term Structure of Risk-Free Rate
In order to calibrate the structural credit risk models, it is necessary to estimate a term structure
for the risk-free rate. Several methods can be used to model the risk-free yield curves: for ex-
ample, the Nelson and Siegel (1987) model and the Vasicek (1977) model. In Eom et al. (2004),
these two models were applied, and the estimated term structures were very similar. In this
paper, we choose to implement the Nelson and Siegel curve to fit the risk-free yield curve.
In the Nelson and Siegel model, let r(t, T ; Θ) denote the spot rate at time t with a term equal
to T − t predicted by a particular model characterized by a parameter set Θ. At the end of each
quarter, we use the constant maturity treasury (CMT) rates, obtained from the Federal Reserve
Board’s website, to fit the model on the day t. We choose parameters in Θ to minimize the sum
of squared errors, where the error is measured as the deviation between the model yield and the
market yield. The specific model in the Nelson and Siegel (1987) is:




where Θ = (β0, β1, β2, δ1), and β0 and δ1 need to be positive.
3.4.1.2 The Merton (1974) Model
The Merton model requires the use of five parameters: asset value, asset volatility, the face value
of debt, the maturity of the debt and risk-free rate. The points below demonstrate the estimation
process for these parameters.
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• Maturity of liabilities under FVOL (TB): The Merton model prices appropriately a single
specific corporate debt — zero-coupon debt. However, all banks in our sample not only
adopted multiple types of debt measured under FVOL, but also traded debt with coupon
payments. Therefore, some assumptions have to be adopted in order to convert ’real debt’
into ’synthetic Merton debt’. We consider the duration of each bond as the proxy for the
maturity of Merton zero-coupon debt.24 By definition, the duration of a bond discounts
the weighted average of the maturity of each coupon payment and the final principal
at the yield to maturity, with the weights by using the present value of each payment.
Because banks in our sample only disclose the maturity distribution of various debt in
their SEC filings,25 we first estimate the weighted average maturities of portfolio debt,
with the weights being based on the debt value. Then we convert these weighted average
maturities into the duration of a portfolio. This approach takes the time to maturities
of each payment into consideration, which returns a ’synthetic maturity’ of Merton zero-
coupon debt. By using this approach, we implicitly assume that the liability structure
will remain the same over time and that no bankruptcy will happen before this portfolio
duration.
• Balanced principal value of liabilities under FVOL (B): We hand-collect the remaining
principal value of financial liabilities under FVOL from SEC filings.26 In our sample, we
implicitly assume all debt under FVOL to be strict bonds with constant coupon rates,
which is the main type of debt account for FVOL. Then, the balanced principal value
of bonds in the Merton model is computed as follows. We discount all the coupons and
principal of each bond at the corresponding risk-free rate — term structure of risk-free
rate from Nelson and Siegel model — to time zero, and then compound the sum of their
present value to the ’synthetic maturity’ of the Merton zero-coupon debt. This final value
is denoted as the balanced principal value of ’synthetic Merton debt’, which incorporates









(1 + rT )T
(3.2)
B = PV × (1 + rTB )TB (3.3)
24Eom et al. (2004) develop the Merton model with considering each coupon as a separate
zero-coupon bond and then value them by using the Merton model separately.
25The Table 3.3 in Appendix 3.2 provides the presentation of the maturity distribution of debt
under FVOL.
26In Appendix 3.2, Table 3.2 provides the presentation of the difference between aggregate
fair value and the aggregate remaining contractual principal balance outstanding by JP Morgan
Chase & Co as of September 31, 2015.
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where C, T and F is the price-weighted average coupon rate, price-weighted average term
to maturity and principal value of debt under FVOL. And here, rt is the risk-free rate of
Nelson and Siegel curve with the term t.
• Asset value (V ) and asset volatility (σ): We estimate the quarterly asset value (unlevered
firm value) and asset return volatility by undertaking an option theory-based method
introduced by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). By using the option nature
of equity, we can express the asset value and asset volatility associated with the equity
value and equity volatility.27 This procedure is similar to the process used to determine
the implied volatility of an option from the observed option price. This calibration is
illustrated as follows. Given that V and E represent a bank’s market value of asset and
equity value, σ and σE denote as a bank’s asset volatility and equity volatility, TL denotes
the book value of total liabilities with maturity of T and r is the risk-free rate, we use the
following system of equations to describe their relations:





where d1 and d2 are defined in Eq. 3.24 in Appendix 3.1. Eq. 3.4 expresses the equity
value as a function of the asset value and Eq. 3.5 describes the relationship between the
asset volatility and equity volatility. To reflect the relevant horizon, we set the maturity
T as 0.25,28 and the 3-month CMT yield as a proxy for the corresponding risk-free rate.
Moreover, the annual equity volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of daily
return over 150 days before the observation date times the square root of 252. Having
observed or estimated E, σE , r, T and B, we can compute the asset value V and asset
volatility σ by numerically solving the system of equations.
3.4.1.3 The Leland (1994) Model
Similar to the calibration procedure in the Merton model, the Leland model requires six parame-
ters: risk-free rate, perpetual coupon rate, corporate tax rate, recovery rate, unlevered firm value
27Vassalou and Xing (2004) use an interactive process to obtain a time series of asset values
that allows the further computation of asset volatility.
28This maturity assumption follows Liao et al. (2009), it is reasonable to set the maturity of
debt as 0.25 year because all data-type used in the estimation of these two variables is quarterly.
Moreover, the financial data in SEC filings need to be audited by public investors, indicating
the public investors could make a decision on holding or selling securities in the review process
quarterly (i.e., the exercise date).
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and asset volatility.
• Leland model-implied risk-free rate (rLeland): The Leland model modified the Merton
model by considering a single perpetual coupon debt, and it is considered reasonable to use
a continuous rate to discount the perpetual coupon payments. The risk-free rate obtained
from the Nelson and Siegel model only reflects the spot rate with the corresponding term.
Therefore, we construct an alternative flat interest rate as follows. We compute the Leland
model-implied risk-free rate (rLeland) which makes the present value of a 30-year annuity
discounted at rLeland equal to the present value of the same annuity discounted at the
corresponding risk-free rates obtained from the Nelson and Siegel model. The Leland











This continuous rate captures the information for both short-term and long-term risk-free
rates.
• Leland model perpetual debt coupon payment (CLeland): Following the same method used
in the Merton model, we transform all payments of debt — periodic coupon payments
and a final principal payment at maturity – into perpetual coupon debt. This makes
the present value of ’synthetic Merton debt’ discounted at the corresponding risk-free
rate from the Nelson and Siegel curve equal to the present value of ’synthetic Leland
model’ discounted at the Leland model-implied risk-free rate. The perpetual coupon is





• Corporate tax rate (τ): Following Eom et al. (2004), we assume a corporate tax rate of
35% by incorporating the tax-deductibility of interest payments in the model.
• The bankruptcy cost (α): The bankruptcy cost parameter is defined as one minus the
recovery rate which is assumed as 51.31% following Eom et al. (2004).
• Asset volatility (σLeland) and unlevered firm value (VLeland): Similar to the method used
in the Merton model, we have two equations for numerically solving these two parame-
ters. The first equation is the equity valuation equation which describes the relationship
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between equity value and unlevered firm value:
E = vLeland −D = VLeland −BC + TS −D (3.8)






where E is the market value of equity. In addition, vLeland is the levered firm value equal
to the unlevered firm value VLeland minus the bankruptcy costs BC in Eq. 3.31 in Ap-
pendix 3.1 and add the tax shields TS in Eq. 3.32 in Appendix 3.1. VB in Eq. 3.29 in
Appendix 3.1 is the endogenously determined optimal bankruptcy threshold. PB in Eq.
3.28 is interpreted as the risk-neutral default probability, and in Eq. 3.8, the market value
of equity is the residual of levered firm value vLeland after paying off all liabilities D.








where ∂E/∂VLeland is now the partial derivative of the equity value with respect to the
unlevered firm value, instead of asset value (levered firm value) V in the Merton model.
Based on the equity valuation in the Leland model, the partial derivative ∂E/∂VLeland is













where λ equals to − 2rσ2 . It is interpreted as the elasticity of the default probability with
respect to the unlevered firm value.
3.4.2 Estimation methodology
By definition, the reported DVAs equal the changes in the fair value of liabilities due to the
changes in the firms’ own credit risk. However, net gains or losses on the same amounts of
fair-valued liabilities can arise both from changes in market risk and the issuer’s own credit risk.
Thus, we need to control for the effect of fluctuations in market risk on the debt value when
estimating the market information-estimation DVAs at t (D̂V At). To do this, we follow these
steps:
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Step 1: Compute the value of liabilities designated under FVOL by applying structural credit
risk models at the end of audit period t − 1 (i.e., the last quarter-end date). In the Mer-
ton model, the market value of liabilities is a function of asset volatility, asset value, risk-free
rate, time-to-maturity and principal value of liabilities at time t − 1. To avoid the changes in
the fair value of debt due to the changes in the principal value, we use the balanced princi-
pal value of liabilities under FVOL at t (Bt). We denote the debt value in the Merton model
at t − 1 as D(Bt;σt−1, rt−1, Tt−1, Vt−1). In the Leland model, the market value of liabilities
is a function of the Leland perpetual coupon rate, asset volatility, unlevered firm value, the
Leland model-implied risk-free rate, tax rate and recovery rate at time t − 1. Similar to the
Merton model, the Leland model uses the perpetual coupon rate at t as the input to value
debt at t − 1. The corporate tax rate and recovery rate maintain the same level over time in
our calibration procedure. Thus, the debt value in the Leland model at t − 1 is denoted as
D(CLeland,t, τ, α;σLeland,t−1, VLeland,t−1, rLeland,t−1). We are then able to calculate the internal
rate of return (Rt−1) given the debt value estimated by the Merton and Leland models respec-
tively.
Step 2: To control for the effect of fluctuations in market risk on the debt value, we first compute
the credit spread at t− 1 by deducting the risk-free rate at t− 1 from yield to maturity (Rt−1),
arriving at an instrument-specific credit risk of the internal rate of return. In the Merton model,
the credit spread is determined by solving the Eq. 3.11 below:




D(Bt;σt−1, rt−1, Tt−1, Vt−1)
Bt
− rt−1 (3.11)
where the risk-free rate rt−1 is obtained from the Nelson and Siegel model with term to maturity
Tt−1.
In the Leland model, the credit spread is calculated as follows:
CSLeland,t−1 =
CLeland, t
D(CLeland,t, τ, α;σLeland,t−1, VLeland,t−1, rLeland,t−1)
− rLeland,t−1 (3.12)
where the risk-free rate rLeland,t−1 is the Leland model-implied risk-free rate at t − 1. This
implied risk-free rate captures the short-term and long-term market risk at time t− 1.
Step 3: Estimate the discount rate at time t (R̂t) equal to the sum of the risk-free rate at
time t and the credit spread at time t − 1 as determined in Step 2. This discount rate reflects
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the firms’ own credit risk at t− 1 and market risk at t. In the Merton model, the discount rate
is:
R̂t = CSt−1 + rt (3.13)
This step in the Leland model is similar to the Merton’s. Eq. 3.13 in the Merton model is replaced
by:
̂RLeland, t = CSLeland, t−1 + rLeland, t (3.14)
Step 4: Estimate the market value of debt at time t (D̂t) by calculating the present value
of the cash flows associated with the liabilities under FVOL, with the discount rate determined
in Step 3. In the Merton model, the debt value is below:
D̂t(R̂t, Tt, Bt) = Bte
−R̂tTt (3.15)
We obtain the yield to maturity at t based on the credit risk at t− 1 from Eq. 3.13, and we then
estimate the debt value by discounting the balanced principal value of synthetic zero-coupon
debt with this rate.
Since the debt in Leland model is assumed to be paid perpetually, the value of debt is given
as:




The debt value determined in this step reflect the firms’ credit risk at t− 1 and market risk at t.
Step 5: Similar to Step 1, we first implement structural credit risk models to estimate the
debt value under FVOL at t. The fair value of liabilities at the end of the period t is denoted as
D(Bt;σt, rt, Tt, Vt) in the Merton model and D(CLeland, t, τ, α;σLeland, t, VLeland, t, rLeland, t) in
the Leland model. Then, we compute the market information-estimated DVAs as the differences
between the debt value determined in Step 3 and Step 4, as the changes in these two debt value
is only attributable to changes in the firms’ own credit risk. In the Merton model, the market
Chapter 3. Evidence on information differences in reported DVAs and market
information-estimated DVAs 84
information-estimated DVAs are obtained by solving the equation below:
D̂V At = D̂t(R̂t, Tt, Bt)−D(Bt;σt, rt, Tt, Vt) (3.17)
The market information-estimated DVAs in the Leland model is given as:
̂DV ALeland, t = D̂t( ̂RLeland, t, CLeland, t) (3.18)
− D(CLeland, t, τ, α;σLeland, t, VLeland, t, rLeland, t) (3.19)
Appendix 3.3 provides the summarized illustration of market information-estimated DVAs cal-
culation, together with a numerical example of the calculation.
3.5 Empirical Results
This section is organized into three parts. In Section 3.5.1 we discuss the estimated parameters
in the Merton and Leland models after adjusting the real liabilities into the synthetic Merton
zero-coupon bond and synthetic Leland perpetual coupon bond. In Section 3.5.2 we examine the
ability of structural credit risk models to fit reported DVAs. We first compare the distribution of
estimated and reported DVAs, and then compute the measures of bias and accuracy to investigate
the extent to which the market information-estimated DVAs deviate from the reported DVAs.
In Section 3.5.3 we evaluate the performance of the Merton and Leland models by investigating
whether the estimation errors are determined by systematic factors.
3.5.1 Estimation of parameters
Table 3.10 summarizes the descriptive statistics of parameters in the Merton model. Panel A and
Panel B present the estimation of parameters at the end of audit period t− 1 and t respectively.
Comparing the distribution of equity value (E) and equity volatility (σE) in these two panels,
our results suggest the equity value and equity volatility are far closer over two subsequent pe-
riods. The average equity volatility and equity value are around 47% and $36 billion. Given the
one-quarter interval between time t− 1 and t, we do not expect such extreme fluctuations in the
equity market.
Following the calibration of the Merton model in Section 3.4.1.2, the average asset value (V )
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and asset volatility (σV ) are $464,759,496,200 ($463,146,281,300) and 3.49% (3.51%) at t (t−1).
Given the average book value of total liabilities (TL), the average financial leverage is approx-
imately 92%, consistent with the feature of financial institutions that are in the business of
facilitating leverage for others. The risk-free rate (r) with term to maturity equal to the liabil-
ities under FVOL are computed by the Nelson and Siegel model (around 1.9%). The liabilities
accounted for FVOL in our sample banks are implicitly assumed to be straight bonds with peri-
odic coupon payments. In order to be compatible with the zero-coupon bond assumption in the
Merton model, we adjust the real bonds into synthetic Merton zero-coupon bond. The average
synthetic face value of bonds (B) is about $25 billion, whereas the real balanced face value of
bonds is about $21 billion. The increased amounts are attributable to the value of total coupon
payments. Besides, the average real term-to-maturity shrinks from an 8-year to 6-year duration
(TB).
In the Leland model, the estimations of parameters are reported in Table 3.11. Similarly, we
convert the real straight bonds into synthetic Leland perpetual coupon bonds so that the assump-
tions in the Leland model are necessarily adapted. The average Leland model-implied risk-free
rate (rLeland) is 3.14% (3.46%) at time t (t − 1), reflecting both the short-term and long-term
market risk. In contrast with the average real coupon rate of 5.66% at time t, the average
Leland model-implied coupon rate (CLeland) is reduced to more or less 2.56% after conversion.
Correspondingly, the average annual Leland model-coupon payments (CouponLeland) decrease to
$654,094,700. The reduction in annual coupon payments is because the total coupon payments
are spread over from the finite maturity into the perpetual maturity after conversion. Solving
the two system equations in the Leland model calibration, the average unlevered asset value
(VLeland) and asset volatility (σLeland) are near $50 billion and 3.44%. Furthermore, the average
levered asset value (vLeland) increases to near $57 billion after taking into account the tax shields
(TS) and bankruptcy costs (BC). Contrast to the tax shields ($7,283,934,400 in audit period t
and $7,298,774,300 in audit period t− 1), the bankruptcy costs are immaterial ($11,870 in audit
period t and $12,810 in audit period t − 1), indicating that the default risk is extremely low.29
The low average lambda (λ) and low default probability (PB) also provide evidence that the
banks in our sample have low default risk.
29The bankruptcy costs depend on the default probability, recovery rate and bond value at
the default date. Given the constant recovery rate 51.31% and the same bond value in the
calculation of tax shields, the extreme low bankruptcy costs but high tax shields imply that the
default probability in bankruptcy costs calculation is low.
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3.5.2 Model performance measure
In this section we discuss the performance of structural credit risk models in pricing DVAs.
Firstly, we compare the distribution of market information-estimated DVAs and reported DVAs.
Secondly, we analyze the estimation errors by using structural credit risk models in the estimation
of DVAs.
3.5.2.1 Distribution analysis of market information-estimated DVAs
First we compare the reported DVAs with the market information-estimated DVAs estimated by
the Merton and Leland models for total observations, as illustrated in Panel A in Table 3.12. On
average, the sign of Merton model-estimated DVAs is same as the reported DVAs, whereas the
sign of Leland model-estimated DVAs is opposite to the reported DVAs. Both the Merton and
Leland models overestimates DVAs ( $-5,628,000 and $42,401,000 against $-14,651,000). Fur-
thermore, the distribution of Merton model-estimated DVAs is similar to the reported DVAs,
with same median value of zero. By contrast, the distribution of Leland model-estimated DVAs
differs from the reported DVAs, revealing a substantial dispersion in estimated DVAs (standard
deviation of 703,416,000 against 374,937,000 of reported DVAs).
To investigate further, we split our sample into four subsamples in accordance with the categories
of reported DVAs (i.e., non-zero DVAs, positive and negative DVAs, and zero DVA reporters).
We find that the distribution of estimated DVAs by the Merton and Leland models for non-zero
DVA reporters, shown in Panel B of Table 3.12, appears to be close to the distribution of re-
ported DVAs for total observations. Figure 3.2 plots the market information-estimated DVAs
from the Merton and Leland models versus the reported DVAs over the sample period (2007 -
2017) for non-zero DVA reporters. The Merton model performs well on the reported DVAs with
small magnitude. However, the estimates deviate significantly from the DVAs with large magni-
tude, which are clustered into the periods 2008, late 2011 and 2012. Unlike the Merton model,
the Leland model has many examples of extreme overestimation and underestimation of DVAs
before 2011, but the estimates converge to the reported DVAs afterwards. This pattern implies
that the performance of pricing DVAs by structural models tends to be less well when the firms’
own creditworthiness is volatile, but improves when the firms are in a stable credit risk condition.
Panel C and D in Table 3.12 show the information on positive and negative DVA reporters,
respectively. The average estimates in Panel C indicate both the Merton and Leland models
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underestimate the positive DVAs. By contrast, the average estimates in Panel D indicate both
the Merton and Leland models overestimate the negative DVAs. From Figure 3.3 and Figure
3.4, we find the average Merton model-estimated DVAs are positive (negative) for the positive
(negative) DVA reporters, although some exceptional cases show the opposite in the year 2009
and 2012. However, the estimates for the Leland model in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 have a
tendency to oppose the reported DVAs — over 53% (70%) of Leland model-estimated DVAs
are negative (positive) for the positive (negative) DVA reporters. This pattern results in the
average estimates by the Leland model being opposite to the reported DVAs (the average Leland
model-estimated DVAs of $-170,610,000 and $382,278,000 versus the average reported DVAs
of $259,153,000 and $-325,628,000). Morover, the dispersion of the estimates from the Leland
model, as illustrated by the standard deviation in Panel C and D of Table 3.12, is substantially
spread over the sample period, especially in 2008. In particular, the estimated DVAs range
from $-7,052,019,000 to $4,549,972,000 for positive DVA reporters, and from $-4,158,417,000 to
$4,191,246,000 for negative DVA reporters.
In contrast to non-zero DVA reporters, the estimates for zero DVA reporters in panel E of
Table 3.12 reveal a tendency toward underestimation of DVAs. Figure 3.5 indicates the Merton
model outperforms the Leland model significantly because the reported DVAs are almost over-
lapped by the estimates by the Merton model, but the Leland model is way off the mark. The
estimated DVAs from the Leland model range from $-446,221,000 to $362,901,000, although the
reported DVAs are zero in this case.
From the distribution analysis of market information-estimated DVAs and reported DVAs, we
find on average both the Merton and Leland models overestimate the DVAs for non-zero DVA re-
porters, but underestimate the DVAs for zero DVA reporters. From the comparison of estimates
between positive DVAs and negative DVAs, we find the Merton and Leland models underestimate
the DVA gains but overestimate the DVA losses, suggesting the sign direction of reported DVAs
matters in estimates. In addition, the distribution of market information-estimated DVAs and
reported DVAs over the sample period shows the estimates from the Merton and Leland models
have a tendency to deviate wildly from the reported DVAs during the financial crisis, indicating
that the pricing performance of DVAs by structure models is sensitive to the macroeconomic
environment.
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3.5.2.2 Estimation errors analysis
This section sheds light on the examination of the performance of structural credit risk models
to fit the reported DVAs. Prior studies examine the valuation performance of structural mod-
els through computing the measure of relative percentage errors in order to allow them to be
comparable among different size of firms (Liao et al., 2009; Eom et al., 2004). However, we do
not rely on this widely used measure in our main test, as zero DVAs could generate missing
value when they are the denominator of percentage error. Therefore, we consider the difference
errors and the absolute difference errors in DVAs to be the most informative measures of model
performance as follows:
Error = Market information-estimated DVAs - Reported DVAs
Absolute Error = | Market information-estimated DVAs - Reported DVAs |
Error captures the signed difference between the estimated DVAs and the reported DVAs. The
negative (positive) Error implies structural credit risk models underestimate (overestimate) the
DVAs.30 In addition, the Absolute Error is denoted as the absolute value of Error, which cap-
tures the unsigned difference between the estimated DVAs and the reported DVAs. All positive
Absolute Error would mitigate the problem arisen from being off-set by negative values when
we compute the mean. The lower (higher) Absolute Error indicates the more (less) accurate the
model estimates DVAs. In addition, we also pay particular attention to the standard deviation
of these two measures because all structural credit risk models have substantial dispersion in
estimated DVAs.
Table 3.13 summarizes the estimation errors (Error and Absolute Error) of the Merton and
Leland models. Two measures are reported for total observations and four subsamples (i.e., zero
DVAs reporter, non-zero DVA reporters, positive DVA and negative DVA reporters). For each
measure, we report the average value and the standard deviation in parentheses.
The measure of Error in Table 3.13 shows that both the Merton and Leland models overes-
timate the reported DVAs. Identical to the implications from distribution of estimated DVAs
in Section 3.5.2.1, the standard deviation of estimation errors is relatively high, suggesting ex-
treme over-estimates or under-estimates of DVAs appear in our sample. Then, we split our total
30The distribution of DVAs is unlike the benchmark used in previous literature (Eom et al.,
2004; Liao et al., 2009). The benchmarks in these papers are credit spreads, default probability,
and the debt value, which are always positive.
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observations into zero DVA reporters and non-zero DVA reporters. The positive pricing errors
imply the Merton and Leland models overestimate the DVAs for non-zero DVA reporters, while
the negative errors for zero DVA reporters show an underestimation. Therefore, the pattern of
overestimation appeared in total observations is mainly driven by the non-zero DVA reporters,
although the number of observations for non-zero DVAs is less than zero DVAs (347 versus 540).
Accordingly, the mean errors for non-zero DVA reporters are $23,187,000 and $147,268,000 by
the Merton and Leland models respectively, which are remarkably higher than these for zero
DVA reporters ($-79,000 by the Merton model and $-921,000 by the Leland model). Moreover,
the mean absolute errors for non-zero DVA reporters also largely contribute to the pricing ab-
solute errors in total observations because the mean absolute errors for zero DVA reporters are
immaterial.
Further, we split non-zero DVA reporters into positive DVA reporters and negative DVA re-
porters to investigate whether the estimation errors are relevant to the sign direction of reported
DVAs. Table 3.13 shows that the observations of non-zero DVA reporters are almost equally
divided into positive DVA reporters (171) and negative DVA reporters (176). However, the sign
direction of mean errors for positive and negative DVA reporters are opposite. Specifically, the
mean Error for positive DVA reporters is negative but positive for negative DVA reporters, sug-
gesting the Merton and Leland models underestimate positive DVAs but overestimate negative
DVAs. In contrast, the mean Absolute Error are almost identical for these two groups.
Another conclusion that we could draw from Table 3.13 is whether incorporation of additional
information in structural credit risk model could improve the performance in the estimation of
DVAs. Comparing the two measures between the Merton and Leland models, we find the Merton
model outperforms the Leland model regarding the accuracy of DVA estimations, although the
Leland model has considered additional economic information.31 In full sample, the magnitude
of mean Error for the Leland model ($57,051,000) is significantly greater than that for the Mer-
ton model ($9,023,000). The mean Absolute Error for the Leland model is three times higher
than that for the Merton model ($325,958,000 versus $113,716,000). This pattern persists in the
other four sub-samples.32
31 Appendix 3.1 gives all the assumptions and pricing formulas of the Merton and Leland mod-
els. The Leland model relaxes some conservative assumptions in the Merton model by considering
early default, cost of financial distress, interest payments savings, and the optimal endogenously
determined default barrier. Teixeira (2007) finds that the Leland model outperforms the Merton
model in pricing credit spreads of bonds.
32The inference still holds if we use median deviations to examine the pricing
performance.
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Next, we examine the model effectiveness over the year in our sample period. Panel A in Table
3.14 suggests that the estimation errors from the Merton model are clustered in the period 2007
to 2012, covering both the 2008 financial crisis and the 2011 sovereign debt crisis. However,
the results of the Leland model in Panel B indicate that the tendency toward overestimation
appears to spread over the entire sample period, although the occasional underestimation did
happen. Interestingly, both Merton and Leland models tend to underestimate the reported DVAs
in years 2007, 2008 and 2011 in which creditworthiness deteriorates. Merton (1974) states that
the debt value tends to be more sensitive to the changes in the firms’ credit risk when the default
probability is high. Thus, the loss of accuracy occurs in both the Merton and Leland models,
as bonds become even riskier. To further illustrate the impact of high own credit risk on the
accuracy of the estimated DVAs, we compare the estimations in zero DVA reporters and non-
zero DVA reporters because the zero DVAs imply no change or immaterial changes in the credit
risk of bond issuers. Under the similar economic condition (i.e., in the same year), the struc-
tural credit risk models perform far better in pricing DVAs for zero DVA reporters (columns 4
and 5) than non-zero DVA reporters (columns 6 and 7) due to the stability of credit environment.
Parallel to analyzing estimation errors we also test whether the mean Error (Absolute Error)
for the Merton and Leland models differ from zero, and whether the Merton model mean Error
(Absolute Error) equal to that for the Leland model. Panel A in Table 3.15 reports the p-values
for the mean zero of Error and Absolute Error for the Merton model and the Leland model. The
results indicate the mean Absolute Error for these two models are significantly different from
zero. Panel B in Table 3.15 reports the p-values for the mean equality test of Error and Absolute
Error between the Merton model and the Leland model. The significant results of mean Abso-
lute Error imply that the Leland model-estimated DVAs significantly differ from the estimated
DVAs by the Merton model. This is essentially due to the consideration of more real economic
information in the Leland model.
Considering the inconsistent estimation errors across the four sub-samples, illustrated in Ta-
ble 3.13, the equality test might depend on the types of reported DVAs. In addition, Table 3.7
shows that large banks appear to disclose non-zero DVAs whereas small banks report zero DVAs.
In order to detect any size effects we divide the sample into two groups in accordance with their
firm size. Table 3.16 reports the p-values for the mean equality of estimation errors according
to the types of reported DVAs and the firm size. Considering a 5% significance level, we fail
to reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the Absolute Error between positive DVA and
negative DVA reporters, but the mean Error differ significantly across these two sub-samples
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(see Panel A). These results indicate the sign direction of reported DVAs does not affect the
accuracy of DVA estimations by structural models. However, the estimation bias between these
two groups are statistically different — underestimation of positive DVAs and overestimation of
negative DVAs. The results in Panel B show that both the mean Error and mean Absolute Error
for zero DVA reporters differ significantly to non-zero DVAs reporters. The results in Panel C
reveal the significant effects in Error and Absolute Error according to the size of banks in our
sample. This result is consistent with the implications from Panel B, as large banks tend to
report non-zero DVAs and vice versa.
The analysis of estimation errors in this section provides consilient evidence with the findings
in the distribution analysis. On average, both the Merton and Leland models overprice DVAs.
This pattern of overestimation is driven by non-zero DVA reporters, as the estimation errors
for zero DVA reporters are immaterial. Dividing the sample of non-zero DVAs into positive
and negative DVAs, we find both the Merton and Leland models overprice negative DVAs, but
underprice positive DVAs. From the descriptive statistics of estimation errors by year, we find
the estimation errors for the Merton model are more pronounced in the 2008 financial crisis and
2011 sovereign debt crisis, while the estimation errors for the Leland model appear to spread
somewhat over the entire sample period. Further, the mean zero test shows the Absolute Error
are significantly different from zero for both the Merton and Leland models, indicating the mar-
ket information-estimated DVAs remarkably deviate from the reported DVAs. The significant
results of mean equality test of Absolute Error suggest the Merton model and the Leland model
fit the reported DVAs differently. The measure of Absolute Error is not affected by the sign
direction of reported DVAs, but is significantly affected by the magnitude of reported DVAs.
3.5.3 Systematic estimation errors
In this section we investigate in more detail issues in line with the poor job of pricing DVAs
by structural credit risk models. First, we estimate a multi-variable regression on the logarithm
value of Absolute Error to detect the factors that might lead to systematic valuation errors.
These factors are classified as firm-specific variables, bond-specific variables and macroeconomic
variables. Then, we test the relationship between the logarithm value of Absolute Error and the
systematic factors by type of reported DVAs.
Chapter 3. Evidence on information differences in reported DVAs and market
information-estimated DVAs 92
3.5.3.1 Multivariate regression analysis
Similar to Eom et al. (2004), we use the measures of leverage and capital structure (e.g., market
leverage ratio, the absolute differences between market leverage and book leverage), and the
measures of firm value and its riskiness (e.g., the bank size, the market-to-book ratio, the asset
volatility and tangible assets ratio) to reflect the firms’ economic condition. In terms of the
bond-specific variables, we consider the variables related to bond features such as the weighted
average maturity, weighted average coupon rate and balanced principal value of liabilities under
FVOL. Since structural credit risk models (i.e., the contingent claim theory) price the debt in
risk-neutral environment, which indicates the asset value grow at the risk-free rate, we consider
two macroeconomic variables related to the term structure (e.g., the ten-year CMT and the
difference between the ten and two years yield). The significant relation between the absolute
error and factors indicates these factors play an essential role in improving the performance of
structural credit risk models regard to the estimation of DVAs.
Table 3.17 and Table 3.18 display the Pearson correlations between regressors and the Abso-
lute Error by implementation of the Merton and Leland models respectively. The results show
market leverage, firm size and principal value of liabilities under FVOL might explain variations
in the absolute errors. Moreover, the low correlations across regressors indicate no multicollinear-
ity issues in our test specification.
Table 3.19 shows six sets of regressions. The first and the second columns report the results
of regressions for total observations by implementation of the Merton and Leland models respec-
tively. Given the implications from Table 3.16 that the Absolute Error for the Merton and Leland
models are significantly different between zero DVA reporters and non-zero DVA reporters, we
also conduct the same regressions for these two groups. The results are displayed in the remaining
columns. Unsurprisingly, both the Merton and Leland models have systematic errors related to
market leverage. The positive t-statistics implies that the market information-estimated DVAs
significantly deviate the reported DVAs on average for the banks with a higher market leverage
ratio. This is consistent with the findings in the previous sections that structural credit risk
models do a poor job of pricing DVAs in the risky banks. This systematic factor markedly
affects the accuracy of estimation. However, the effect of market leverage disappears for zero
DVAs reporters.
Like leverage, asset volatility also positively and significantly explain the variations in Absolute
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Error for these six regression specifications. In addition, the explanatory power of regressions
is clearly reduced once asset volatility is removed (untabulated). This result is consistent with
the inference from the analysis of estimation errors that banks with high business risk typically
receive severe estimation errors in all models. Moreover, given the fact that these two factors
have been incorporated in these two structural models (they should lead to white noise other
than the systematic errors), the positive and significant coefficients on both leverage and asset
volatility suggest that the structural credit risk models would suffer fewer estimation errors if
they include more information of leverage and asset volatility.33
Unlike our expectation indicated from the Pearson correlation, we do not observe a consistently
significant effect of firm size on the Absolute Error, especially the Leland model. The insignificant
t-statistics in the Leland model indicates the impact of bank size on the estimation errors is less
pronounced. This result is consistent with the high dispersion of estimation errors by the Leland
model. However, the untabulated results show firm size is significantly associated with the Ab-
solute Error if we replace to control for time effect instead of firm effect. Therefore, including
the firm fixed effect captures the firm-specific information that is incorporated in the firm size.
Moreover, the positive coefficient provides evidence that structural credit risk models tend to
overestimate (underestimate) the DVAs for large (small) firms. The reason is large (small) banks
tend to disclose the non-zero (zero) DVAs, and the distribution analysis shows that non-zero
DVAs suffer more severe estimation bias. Further, we use the market-to-book ratio as the proxy
of banks’ growth opportunities. Banks with higher growth opportunities tend to be safer than
banks with lower growth opportunities; thus, the estimation errors are less pronounced in the
safe banks. However, we do not find the significant effect of market-to-book ratio on theAbsolute
Error.
The t-statistic for variables related to recovery rates are strongly consistent in the Merton and Le-
land models. The negative coefficients reveal that structural models fit the DVAs much better for
banks with higher tangible assets ratios. Banks with higher tangible assets are perceived as low
default risk premiums because these assets can be used as collateral in a potential bankruptcy. In
addition, the tangible assets only significantly explain the Absolute Errors by the Merton model,
suggesting that consideration of bankruptcy costs in the Leland model somewhat improve the
performance of pricing DVAs.
33In both the Merton and Leland models, they assume the constant leverage ratio and asset
volatility. The prior studies find that the models incorporating the mean reversion in leverage
(Pierre Collin-Dufresne, 2001) extremely improve the prediction errors in bond spreads.
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Regarding the bond-specific variables, maturity is a major factor in both the Merton and Le-
land models, suggesting the careful treatment of maturity in structural credit risk models may
help the accuracy of estimations. Further, the negative t-statistic reveals that the shorter ma-
turity bonds are subject to higher estimation errors issue, which was raised initially by Duffie
et al. (2001). In contrast, the coupon rate does not influence the accuracy of structural models
in terms of pricing DVAs. This is because the coupon payments have been incorporated into
the face value of liabilities under FVOL after transferring the ’real’ bonds into the ’synthetic’
bonds. The variable of the principal value of liabilities under FVOL positively and significantly
affects the Absolute Errors, suggesting greater amounts of liabilities accounted for FVOL lead
to higher estimation errors. Apparently, given the same changes in the firms’ own credit risk,
the greater magnitude of liabilities under FVOL would generate higher DVAs. Moreover, the
findings in Table 3.13 show that the estimation errors in total observations is contributed mainly
by non-zero DVA reporters. Therefore, the principal value of liabilities under FVOL should be
positively associated with Absolute Errors. In addition, the adjusted R2 rises considerably when
the principal value of liabilities under FVOL is considered.
Considering the macroeconomic variables, we find no evidence that the slope of the term struc-
ture is significantly related to the systematic errors in both the Merton and Leland models.
In addition, there is no tendency for the level of the term structure to come into play in the
estimation of DVAs by the Leland model, even though the changes in firm value occurs with
interest rates (the risk-neutral drift of the firm value Brownian motion process). In contrast,
the significant negative t-statistic in the Merton model implies that the high level of interest
rates reduces the estimation errors of pricing DVAs. Following Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), the
higher drift in the firm value process decreases the default probability, and in return, improves
the creditworthiness. This finding confirms the estimation errors are less pronounced in banks
with more healthy credit condition.
3.6 Conclusions
This paper directly tests whether the information contained in the Debt Valuation Adjustments
(DVAs) can be captured by market efficiently by using a sample of 887 bank-quarter observations
between 2007 and 2017. In particular, we compare the reported DVAs to the market information-
estimated DVAs which are estimated by the Merton (1974) model and Leland (1994) model.
Chapter 3. Evidence on information differences in reported DVAs and market
information-estimated DVAs 95
We first analyze the distribution of reported DVAs and market information-estimated DVAs
over the sample period. We find the distribution of estimated DVAs from the Merton model ap-
pears to be similar to that of the reported DVAs, whereas the estimates from the Leland model
deviate wildly from the reported DVAs over the entire sample period. Overall, the Merton model
outperforms the Leland model when the banks’ own credit risk is considerable low, although the
Leland model incorporates the additional information.
Then, we compute the signed difference (Error) between the reported DVAs and the estimated
DVAs as the measures of bias, and unsigned difference (Absolute Error) between the reported
DVAs and the estimated DVAs as the measures of accuracy. We find that both the Merton and
Leland models tend to overestimate the DVAs on average. However, the average Errors is a
rather poor summary of a model’s ability in fitting reported DVAs, because the dispersion of
market information-estimated DVAs in our sample is remarkably high. Therefore, we analyze the
estimation errors by year. Interestingly, we find that both the Merton and Leland models reverse
their performance on average to the underestimation of DVAs when banks’ own creditworthiness
was volatile, and the estimated DVAs gradually converge to the reported ones when their credit
risk improves. The results indicate that the poor economic condition exacerbates the weakness
of pricing DVAs by structural models.
Finally, we consider whether the estimation errors are associated with some systematic fac-
tors. The results reveal that banks with high market leverage and asset volatility lead to high
estimation errors. In both the Merton and Leland models, leverage ratio and asset volatility are
two main channels of default risk. This pattern of high estimation errors in banks with poor
credit condition may stem from the fact that the debt value tends to be more sensitive to the
changes in the firm’s credit risk when default probability is high.
All analysis incorporate a decomposition of banks in accordance with the categories of reported
DVAs due to the different economic impacts on accounting earnings (i.e., non-zero DVAs, zero
DVAs, positive DVAs and negative DVAs). The estimates for zero DVA and non-zero DVA re-
porters are significantly different. In particular, the Merton and Leland models underestimate
the DVAs on average for zero DVA reporters, but overestimate the non-zero DVAs. Moreover,
comparing to non-zero DVAs, the Absolute Errors for zero DVAs are immaterial, suggesting the
loss of accuracy in full sample are mainly attributed to zero DVA reporters. Further, we split
non-zero DVAs into positive and negative DVAs due to their opposite accounting effects — DVA
gains and DVA losses. The insignificant t-statistics of equality test indicate that the Absolute
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Errors between these two groups are equal. However, the measure of Error suggests the Merton
and Leland models underestimate DVA gains but overestimate DVAs losses. The results imply
that management estimate positive DVAs and negative DVAs differently, while the capital mar-
ket treats them indifferently.
Overall, the results in this chapter indicate that the reported DVAs contain private informa-
tion and the ignorance of private information in structural credit risk models limit their ability
in the replication of reported DVAs. Further, the reported DVAs reflect more private information
on credit risk when the economy is volatile rather than stable.
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Appendix 3.1 Formulas for Structural Credit Risk
Models
In this appendix we summarize the main assumptions and formulas for firm value, equity value,
debt value and credit spread of the Merton (1974) and Leland (1994) models.
3.6.1 The Merton (1974) model
The Merton (1974) model assumes that the dynamics for the asset value, Vt, to be the geometric
Brownian motion (GBM) process as follows:
dVt = rVtdt+ σVtdWt (3.20)
where σ is the constant variance of the return on the underlying assets, and Wt is a standard
Brownian motion under the risk-neutral measure Q. In this extended Merton model we include
the payout ratio, as most firms pay both interests to debtholders and dividends to equity-holders.
The Merton model assumes that a firm issues a single class of debt, a zero-coupon bond, with
a face value B payable at maturity T . A default is triggered by the market value of the firm’s
assets being lower than the face value B, and such credit events can only occur at the finite
maturity T of this bond, i.e. VT ≤ B. If a default occurs, debt-holders receive the remaining
asset VT without incurring any distress costs. The payoff to debt D(VT ) is given as
D(VT ) = min(VT , B) = B −max(B − VT , 0) (3.21)
The representation of the payoff to debt-holders makes it clear that the debt-holders are short a
put option written on the assets of the borrowing firm with a strike price equal to B, the face
value of debt. In addition, according to the assumptions in the Merton model the value of the
firm and the asset value are identical and are not affected by the capital structure (i.e., MM
theory). The asset value is thus given by the sum of risky debt and equity. With this framework,
equity is a call option on the assets of the borrowing firm with a strike price equal to B, the face
value of debt. We can therefore express equity as follows:
E(VT ) = max(VT −B, 0) (3.22)
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Equity and debt values are therefore given by Black and Scholes (1973) formulas:
E = CallBS(V0, B, r, T, σ)
= V0N(d1)−Be−rTN(d2) (3.23)
D = Be−rT − PutBS(V0, B, r, T, σ, δ)
= V0N(−d1) +Be−rTN(d2) (3.24)
d1, d2 =







where N(.) is the cumulative standard normal distribution.
The yield to maturity Y TM is computed as
Y TM = − ln(D/F )
T
(3.25)
Hence, the credit spread CS is the difference between the yield to maturity Y TM and the
risk-free rate r as follows:










3.6.2 The Leland (1994) model
The Leland (1994) extends the results of Merton (1974) by including bankruptcy costs and cor-
porate costs as endogenous cases. In other words, the option-based pricing models assume the
Modigliani-Miller theorem in corporate capital structure, which the firm’s asset value is only split
into debt and equity and invariant to the capital structure. In practice, however, it is unrealistic
to develop a default model without considering the corporate capital structure. In this model,
the firm issues perpetual security with a long period to maturity, which pays a nonnegative
coupon C before infinite maturity T when the firm is solvent. Therefore, these securities are
time-homogeneous, which means they are time-independent Ft(V, t) = 0.
Considering a constant corporate tax rate τ , the firm obtains tax shields from its debt at a
rate Cτ until default. Bankruptcy occurs when the firm value reaches a threshold VB . In this
case, the bankruptcy costs are αVB , where α is defined as the bankruptcy cost rate or one minus
the recovery rate. Because of these new ”real world features” the levered firm value, VLeland,
differs from the unlevered firm value V (i.e., the asset value in the Merton model). Rather, the
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firm value increases by the tax shield, TS, and decreases by the bankruptcy costs, BC. After






















The parameter λ in the bankruptcy trigger solution is
λ = − 2r
σ2
(3.30)
PB can be interpreted as the risk-neutral default probability and λ as the elasticity of the prob-
ability of default with respect to the value of the assets of the firm. As such, it is negative and
increases with the volatility of the assets of the firm.
The bankruptcy costs resemble a zero-coupon bond with the face value equal to the bankruptcy







Similarly, the tax benefits resemble the security of paying a constant coupon equal to the tax-
sheltering value of interest payment τC if the firm is solvent and paying nothing if the firm goes



















The total firm value therefore is
VLeland = E +D = V + TS −BC (3.33)
The equity value is the residual of total firm value after paying off all liabilities
E = VLeland −D = V + TS −BC −D (3.34)
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Appendix 3.2 An Example of DVA Disclosure
The Appendix provides an example of DVA disclosure by JP Morgan Chase & Co as of Septem-
ber 31, 2015.
Figure 3.1: Example of DVA disclosure from FR Y-9C report
In the 10-Q form the following information was provided regarding the DVA and financial liabil-
ities under FVOL : ”Total changes in instrument-specific credit risk (DVA) related to structured
notes were $169 million and $190 million for the three months ended September 30, 2015 and
2014, respectively, and $492 million and $209 million for the nine months ended September 30,
2015 and 2014, respectively. These totals include such changes for structured notes classified




































Table 3.1: Presentation of the fair value of financial liabilities at fair value in the statement of financial statement
(in millions)
Liabilities Sep 30, 2015
Deposits (include $11, 062 and $8,807 at fair value) $ 1,273,106
Federal funds purchased and securities loaned or sold under repurchase agreements
180,319
(included $3,565 and $2,979 at fair value)
Other borrowed funds (included $9,665 and $14,739 at fair value) 27,174
Accounts payable and other liabilities (included $5,850 and $4,155 at fair value) 187,986
Beneficial interests issued by consolidated variable interest entities
48,733
(included $1,199 and $2,162 at fair value)
Long-term debt ( included $31,160 and $30,226 at fair value) 292,945
The table provides information on the disclosure of the fair value of financial liabilities under fair value option (FVO) by JP
Morgan Chase & Co as of September 31, 2015. According to the disclosure requirements from SFAS No. 159, adopters need
to present the aggregate of fair value amounts in the same line item in the statement of financial position and parentheti-
cally disclose the amount measured at fair value included in the aggregate amount. JP Morgan Chase & Co parenthetically
reported the current fair value of financial liabilities under FVOL in bold front as of September 30, 2015 (page 87).
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Table 3.2: Presentation of the fair value of financial liabilities at fair value in the financial report
Difference between aggregate fair value and the aggregate remaining contractual prin-
cipal balance outstanding
The following table reflects the difference between the aggregate fair value and the aggregate re-
maining contractual principal balance outstanding as of September 30, 2015, for long-term debt for






(in millions) outstanding Fair value outstanding
Long-term debt
Principal-protected debt $ 16753 (b) 15,520 (1233)
Nonprincipal-protected debt (a) NA 15,640 NA
(a): Remaining contractual principal is not applicable to nonprincipal-protected notes. Unlike principal-
protected structured notes, for which the firm is obligated to return a stated amount of principal at the
maturity of the note, nonprincipal-protected structured notes do not obligate the firm to return a stated
amount of principal at maturity, but to return an amount based on the performance of an underlying
variable or derivative feature embedded in the note. However, investors are exposed to the credit risk of
the firm as the issuer for both nonprincipal-protected and principal protected notes.
(b): Where the Firm issues principal-protected zero-coupon or discount notes, the balance reflects the
contractual principal payment at maturity or, if applicable, the contractual principal payment at the
Firm’s next call date.
The table from 10-Q filing includes the differences between aggregate fair value and aggregate re-
maining contractual principal balance outstanding for liabilities. JP Morgan Chase & Co only displayed
the differences between fair value and contractual principal balance of principal-protected debt. This is
because this type of debt has relatively long-term maturity. For the rest of liabilities under FVO (i.e.,
nonprinciple-protected debt), JP Morgan did not report the differences of these liabilities. On the one
hand, they probably do not have principal value. On the other hand, these liabilities have relatively
short-term maturity so that the differences between fair value and contractual principal are immaterial.
According to the Table 3.1 ”Fair value disclosure”, the fair value of liabilities under FVO was 62,501
millions, therefore, the principal value of liabilities under FVO should be 63,734 millions (62,501 millions




































Table 3.3: Presentation of maturity of financial liabilities at fair value in the financial report
Contractual cash obligations
2015
By remaining maturity at December 31, 2016 2017-2018 2019-2020 After 2010 Total
(in millions)
On-balance sheet obligations
Deposits (a) $ 1,262,865 5,166 3,553 4,555 1,276,139
Federak funds purchased and securities loaned or
sold under repurchase agreements
151,433 811 3 491 152,738
Other borrowed funds (a) 11,331 0 0 0 11,331
Beneficial interests issued by consolidated variable
interest entities
16,389 18,480 3,093 3,130 41,092
Long-term debt (a) 45,972 82,293 59,669 92,272 280,206
(a) Excludes structured notes on which the Firms is not obligated to return a stated amount of principal at the
maturity of the notes, but is obligated to return an amount based on the performance of the structured notes.
This table displays the maturity distribution across various liabilities by JP Morgan Chase & Co as of September 31, 2015 (page 78). This
data is used to compute the priced weighted average maturities.
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Appendix 3.3 Illustration of Market Information-
estimated DVAs Calculation
1. Steps for determining the market information-estimated DVAs.
Step 1: Determine the fair value of liabilities at the end of period t− 1
We implement structural credit risk models — the Merton model and the Leland model — to
compute the fair value of liabilities at the end of audited period t− 1.
Step 2: Determine the instrument-specific component at the end of period t− 1
Given the fair value of liabilities determined in Step 1, we compute the yield to maturity in
accordance with the zero-coupon bond and perpetual coupon bond pricing formula in the Mer-
ton and Leland model respectively. Deducting from yield to maturity the observed (benchmark)
interest rate at the end of audited period t − 1, we arrive at an instrument-specific component
of the yield to maturity, which reflects the credit risk at the end of audited period t− 1.
Step 3: Determine the discount rate at the end of the period t
In order to control for the fluctuation in fair value of liabilities between t − 1 and t due to the
changes in interest rate, we compute the discount rate (i.e., yield to maturity) equal to the sum
of (i) the observed (benchmark) interest rate at the end of the period t and (ii) the instrument-
specific component as determined in Step 2.
Step 4: Determine the fair value of liabilities at the end of the period t
According to the zero-coupon bond and perpetual coupon bond pricing formula, we compute the
fair value of liabilities at the end of the period using the discount rate as determined in Step 3.
This estimated bond value reflects the firm’s own credit risk at the end of audited period t − 1
and the interest rate at the end of the period t.
Step 5: Determine the market information-estimated DVAs at the end of the period
Again, we implement structural credit risk models — the Merton model and the Leland model —
to compute the fair value of liabilities at the end of audited period t. Accordingly, the estimated
fair value reflects both the firm’s own credit risk and the interest rate at the end of the period
t.The differences in the bond value determined in Step 3 and Step 4 are denoted as the market
information-estimated DVAs, as these are the changes in fair value that is only attributable to
changes in the firm’s own credit risk.
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Appendix 3.4 Empirical Results
Table 3.4: Sample selection procedure
Banks that report net gains or losses on liabilities (bhckf553) or net gains or losses on liabilities
attributable to changes in their own credit risk (bhckf554) at least once during sample period
2007: Q1 to 2017: Q4 85
Banks that match with COMPUSTAT and CRSP with publicly available stock price and positive
book value of liabilities 46
Banks that report fair value and principal value of liabilities under fair value option 38
All bank-quarters of selected banks 887
The table provides information on the number of bank-quarters for which FVOL was adopted, and the recognition of positive and
negative DVA each year. The sample includes all U.S. bank holding companies which have available data for the period 2007-2017
(887 bank-quarter observations).
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Table 3.5: List of bank holding companies
Name GVKEY ID N DVAs (’000) FV (’000) PV (’000)
American International Group Inc. 001487 40 -16,750 17,142,875 15,718,700
Popular Inc. 002002 4 -2,500 181,830 264,156
Bank of Hawaii Corp. 002005 3 0 120,400 118,971
Bank of New York Mellon Corp. 002019 6 -1,500 3,197,833 3,210,833
JP Morgan Chase & Co. 002968 44 7,227 70,885,159 71,324,932
Citigroup Inc. 003243 44 -17,182 146,456,318 146,779,145
Bank of America Corp. 007647 39 -234,431 92,550,410 95,136,026
Wells Fargo & Co. 008007 5 200 296,800 340,000
P N C Finanical Service Group Inc. 008245 23 0 124,522 160,478
Keycorp 009783 18 0 2,440,056 2,845,889
Suntrust Bank Inc. 010187 44 2,000 3,383,067 3,320,874
Valley National Bancorp 011861 23 0 153,843 155,641
Morgan Stanley 012124 42 -34,429 49,792,905 50,735,595
Synovus Financial Corp. 013041 5 0 100,433 100,433
Fulton Financial Corp. 014172 1 -35 7,517 7,458
First Bancorp 016821 21 243 1,201,995 1,204,352
National Penn Bancshares Inc. 017070 11 0 61,132 65,200
Old National Bancorp 017095 5 34 39,084 38,880
W Holding Company Co Ltd 017157 4 0 49,756 49,596
Tompkins Financial Corp. 017240 34 -59 15,175 13,824
Irwin Financial Corp. 018928 4 2,232 82,616 82,616
VIST Financial Corp. 021595 17 0 19,240 20,200
BOK Financial Corp. 024447 12 0 239,227 246,167
Cascade Financial Corp. 025719 17 236 10,733 12,647
Banner Corp. 061487 44 0 151,219 201,336
Flushing Financial Corp. 061585 44 17 60,906 87,092
Community Central Bank Corp. 064142 15 0 16,037 22,620
First Mariner Bancorp 064194 10 0 56,581 55,000
United Security Bankshares 064228 44 0 10,665 14,318
Flagstar Bancorp Inc. 064699 19 0 115,415 165,629
Umpqua Holdings Corp. 065228 44 0 148,653 216,026
First Community Corp. 112295 10 0 2,291 2,250
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 114628 36 -36,250 77,700,917 78,803,222
Metlife Inc. 133768 28 0 2,448,214 2,393,857
Principal Financial Group Inc. 145701 28 -2,871 88,739 160,136
Alliance Bankshares Corp. 146354 23 0 65,743 64,505
Western Alliance Bancorporation 163920 44 0 51,143 71,780
Ameriprise Financial Inc. 164708 32 0 4,555,563 4,924,094
The table lists the bank holding companies in our sample, together with COMPUSTAT identifier
(GVKEYI ID), the bank-quarter observations, the arithmetic mean of reported DVAs (DVAs), the arith-
metic mean of fair value of liabilities under FVOL (FV) and the arithmetic mean of the balanced prin-
cipal value of liabilities under FVOL (PV) for each bank.
Chapter 3. Evidence on information differences in reported DVAs and market
information-estimated DVAs 109
Table 3.6: DVAs, Fair value (FV) and Principal value (PV) of
liabilities under FVOL by year
Year N DVAs(’000) FV(’000) PV(’000)
2007 53 48,852 31,581,826 31,544,489
2008 108 105,683 17,777,179 17,982,122
2009 102 -160,467 18,979,335 19,508,684
2010 105 -14,389 19,641,662 19,992,953
2011 86 96,295 23,724,618 24,225,617
2012 80 -155,362 25,129,710 25,126,753
2013 78 -36,649 23,288,955 23,155,473
2014 74 18,526 18,956,872 18,805,129
2015 72 13,054 18,873,678 18,990,011
2016 70 -29,572 20,368,417 20,544,875
2017 59 -53,061 27,347,615 27,838,602
The table provides information on the bank-quarter observations, the
arithmetic mean of reported DVAs (DVAs), the arithmetic mean of
fair value of liabilities under FVOL (FV) and the arithmetic mean of
principal value of liabilities under FVOL (PV) by year in our sample
period.
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Table 3.7: Number of negative, positive and zero DVAs
by year
Number of bank-quarters
DVA<0 DVA=0 DVA>0 Total
Panel A: All banks
2007 1 36 16 53
2008 19 68 21 108
2009 24 65 13 102
2010 19 68 18 105
2011 15 50 21 86
2012 23 47 10 80
2013 24 46 8 78
2014 13 42 19 74
2015 8 40 24 72
2016 14 42 14 70
2017 16 36 7 59
Total 176 540 171 887
Panel B: Large banks (total assets > $50 billion)
2007 1 0 13 14
2008 10 3 16 29
2009 22 3 7 32
2010 16 15 17 48
2011 13 13 19 45
2012 23 12 9 44
2013 24 16 8 48
2014 13 14 19 46
2015 8 12 24 44
2016 14 17 13 44
2017 16 12 7 35
Total 160 117 152 429
Panel C: Other banks (Total assets < $50 billion)
2007 0 36 3 39
2008 9 65 5 79
2009 2 62 6 70
2010 3 53 1 57
2011 2 37 2 41
2012 0 35 1 36
2013 0 30 0 30
2014 0 28 0 28
2015 0 28 0 28
2016 0 25 1 26
2017 0 24 0 24
Total 16 423 19 458
The table provides information on the number of bank-
quarters for which FVOL was adopted, and the recognition
of positive and negative DVA each year. Panel A provides
information for all the banks, while Panels B and C provide
information for large banks (total assets more than $50 bil-
lion) and other banks respectively. The sample includes all
U.S. bank holding companies which have available data for




































Table 3.8: Descriptive statistics of characteristics of liabilities under FVOL
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Panel A: All bank-quarter observations
Fair value of liabilities under FVOL(’000) 887 21,689,588 44,049,942 1,250 41,429 159,787 10,392,000 358,827,000
Principal value of liabilities under FVOL (’000) 887 21,896,584 44,471,600 1,500 61,900 192,900 8,042,000 357,997,000
Maturity 887 8.03 7.11 1.00 3.18 4.80 10.00 39.00
Coupon 887 5.66% 1.79% 1.13% 4.39% 5.47% 6.71% 11.60%
Panel B: Non-zero DVAs recognizers
Fair value of liabilities under FVOL(’000) 347 54,549,423 56,453,525 3,341 4,050,000 54,387,000 79,685,000 358,827,000
Principal value of liabilities under FVOL (’000) 347 55,000,173 57,059,240 5,890 4,050,000 55,293,000 80,602,000 357,997,000
Maturity 347 4.44 4.10 1.07 2.95 3.84 4.81 39.00
Coupon 347 5.76% 1.09% 2.95% 4.85% 6.00% 6.46% 11.60%
Panel C: Zero DVAs recognizers
Fair value of liabilities under FVOL(’000) 540 574,102 1,391,548 1,250 25,037 68,720 172,266 7,129,000
Principal value of liabilities under FVOL (’000) 540 624,464 1,467,050 1,500 25,000 95,750 215,568 7,302,000
Maturity 540 10.33 7.66 1.00 3.65 8.11 17.62 27.62
Coupon 540 5.59% 2.12% 1.13% 4.19% 5.15% 6.79% 11.60%
This table reports descriptive statistics of the characteristics of liabilities account for under the FVOL . Panel A provides information on all the
sample, including bank-quarters where zero DVA were reported. Panel B includes only the bank-quarters that non-zero DVA were reported.
Panel C reports bank-quarters that only zero DVA were reported. Maturity is computed as the price-weighted average of the term to maturity
across liabilities account for FVOL for each bank. The coupon rate is computed as the price-weighted average of coupon rate of all straight




































Table 3.9: Estimation of model parameters
Panel A: Merton model (1974)
Parameters Description Estimation method Data source
Firm characteristics V Unlevered firm value Merton (1974) approach Compustat and CRSP
σV Asset volatility Merton (1974) approach Compustat and CRSP
TL Default barrier Total book value of lia-
bilities
Compustat
Interest rate r Risk-free rate Nelson-Siegel (1987) CMT
Debt related information TB Maturity Duration of bonds Hand-collection
from 10-K/10-
Q filings





Panel B: Leland model (1994)
Parameters Description Estimation method Data source
Firm characteristics VLeland Unlevered firm value Leland (1994) approach Compustat and CRSP
σLeland Asset volatility Leland (1994) approach Compustat and CRSP
τ Corporate tax rate Assumed at 35%





CLeland Perpetual debt coupon rate Implied coupon rate
Datastream
α Recovery rate Assumed at 51.31% Moody’s
This table reports the summary of the estimation of model parameters. Panel A summarizes the parameters needed in Merton’s model (1974);
Panel B summarizes the parameters needed in Leland’s model (1994). The data sources include COMPUSTAT, COMPUSTAT BANK, CRSP,




































Table 3.10: Inputs for market information-estimated DVAs (Merton 1974)
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Panel A: Inputs for Merton model at t-1
σE 887 47.42% 38.34% 12.40% 23.25% 32.51% 54.50% 235.99%
E (’000) 887 36,135,439.80 59,195,982.10 4,259.00 467,129.90 3,591,340.50 48,549,136.00 336,100,000.00
r3month 887 0.63% 1.22% 0.01% 0.05% 0.12% 0.29% 5.04%
TL (’000) 887 427,596,479.80 663,392,165.30 468,363.00 4,381,285.00 21,291,457.00 742,291,000.00 2,341,284,000.00
σV 887 3.51% 2.46% 0.23% 2.09% 2.87% 4.05% 20.81%
V (’000) 887 463,146,281.30 717,106,790.20 496,118.90 4,981,018.70 24,799,569.50 773,866,554.10 2,634,690,000.00
r 887 1.94% 1.24% 0.14% 0.90% 1.75% 2.75% 5.09%
B (’000) 887 25,485,378.50 50,269,458.10 1,625.90 70,586.40 280,600.30 11,312,666.90 379,261,725.90
TB 887 5.9511 4.3853 0.7371 2.7543 4.1517 7.3814 19.203
Panel B: Inputs for Merton model at t
σE 887 47.93% 39.17% 12.40% 22.98% 32.34% 55.36% 235.99%
E (’000) 887 36,527,099.50 60,144,531.20 2,505.80 471,597.60 3,650,342.00 49,539,048.00 371,100,000.00
r3month 887 0.53% 1.04% 0.01% 0.05% 0.12% 0.29% 5.04%
TL (’000) 887 428,764,165.50 665,918,391.60 468,946.00 4,439,590.00 21,387,391.00 742,291,000.00 2,341,284,000.00
σV 887 3.49% 2.45% 0.23% 2.08% 2.84% 4.00% 20.81%
V (’000) 887 464,759,496.20 720,477,655.40 496,118.90 5,009,298.20 24,926,168.00 773,866,554.10 2,641,110,000.00
r 887 1.91% 1.16% 0.14% 0.96% 1.76% 2.63% 5.09%
B (’000) 887 25,770,806.90 50,969,467.00 1,667.80 70,584.40 281,061.30 11,434,833.10 389,891,857.80
TB 887 6.1446 4.3579 0.9754 2.9763 4.3653 7.5328 19.0490
This table reports the descriptive statistics on inputs used to estimate market-implied DVAs by Merton model (1973). Panel A and Panel B report the information on
same variables but at the end of quarter t-1 and t, respectively. σE is annual equity volatility estimated as the standard deviation of daily return over 150 days before
the end of the quarter. E the market value of equity.r3 month is the three-month CMT yield. TL is the total book value of liabilities. σV is Merton model-estimated
annual asset volatility. V is Merton model-estimated unlevered firm value. r is estimated by the Nelson-Siegel model with a term equal to the duration of synthetic





































Table 3.11: Inputs for market information-estimated DVAs (Leland 1994)
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Panel A: Inputs for Leland model at t-1
rLeland 887 3.20% 0.81% 1.87% 2.46% 3.06% 3.91% 5.10%
CouponLeland (’000) 887 664,768.80 1,556,153.30 64.07 1,217.20 5,525.80 268,756.90 16,907,720.40
CLeland 887 2.61% 0.81% 0.71% 2.06% 2.53% 3.22% 4.72%
σLeland 887 3.46% 2.39% 0.21% 2.06% 2.85% 3.96% 19.80%
VLeland (’000) 887 49,717,832.00 81,233,059.00 9,621.70 491,746.50 3,767,363.90 66,511,703.50 469,348,055.60
vLeland (’000) 887 57,016,593.50 94,356,082.10 12,357.00 526,723.60 4,091,219.80 71,819,936.10 585,466,239.40
λ 887 -198 730 -13891 -138 -73 -38 -2
VB (’000) 887 13,387,920.80 27,461,856.00 881.80 24,268.40 107,451.50 4,711,894.80 214,846,326.50
PB 887 0.0005% 0.0089% 0 4.24E-117 5.7E-64 1.11E-35 0.2330%
BC (’000) 887 12.81 324.10 0 2.83E-112 6.59E-58 3.76E-30 9,591.10
TS (’000) 887 7,298,774.30 14,944,777.90 476.20 13,862.10 58,892.60 2,597,720.00 116,118,183.80
Panel B: Inputs for Leland model at t
rLeland 887 3.14% 0.78% 1.87% 2.46% 2.97% 3.86% 5.10%
CouponLeland (’000) 887 654,094.70 1,519,972.10 59.84 1,186.10 5,498.20 263,819.60 15,842,051.70
CLeland 887 2.56% 0.78% 0.68% 2.06% 2.49% 3.11% 4.72%
σLeland 887 3.44% 2.37% 0.21% 2.05% 2.84% 3.94% 19.80%
VLeland (’000) 887 50,051,014.30 81,827,536.40 9,600.80 505,133.10 3,890,415.20 65,177,944.10 450,929,097.30
vLeland (’000) 887 57,334,936.90 94,819,025.50 12,207.50 528,492.90 4,141,960.30 71,993,246.90 568,706,303.50
λ 887 -203 746 -13891 -138 -73 -37 -2
VB (’000) 887 13,359,122.50 27,439,157.10 881.90 24,568.10 106,275.20 4,667,050.70 217,517,401.80
PB 887 0.0005% 0.0087% 0 3.93E-116 2.2E-63 3.99E-36 0.2300%
BC (’000) 887 11.87 270.30 0 5.13E-110 6.72E-57 9.32E-31 7,740.10
TS (’000) 887 7,283,934.40 14,941,225.70 476.20 13,823.00 57,379.10 2,564,336.70 117,777,206.20
This table reports the descriptive statistics on inputs used to estimate market-implied DVAs by Leland model (1979). Panel A and
Panel B report the information on the same variables but at the end of quarter t-1 and t, respectively. rLeland is defined as the Le-
land model-implied risk-free rate. CouponLeland is defined as the Leland model perpetual debt coupon payment. The Leland model
perpetual debt coupon rate (CLeland) is calculated by dividing CouponLeland over the face value of liabilities under FVOL. σLeland
is the Leland model-estimated asset volatility. VLeland is the Leland model-estimated unlevered firm value. vLeland is defined as the
levered firm value. λ is the bankruptcy trigger solution, meaning the elasticity of the probability of default with respect to the value
of the asset value.V B is the endogenously determined optimal bankruptcy threshold. P B is interpreted as the risk-neutral default




































Table 3.12: Descriptive statistics of DVAs and market information-estimated DVAs
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Panel A: Total observations
DVAs (’000) 887 -14,651 374,937 -3,134,715 0 0 0 3,410,000
DVAs Merton (’000) 887 -5,628 237,950 -3,236,161 -30 0 2 3,003,049
DVAs Leland (’000) 887 42,401 703,416 -7,052,019 -2,721 89 7,366 4,549,972
Panel B: Non-zero DVA reporters
DVAs (’000) 347 -37,450 599,267 -3,134,715 -143,000 -162 87,000 3,410,000
DVAs Merton (’000) 347 -14,264 380,606 -3,236,161 -972 -1 57 3,003,049
DVAs Leland (’000) 347 109,817 1,120,764 -7,052,019 -91,925 1,546 431,864 4,549,972
Panel C: Positive DVA reporters
DVAs (’000) 171 259,153 516,821 12 6,000 92,000 231,300 3,410,000
DVAs Merton (’000) 171 15,089 141,951 -581,161 -82 0 173 845,538
DVAs Leland (’000) 171 -170,610 1,231,645 -7,052,019 -276,198 -248 181,570 4,549,972
Panel D: Negative DVA reporters
DVAs (’000) 176 -325,628 530,167 -3,134,715 -383,000 -129,000 -14,300 -35
DVAs Merton (’000) 176 -42,783 514,953 -3,236,161 -10,331 -29 0 3,003,049
DVAs Leland (’000) 176 382,278 926,500 -4,158,417 -938 115,187 656,870 4,191,246
Panel E: Zero DVA reporters
DVAs (’000) 540 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DVAs Merton (’000) 540 -79 1,548 -18,189 -3 0 1 13,729
DVAs Leland (’000) 540 -921 46,836 -446,221 -1,451 8 1,290 362,901
This table reports the descriptive statistics on reported DVAs, Merton model-estimated DVAs and Leland
model-estimated DVAs. Panel A provide the information on total observations. Panel B provides the in-
formation on non-zero DVA reporters. The information on positive DVAs and negative DVA reporters are





































Figure 3.2: The market information-estimated DVAs versus the reported DVAs for non-zero DVA reporters.
This figure shows the market-implied DVAs by the Merton and Leland models versus the reported DVAs against the sample period (2007 -
2017) for non-zero DVA reporters. The bank-quarter observations for non-zero DVA reporters are 347. The Merton model-estimated DVAs
are marked with a trangle and the reported DVAs are denoted with an sterisk in the left graph. The Leland model-estimated DVAs are





































Figure 3.3: The market information-estimated DVAs versus the reported DVAs for positive DVA reporters
This figure shows the market-implied DVAs by the Merton and Leland models versus the reported DVAs against the sample period (2007 -
2017) for positive DVA reporters. The bank-quarter observations for non-zero DVAs reporters are 171. The Merton model-estimated DVAs
are marked with a trangle and the reported DVAs are denoted with an sterisk in the left graph. The Leland model-estimated DVAs are





































Figure 3.4: The market information-estimated DVAs versus the reported DVAs for negative DVA reporters
This figure shows the market-implied DVAs by the Merton and Leland models versus the reported DVAs against the sample period (2007 -
2017) for negative DVA reporters. The bank-quarter observations for non-zero DVA reporters are 176. The Merton model-estimated DVAs
are marked with a trangle and the reported DVAs are denoted with an sterisk in the left graph. The Leland model-estimated DVAs are





































Figure 3.5: The market information-estimated DVAs versus the reported DVAs for zero DVA reporters
This figure shows the market-implied DVAs by the Merton and Leland models versus the reported DVAs against the sample period (2007 -
2017) for the zero DVA reporters. The bank-quarter observations for non-zero DVA reporters are 540. The Merton model-estimated DVAs
are marked with a trangle and the reported DVAs are denoted with an sterisk in the left graph. The Leland model-estimated DVAs are




































Table 3.13: Descriptive statistics of Error and Absolute Error for the Merton and Leland models
Total observations Zero DVA reporters Non-zero DVA reporters Positive DVA reporters Negative DVA reporters
Error Absolute Error Absolute Error Absolute Error Absolute Error Absolute
(’000) error (’000) (’000) error (’000) (’000) error (’000) (’000) error (’000) (’000) error (’000)
mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean
(std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.)
Merton 9,023 113,716 -79 336 23,187 290,157 -244,064 251,066 282,845 328,137
(401,692) (385,347) (1,547) ( 1,512) (642,535) (573,547) (480,856) (477,216) (673,833) (652,855)
Leland 57,051 325,958 -921 13,530 147,268 812,158 -429,763 791,827 707,906 831,912
(925,919) (868,456) (46,835) (44,844) (1,475,984) (1,240,472) (1,505,067) (1,349,196) (1,210,492) (1,128,385)
This table reports the means and standard deviations of the estimation errors from the Merton and Leland models. It presents the results of model effectiveness
for total observations and other four subsamples (i.e. zero DVA reporters, non-zero DVA reporters, positive DVA reporters and negative DVA reporters). The
difference (Error) and the absolute difference (Absolute error) between market-implied DVAs from the Merton and Leland models and the reported DVAs





































Table 3.14: Descriptive statistics of Error and Absolute Error for the Merton and Leland models by year
Total observations Zero DVA reporters Non-zero DVA reporters Positive DVA reporters Negative DVA reporters
Error Absolute Error Absolute Error Absolute Error Absolute Error Absolute
(’000) error (’000) (’000) error (’000) (’000) error
(’000)
(’000) error (’000) (’000) error
(’000)
mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean
Panel A: The Merton model
2007 -50,806 51,379 3 7 -158,401 160,166 -169,238 169,238 15,000 15,000
2008 -71,297 144,209 416 481 -193,208 388,546 -552,212 555,891 203,586 203,586
2009 77,012 266,642 -920 979 213,918 733,346 -413,400 465,163 553,716 878,611
2010 9,837 85,145 -40 153 27,988 241,348 -217,763 217,763 260,804 263,691
2011 -81,712 131,303 570 631 -195,993 312,792 -425,456 446,747 125,255 125,255
2012 139,419 195,592 -765 771 339,075 473,065 -215,131 215,131 580,034 585,211
2013 33,879 59,814 -11 15 82,595 145,774 -126,358 126,358 152,246 152,246
2014 -18,440 34,379 -4 5 -42,637 79,495 -102,849 102,849 45,364 45,364
2015 -13,040 61,703 -0.28 7 -29,339 138,823 -112,107 112,107 218,968 218,968
2016 27,731 66,553 6 126 69,318 166,195 -96,877 96,877 235,512 235,512
2017 52,567 53,907 -12 14 134,864 138,261 -5,580 5,580 196,308 196,308
Panel B: The Leland model
2007 -376,812 448,998 -4,696 5,485 -1,164,824 1,388,203 -1,246,018 1,466,573 134,278 134,278
2008 -308,443 613,137 -1,739 4,751 -829,839 1,647,393 -1,736,888 2,474,898 172,689 732,782
2009 401,863 451,714 2,269 2,803 1,103,853 1,240,341 -141,930 246,536 1,778,652 1,778,652
2010 43,073 264,039 -6,067 30,486 133,383 693,271 -327,499 699,506 570,009 687,364
2011 -79,047 338,282 -16,065 25,926 -166,521 772,111 -544,520 855,756 362,676 655,007
2012 215,782 288,896 746 14,056 522,045 680,336 -218,199 304,158 843,891 843,891
2013 224,654 226,768 18,652 18,652 520,782 525,935 382,626 403,238 566,834 566,834
2014 103,005 125,052 -5,496 8,610 245,412 277,881 221,223 265,113 280,764 296,543
2015 95,404 191,733 3,144 17,880 210,729 409,050 28,289 284,600 758,049 782,400
2016 97,541 308,905 864 13,238 242,557 752,407 -242,884 516,063 727,998 988,751
2017 153,694 181,974 946 2,295 392,778 463,211 -37,769 119,637 581,142 613,525
This table reports the average estimation errors from the Merton and Leland models by year. It presents the results of model effectiveness for total
observations and other four subsamples (i.e. zero DVA reporters, non-zero DVA reporters, positive DVA reporters and negative DVA reporters).
The difference (Error) and the absolute difference (Absolute error) between market-implied DVAs from the Merton and Leland models and the
reported DVAs are applied as the measures of model effectiveness. The error is calculated as the estimated market-implied DVAs minus the actual
DVAs. The absolute error is calculated as the absolute value of the Error. The results from the Merton and Leland models are reported in panel




































Table 3.15: Mean zero and mean equality tests of Error and Absolute Error for the Merton and Leland models
All observations Zero DVA reporters Non-zero DVA reporters Positive DVA reporters Negative DVA reporters











P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value
Panel A: Test mean zero of the Merton and Leland models estimation errors
Merton 0.5037 0.0000*** 0.2386 0.0000*** 0.5019 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
Leland 0.0668 0.0000*** 0.6479 0.0000*** 0.0639 0.0000*** 0.0003*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
Panel B: Test equality of means of the Merton and Leland models estimation errors
Equality 0.0694 0.0000*** 0.6773 0.0000*** 0.0661 0.0000*** 0.0594 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
This table reports the P-values for a two-tailed test, which test the mean zero of the estimation errors from the Merton and Leland models in panel
A and equality of the Merton and Leland model mean estimation errors in panel B. The hypothesis for the mean estimation errors is H0: µ = 0 and
H1 : µ 6= 0. The hypothesis for the equality of the mean estimation errors from the Merton and Leland models is H0 : µMerton − µLeland = 0 and H1 :
µMerton − µLeland 6= 0. All tests hold for a 5% significance level.
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Table 3.16: Mean equality tests of Error and Absolute Error
for the Merton and Leland models by type of DVAs and firm size
The Merton model The Leland model





P-value P-value P-value P-value
Panel A: For the positive and negative DVA reporters
Equality 0.0000*** 0.2112 0.0000*** 0.7639
Panel B: For the zero DVAs and non-zero DVA reporters
Equality 0.0402** 0.0000*** 0.0199** 0.0000***
Panel C: For the large and small banks
Equality 0.0403** 0.0000*** 0.0500** 0.0000***
This table reports the P-values for a two-tailed test, which test the
equality of the Merton and Leland model mean estimation errors
according to the types of reported DVAs and the size of the sample
banks. Panel A compares the estimation errors between the positive
and negative DVA reporters from the Merton and Leland models
respectively. The hypothesis is H0 : µ
Positive − µNegative = 0 and
H1 : µ
Positive − µNegative 6= 0. Panel B reports the P-values to test
the equality of the estimation errors between the zero DVAs and non-
zero DVA reporters. The hypothesis is H0 : µ
Zero − µNon−zero = 0
and H1 : µ
Zero − µNon−zero 6= 0. Applying the threshold ($50 bil-
lion) of large banks used in Table ??, we provide the information on
the equality of the mean estimation errors between the large banks
and the small banks. The hypothesis is H0 : µ
Large−µSmall = 0 and
H1 : µ
Large − µSmall 6= 0. The values in bolt refer to cases where



















































Abs Diff. 0.0291 -0.1591
0.3870 0.0000
Size 0.3599 0.0985 -0.1666
0.0000 0.0033 0.0000
Market to Book -0.1868 -0.7693 0.1844 -0.1790
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Asset volatility 0.0189 -0.4273 0.2504 -0.2681 0.3503
0.5731 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Maturity -0.1798 -0.2790 0.1642 -0.4501 0.1454 0.3318
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Coupon 0.0573 0.1751 0.0979 -0.0565 -0.1246 0.0612 -0.1389
0.0882 0.0000 0.0035 0.0929 0.0002 0.0684 0.0000
PV FVOL 0.4701 0.2119 -0.1044 0.6219 -0.1582 -0.1811 -0.3234 0.0561
0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0948
Tangible assets -0.0389 0.0117 0.2219 -0.2650 -0.1453 0.1291 0.2347 -0.1171 -0.1984
0.2466 0.7268 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000
10r -0.0110 0.0629 0.0890 -0.2157 0.0951 0.1636 0.0491 0.3031 0.0137 0.1543
0.7437 0.0610 0.0080 0.0000 0.0046 0.0000 0.1439 0.0000 0.6846 0.0000
Slope 0.0461 0.2938 -0.0350 -0.0190 -0.2636 -0.0031 -0.0112 0.0811 -0.0385 0.0605 0.1896
0.1701 0.0000 0.2972 0.5710 0.0000 0.9269 0.7398 0.0157 0.2519 0.0718 0.0000



















































Abs Diff. -0.0677 -0.1591
0.0439 0.0000
Size 0.4562 0.0985 -0.1666
0.0000 0.0033 0.0000
Market to Book -0.1375 -0.7693 0.1844 -0.1790
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Asset volatility -0.0603 -0.4273 0.2504 -0.2681 0.3503
0.0725 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Maturity -0.2232 -0.2790 0.1642 -0.4501 0.1454 0.3318
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Coupon 0.0645 0.1751 0.0979 -0.0565 -0.1246 0.0612 -0.1389
0.0547 0.0000 0.0035 0.0929 0.0002 0.0684 0.0000
PV FVOL 0.6818 0.2119 -0.1044 0.6219 -0.1582 -0.1811 -0.3234 0.0561
0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0948
Tangible assets -0.0842 0.0117 0.2219 -0.2650 -0.1453 0.1291 0.2347 -0.1171 -0.1984
0.0121 0.7268 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000
10r 0.1039 0.0629 0.0890 -0.2157 0.0951 0.1636 0.0491 0.3031 0.0137 0.1543
0.0019 0.0610 0.0080 0.0000 0.0046 0.0000 0.1439 0.0000 0.6846 0.0000
Slope 0.0222 0.2938 -0.0350 -0.0190 -0.2636 -0.0031 -0.0112 0.0811 -0.0385 0.0605 0.1896
0.5098 0.0000 0.2972 0.5710 0.0000 0.9269 0.7398 0.0157 0.2519 0.0718 0.0000
This table reports the Pearson correlation between explanatory variables for the Leland model.
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Table 3.19: Regressions of logarithm of Absolute Error on firm, bond and macroeconomic characteristics
Logarithm of Absolute error
Total observations Zero DVAs reporters Non-zero DVAs reporters
Merton Leland Merton Leland Merton Leland
Intercept -71.5447*** -4.1615 23.7654 6.6889 -14.8103 -3.4985
t (-4.35) (-0.71) (0.61) (0.63) (-1.14) (-0.29)
Market leverage 23.6888** 4.8652* -2.7101 1.8000 21.2415*** 5.5794***
(2.49) (1.66) (-0.14) (0.35) (4.73) (3.28)
Size 1.9532** 0.3285 0.4689** 0.7301 0.4470 0.4527
(2.41) (1.26) (2.48) (0.22) (0.62) (0.71)
Market/Book 4.6947 0.5274 -27.5548 -1.0908 5.3498 -1.5982
(0.51) (0.19) (-1.60) (-0.24) (0.91) (-0.35)
Asset volatility 109.0310*** 9.4290*** 158.9584*** 10.8134*** 17.7037*** 8.0548*
(10.50) (4.01) (8.86) (3.94) (3.59) (1.82)
Years to maturity -0.0621** -0.0167** -0.1245 -0.0085 -0.1970* -0.3119***
(-2.49) (-2.58) (-0.90) (-0.29) (-1.92) (-2.82)
Coupon 20.9901 -3.2174 16.6173 -6.7137 17.4585* 6.6778
(1.31) (-0.72) (0.85) (-1.23) (1.78) (0.73)
PV FVOL 0.9186*** 1.0008*** 1.3985*** 1.0299*** 0.4548*** 1.1122***
(4.14) (15.54) (3.91) (11.81) (3.52) (8.29)
PPE/assets -2.6535** -7.0441 -237.6725*** -4.6232 -27.3416*** -8.3491
(-2.22) (-1.10) (-2.75) (-0.19) (-3.69) (-1.12)
10-year CMT -1.4179*** 0.0922 -2.1204*** -0.0496 -0.2213* 0.2493
(-5.75) (1.30) (-6.39) (-0.50) (-1.74) (0.42)
Slope of CMT 0.5368** 0.0063 0.2634 -0.0334 0.2070 0.0191
(2.16) (0.10) (0.76) (-0.36) (1.53) (0.19)
Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 883 887 536 540 347 347
Adj. R-square 77.64% 88.00% 57.85% 73.53% 73.81% 82.20%
This table reports regression coefficients and their t-statistics (in parentheses) of the logarithm value of model
absolute estimation errors by applying the Merton and Leland models, respectively. The first two columns dis-
play the results in total observations. We divide our full sample into zero DVA reporters and non-zero DVA
reporter. Their regression results are shown in the column (3), (4), (5) and (6). Market leverage is the book
value of total liabilities over the market value of total assets. Market to book ratio is defined as the market
value of total assets over the book value of total assets. PV FVOL is defined as the balanced principal value
of liabilities under FVOL. PPE/assets is the proxy for the recovery rate when firms go bankruptcy, which is
defined as the plant, property, and equipment over assets. The slope is the difference between the 10-y CMT
minus the 2-year CMT. The coefficient estimates and t-statistics are based on robust standard errors. *, **,
and *** of the t-statistics indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-tailed) respectively.
Chapter 4
Conclusions
To date, fair value accounting (FVA) has become a crucial measurement principle in both IFRS
and U.S. GAAP. In order to promote FVA as the future basis for measurement, IASB and FASB
issued IAS 39 and SFAS No. 159 respectively, which allow firms to adopt the fair value option
(FVO) to measure eligible assets and/or liabilities at fair value. Following the disclosure guid-
ance set forth in SFAS No. 157, firms need to recognize the changes in fair value of liabilities
under FVO due to the changes in firms’ own credit risk in accounting earnings, referred as Debt
Valuation Adjustments (DVAs).
Although the counterintuitive accounting results of recognizing DVAs attract remarkably at-
tention from both financial statements-users and standard setters, there is a limited theoretical
analysis and empirical evidence regarding DVAs. This thesis aims to contribute to the mixed
arguments over the recognition of DVAs in accounting earnings.
The first study (Chapter 2) examines whether the information (including the private informa-
tion) in the reported DVAs correctly reflect (or are at least positively correlated to) changes in
the credit quality of the entity. Indeed, prior studies focus on the value and information asymme-
try implications of DVAs and associated disclosures without answering this question. However,
we believe the investigation on the reliability of reporting DVAs in accounting earnings really
matters to investors given the findings in the prior studies that reported DVAs are value and
risk-relevant to investors (Chung et al. 2012). Moreover, both FASB and IASB have invested
considerable time and resources in introducing and amending the FVOL accounting standard,
providing evidence as to whether this process leads to more informative financial statements or
not is important.
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The mandatory disclosure of fair value estimates in accordance with a three-level hierarchy based
on the nature of the inputs used in the estimation provides a perfect research specification to
examine the reliability of DVAs. We find that changes in bond and credit spreads are statistically
significant in explaining DVA-estimated changes in credit spread for banks that report liabilities
at fair value Level 1 and 2. These results provide evidence that market inputs are used in the
DVAs estimation process for Level 1 and 2 reporters. When we investigate whether reported
DVAs convey private information about the credit quality of the entity, we find that lagged
DVA-estimated changes in credit spreads are significant in explaining changes in bond and CDS
spreads for Level 3 reporters. These results indicate that managers have superior information
in estimating their own credit risk and credibly communicate this information through financial
reports to the market.
Our results support the view that managers have an information advantage in estimating DVAs,
and that the fair value measurements based on managerial inputs better reflect the credit risk
of liabilities in our sample. We believe that our results improve our understanding of manage-
rial decision-making with respect to fair value accounting, contributing to the literature that
examines the equity and risk relevance of fair value Levels. Our findings indicate that managers
use their discretion in computing Level 3 fair values to provide information to the market that
is useful to predict future risk. We also contribute to the debate about the role of fair value
accounting in generating decision-useful financial information (Fontes et al. 2018; Blankespoor
et al. 2013; Koonce et al. 2011).
The second study (Chapter 3) is motivated by the empirical evidence on the informativeness
of reported DVAs in net income. Following the guidance set forth in the SFAS No. 157, the
disclosure on DVAs is voluntary and usually reported in the footnotes. This opaque disclosure
gives management an opportunity to exercise discretion over DVAs. Furthermore, the survey on
the data sources and methodologies used in DVAs estimation procedure suggests management
employ observable and/or unobservable market data in a range of valuation techniques. There-
fore, the reported DVAs attracts the investors’ concerns about the extent to which the privacy
information exploited by management in the estimation of DVAs.
This study compares the reported DVAs provided by management with the estimated DVAs
based on market information, denoted as market information-estimated DVAs. If the market
information-estimated DVAs differ from the reported DVAs significantly, we could state the
internal credit risk assessment reflects private information not covered by the external credit
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risk assessment efficiently, as the guidance of DVAs calculation permits management to use the
private information if the market for the underlying liabilities is illiquid. Alternatively, if the
market information-estimated DVAs are close to the reported DVAs, we could state the ex-
ternal credit risk assessment captures the information on credit risk through financial reports
in a timely manner. We find that the structural credit risk models do a poor job of pricing
DVAs, especially when the banks’ own creditworthiness is volatile. Our results support the view
that the reported DVAs contain private information and the ignorance of private information in
structural credit risk models limit their ability in the replication of reported DVAs. Further, the
private information in the reported DVAs surges when the economy is volatile rather than stable.
This paper contributes the debate over the recognition of DVAs in accounting earnings in terms
of its informativeness to investors. Our investigation allows us to discuss the extent to which
market information-implied credit risk capture the information contained in the banks’ internal
risk measure. That is, whether estimates from structural credit risk models are informative to
the regulators and investors who mainly rely on the public information to understand the un-
derlying economic performance of an entity. Our results suggest that the reported DVAs reflect
more internal information of credit risk if an entity suffers from poor economic condition.
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